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A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
THIS EVALUATORY REPORT WAS A RESEARCH PROJECT SPONSORED BY
FIDEICOMISO LAZARO CARDENAS (FIDELAC), AND BY THE KEVIN LYNCH
THESIS-GRANT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ARCHITECTURE AT M.I.T.
THE THESIS PRESENTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WORLD BANK
PROJECT TERMINATION REPORT IN ITS SHELTER COMPONENTS; THE
DIFFERENCES BEING THE LARGER SCOPE AND HOW THE TOPICS ARE
STRUCTURED. ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THIS DIFFERENT APPROACH IS
THAT A LARGE AMOUNT OF DATA WAS INITIALLY COLLECTED FROM
INDIRECT SOURCES . THIS CAUSED UNEXPECTED DIFFICULTIES AT THE
ONSET OF THE PROJECT, AND NECCESITATED DEVISING A NEW
STRUCTURING OF TOPICS THAT INCLUDED THE PREVIOUS AND LATER
STAGES TO EACH ONE OF THE THREE SHELTER PROJECTS.
IN DOING THIS RESEARCH I RAN INTO TWO OBSTACLES. FIRSTLY,
WAS THE SURPRISINGLY HIGH TURN OVER RATE OF FIDELAC'S PERSONNEL
WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE SHELTER PROJECTS; AND SECONDLY, THE
LACK OF NECESSARY SUPPORT AT THE REQUIRED TIME FROM THE TWO
INSTITUTIONS THAT HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT. FROM
FIDELAC I NEEDED INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND APPROVAL TO CARRYING
OUT SURVEYS DIRECTLY IN THE FIELD IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY; FROM THE
WORLD BANK I COULD NOT HAVE ACCESS TO SOME REQUIRED
INFORMATION. SEEMED TO ME THAT BOTH HAD, FOR SOME REASON, LOST
INTEREST IN THE PROJECT.
HOWEVER, I WAS FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SPEND
ONE SEMESTER MORE THAN PLANNED DOING RESEARCH. THIS ENABLED ME,
LITTLE BY LITTLE, TO FIND SOURCES OF INFORMATION THAT CORRECTED
MY ORIGINAL INADEQUATE PERCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM DATA.
IN THIS RESPECT, CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS WERE VERY VALUABLE,
SUCH AS CLEMENTINA, A VERY ENTHUSIASTIC TEAM FIELD WORKER
STILL LABORING IN FIDELAC, AND TEODORO, A WATCHMAN OF FIDELAC
IN GUACAMAYAS AT THE TIME OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. HAD IT
NOT BEEN FOR THEIR HELPFUL DISPOSITIONS AND THEIR WILLINGNESS
TO RECALL THEIR EXPERIENCES REGARDING THE PROJECT, I WOULD NOT
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL INSIGHTS CONCERNING THE
ACTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATORS IN THE FIELD. ALSO
HELPFUL WERE MY FIRST MEETINGS WITH ARQ. MARGARITA GARCIA, HEAD
OF THE URBAN PLANNING AND HOUSING OFFICE -AT THE TIME OF
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION WORKING WITHIN THE PROJECT MONITORING
UNIT (U.P.E.)-; UNFORTUNATELY I COULD NOT HAVE MORE INTERVIEWS
WITH HER ON ISSUES RELATED TO THE WORLD BANK PROGRAM.
VERY RECENTLY, I WAS FORTUNATELLY ENOUGH TO HAVE CONTACTED
BY PHONE ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO, HEAD OF THE FIELD TEAM
DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, AND THANKFULLY, TO BE ABLE TO
INTERVIEW DR. DANIEL HIERNOUX. HE WAS THE PERSON WHO ACTUALLY
CARRIED OUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WORLD BANK, AND THE
PLANNER RESPONSIBLE FOR FIDELAC'S CRITERIA FOR PROJECT
DESIGNING. BOTH THESE ENCOUNTERS WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN FILLING
MANY OF THE GAPS IN MY DATA, AND IN PROVIDING ME WITH A MORE
INTEGRATED PICTURE OF THE PROGRAM ITSELF.
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ANOTHER LATE CONTRIBUTION CANE FROM THE RECENT BOOK "LAS
TRUCHAS", EDITED IN 1984 BY DR. IVAN RESTREPO. IT GAVE ME THE
REQUIRED OVERALL VISION OF THE GROWTH POLE THEORY UNDERLYING
THIS NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT. ARTICLES BY MARGARITA NOLASCO,
MARIA PILAR GARCIA (WHOSE STUDIES SUPPLEMENTED MY PREVIOUS
STUDIES FROM THE CIUDAD GUAYANA EXPERIENCE), ELSA LAURELLI, AND
PERHAPS MOST SIGNIFICANTLY, BY DANIEL HIERNOUX, WERE
FUNDAMENTAL TO THIS THESIS. THEY INFORMED ME OF ISSUES OF
URBAN PLANNING AND THE PROVISION OF HOUSING WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF A NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT.
LASTLY, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS SOME THOUGHTS, IN
RETROSPECT. FIRST, I THINK I SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED REINHART
GOETHERT'S ADVISE, AND CONCENTRATED EXCLUSIVELY ON FIELD
RESEARCH INTERVIEWING SOME FAMILIES, AND THEN DRAWING A THESIS
BASED UPON THESE CASE STUDIES. LACK OF INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
AT THE OUTSET STOPPED ME FROM GOING IN THIS DIRECTION. ALSO AT
THAT POINT IT WAS HARD TO PREDICT THAT OTHER METHODS OF DATA
COLLECTING WOULD BECOME SO DIFFICULT.
I ALSO WANT TO EXPRESS MY ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS TO THREE OTHER
PROFESSORS: RANKO BON, FOR HIS CONSTANT ATTITUDE AS A TEACHER
IS ADVISOR; BISH SANYAL FOR HIS FRIENDSHIP; AND NABEEL HAMDI,
MY THESIS ADVISOR FOR HIS EASY GOING PEDAGOGY, WHICH IN MY
CASE WAS EXTREMELY APPRECIATED. VERY USEFUL WAS THE EDITING OF
MYRIAM CALDWELL AND THE HELP AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF MY FRIEND
BEVERLEE SERONICKS. LASTLY, I AM VERY GRATEFULL TO MS. LISA
KATZE FOR HER INVALUABLE HELP IN PRINTING THIS THESIS.
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I N T R O D U C T IO N
GIVEN THE NATURE OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, A
MAJOR PROBLEM FOR THE CREATION OF A NEW TOWN IS THE DIFFICULTY
INVOLVED IN PROVIDING LOW-INCOME HOUSING. FOR THAT REASON THE
OUTCOME HAS CUSTOMARILY BEEN THE SPONTANEOUS DEVELOPMENT OF
LARGE PROBLEM-RIDDEN SETTLEMENTS OF THE POOR FULL OF SHELTER
PROBLEMS, RESULTS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF A TOTAL ABANDONMENT OF
THE PROBLEM BY THE REGIONAL AUTHORITIES. THE CASE OF LAZARO
CARDENAS-LAS TRUCHAS HAS FOLLOWED THIS PATTERN; ONLY A FEW
PLANNED LOW-INCOME PROJECTS WERE CARRIED OUT.
THE PROVISION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE LAZARO
CARDENAS-LAS TRUCHAS REGION MAY BE BROKEN DOWN INTO FIVE
STAGES: 1.WORKERS CAMPS (1964-1971), 2.EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS
(1971-1976), 3.PILOT PROJECTS (1977), 4.THE WORLD BANK SHELTER
PROGRAM (1978-1983), AND 5.THE POST-PROJECT HOUSING SUPPLY
(1983-1984).
THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROGRAM REPRESENTS BY FAR THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO PROVIDE LOW-INCOME HOUSING IN THE REGION.
THE OTHER THREE STAGES ARE BY CONTRAST OF MARGINAL IMPORTANCE.
FOR THIS REASON, IN THIS DOCUMENT THEY WILL BE CONSIDERED ONLY
AS THEY RELATE TO THE LARGER SHELTER PROJECT.
THE AIM OF THIS THESIS THEN IS TO MAKE SENSE OF THAT BANK
PROGRAM, SO THAT THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EXPERIENCE WILL
BE USEFUL ELSEWHERE TO ANALYSTS OF SHELTER PROVISION PROJECTS
AND POLICY MAKERS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
THE THESIS IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAJOR SECTIONS: PROJECT
ANTECEDENTS, PREPARATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND FINALLY, THE
EVALUATION OF THE RESULTING SHELTER PROJECTS.
THE PROJECT ANTECEDENTS SECTION DESCRIBES THE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE REGION; THE GROWTH OF
GUACAMAYAS, THE TOWN WHICH RECEIVED THE THRUST OF THE SHELTER
PROJECTS, AND A PART OF THE PROVISION OF HOUSING DURING THE
FIRST "EXPERIMENTAL" STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW TOWN.
THE PROJECT PREPARATION SECTION DISCUSSES THE SOCIO-
POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE REGION THAT MOTIVATED THE PROJECT.
IT PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT'S FIRST VERSION, AND
THEN INDICATES CHANGES AND PROVIDES A MORE DETAILED DESCRIPTION
OF THE PROJECTS'S FINAL VERSION.
THE SECTION ENTITLED "IMPLEMENTATION STAGE" IS DIVIDED
INTO TWO CHAPTERS: THE FIRST DESCRIBES THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY;
HOW IT WAS CHOSEN AND THEN STRENGHTENED, AND HOW ITS
ORGANIZATION WAS SET UP FOR IMPLEMENTATION. IT CONCENTRATES ON
HOW IT GAINED ACCESS TO THE VERY CLOSED COMMUNITY AND WHAT
DIFFICULTLIES IT FOUND IN ITS SOCIAL AND TECHNICAL DEALINGS
WITH IT. THE CHAPTER ENDS PRESENTING SOME ISSUES RELATED TO
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE IMPLEMENTING PHASE.
THE SECOND CHAPTER DEALS WITH THE VARIOUS PROJECTS
THEMSELVES. IT BEGINS BY DESCRIBING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN
GUACAMAYAS AT A TIME WHEN THE PROJECT NEGOTIATIONS WERE WELL
UNDER WAY AND THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY WAS ALREADY PREPARING
ITSELF FOR THE IMPLEMENTION PHASE. AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO RELATE
THESE PREPARATIONS TO THE PILOT PROJECTS OF STAGE TWO THAT WERE
BEING IMPLEMENTED AT THE SAME TIME. THIS IS DONE ON THE BASIS
OF A LIST OF CONCLUSIONS I DRAW FROM THOSE PILOT EXPERIMENTS.
WHAT FOLLOWS NEXT IS A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EACH OF THE
THREE WORLD BANK PROJECTS. THE CHAPTER ENDS WITH A SET OF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PHYSICAL DESIGN.
THE LAST SECTION, CONCERNING PROJECT EVALUATION, IS ALSO
DIVIDED INTO TWO CHAPTERS: THE FIRST CHAPTER ANALYSES THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF
EACH PROJECT. THE PERFORMANCES ANALYZED DEAL WITH ISSUES
WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE SHELTER PROJECTS. THE CHAPTER ENDS
SHOWING THE NEW ROLE OF THE AGENCY WITH RESPECT TO LOW-INCOME
HOUSING PROVISION. FINALLY, THE SECOND CHAPTER PRESENTS THE
IMPACTS OF THE SHELTER PROJECTS ACCORDING TO A WORLD BANK
PUBLICATION CRITERIA.
P R O J E C T C O N T E X T
THE WORLD BANK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT WAS UNDERTAKEN
SINCE 1976, BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS DERIVED FROM THE RAPID GROWTH
OF A LARGE SETTLEMENT WITHOUT BASIC SERVICES - GUACAMAYAS -
WHICH HAD DEVELOPED NEXT TO THE NEW INDUSTRIAL TOWN BEING
DEVELOPED ON THE SOUTH COAST OF MEXICO.
THE WORLD BANK - HAVING FINANCED OTHER DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS IN THE SAME REGION - SUGGESTED AN INTEGRATED URBAN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT TO THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF MICHOACAN. THIS
INITIAL PROJECT PROPOSAL CONTAINED NINE COMPONENTS, FOUR OF
WHICH WERE SHELTER RELATED. THE PROJECT WAS CONCEIVED AS A
PARALLEL ACTION TO SUPPORT THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT PHASE OF THE
PROGRAM CENTERPIECE, SICARTSA, THE STEEL MILL PLANT, WHICH HAD
BEEN INITIATED 6 YEARS BEFORE.
THE NEED FOR ADJUSTMENT OF THE URBAN PROJECT PROPOSAL
EMERGED FROM AN UNEXPECTED POSTPONEMENT OF SICARTSA'S PLANS.
THE ADJUSTED VERSION REPRESENTED A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS, FROM AN
INTEGRATED URBAN PROJECT TO A PROJECT MORE FOCUSED ON ITS
SHELTER COMPONENTS.
AT THE TIME OF PROJECT PREPARATION, THE LAZARO CARDENAS-
LAS TRUCHAS MICROREGION WAS FULL OF URBAN PROBLEMS. THE MOST
IMPORTANT ONES WERE: THE LACK OF BASIC URBAN SERVICES, THE
RISKS THAT THE BALSAS RIVER WOULD FLOOD URBAN AREAS, THE NEED
FOR REGIONAL AND URBAN PLANNING, THE URGENCY FOR REMOVING
SQUATTER FAMILIES SETTLED ON RESTRICTED AREAS, AND IN THE LIGHT
OF THE REGION'S EXPENSIVE INFRASTRUCTURE, FINDING A WAY TO
SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION.
SOME OF THE MANY PROBLEMS THAT DEVELOPED DURING PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION WERE: POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE PROJECT,
PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION WITHIN A COMPLICATED POLITICAL AND
TECHNICAL SITUATION, A MINISTERIAL BLOCKADE IN THE LAND
EXPROPRIATION PROCESS, A RAPID SOARING OF BUILDING MATERIAL
PRICES, THE SLOW PROGRESS OF THE UPGRADING PROJECT, AND THE
EXISTENCE OF A DEFECTIVE COST-RECOVERY MECHANISM.
SINCE PROJECT TERMINATION THERE HAVE BEEN TWO CHIEF
PROBLEMS. FIRST, THE INTERVENTION IN HOUSING PROVISION OF OTHER
AGENCIES THAT HAD NO APPARENT CONCERN FOR LOW-INCOME GROUPS AT
A TIME WHERE THERE ARE VERY LIMITED AVAILABLE FINANCIAL
RESOURCES AT FIDELAC, THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT TRUST THAT
CONSTRUCTED THE NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENTAL WORK, AND WHICH
IMPLEMENTED THE WORLD BANK'S SHELTER COMPONENTS. A SECOND
PROBLEM WAS THE COMPLICATIONS IMPOSED ON THE COST RECOVERY
EFFORTS OF FIDELAC BY THE LOCAL LEADERS, WHO ENCOURAGED
DEFAULTING AS A MEANS TO PUT PRESSURE ON FIDELAC TO FINISH UP
THE PROGRAM.
THE PROSPECTIVE PROBLEMS FOR THE NEAR FUTURE SEEM LEGION.
THE PRESENT PROVISION OF HOUSING IN THE REGION IS LIMITED,
ESPECIALLY FOR LOWER-INCOME GROUPS.
HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF DEMAND, LOCAL AND STATE AUTHORITIES
HAVE DECIDED TO OFFER INEXPENSIVE UNSERVICED LAND IN OPEN
AGRICULTURAL AREAS OF THE REGION PRESENTLY LOCATED OUTSIDE THE
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FIDELAC'S URBAN AREAS. THIS PERMISSIVE POLICY PRESENTS TWO
PROBLEMS: FIRST, THERE IS NO PROVISION FOR THE FUTURE
INTRODUCTION OF BASIC SERVICES; AND SECOND, THE POLICY VIOLATES
THE LOCATIONAL GUIDELINES OF THE 1982 APROVED MASTER PLAN FOR
THE LAZARO CARDENAS FUTURE METROPOLITAN AREA.
AT THE PRESENT TIME, FIDELAC IS REDUCING ITS PERSONNEL IN
AN APPARENT MOVE TO BLOCKADE THE ALLOCATION OF ASSIGNED FUNDS.
THE RESULT IS A SLOW PROCESS OF DISARRAY. IN SPITE OF ITS
IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE POLITICAL STABILIZATION OF A NATIONALLY
STRATEGICAL REGION, THIS AGENCY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO INSIST
UPON ENFORCING EFFICIENT COST RECOVERY. MOREOVER, LARGE
BUDGETARY CUTS TO THIS FEDERAL AGENCY, COUPLED WITH THE INITIAL
DRASTIC AND NOW CONSTANT PESO DEVALUATION ARE MAKING THIS
ENDEAVIOR INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SQUATTER PHENOMENA IN THE REGION
SUGGESTS THAT IN THE NEAR FUTURE HIGHER INCOME GROUPS WILL BE
TAKING OVER THE UPGRADED AND LOW-INCOME HOUSING JUST RECENTLY
FINISHED. THE ONLY WAY TO STOP THIS TREND IS TO PROVIDE THE
REGION WITH MORE SUCH SHELTER PROGRAMS. IN THIS RESPECT, THIS
RESEARCH MAY CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORT PROJECT REPLICABILITY AS FAR
AS IT DRAWS AND PUTS TOGETHER DATA THAT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE
BEEN LEFT IDDLE. HOWEVER, TO PROPOSE SOLUTIONS NECESSARILY
INVOLVES POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS, CERTAINLY OUT OF
THE SCOPE OF THIS THESIS.
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C H A P T E R I
ANTECEDENTS TO THE SHELTER PROGRAM.
THIS SECTION CONTAINS THE FRAMEWORKS IN WHICH THE WORLD BANK
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT EVOLVED AS A RESPONSE. THE TWO FIRST
CHAPTERS DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE TWO INSTITUTIONS THAT WERE
INSTRUMENTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA. WHILE THE FIRST IS
DESCRIBED AS AN ANTECEDENT, THE SECOND IS DESCRIBED AS THE
PREVIOUS PERFORMANCE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY TO THE SHELTER
PROJECTS. THE FOLLOWING PART DEALS WITH THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENTS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF GUACAMAYAS, WHERE
MOST OF THE SHELTER PROJECT ACTIONS TOOK PLACE. THE FOURTH
CHAPTER PRESENTS THE ISSUES RELATED TO THE PROBLEMS OF LAND
TENURE IN MEXICO IN GENERAL, AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE REGION.
FINALLY, IN IS THE PRESENTATION OF THE PANORAMA OF HOUSING
PROVISION THAT TOOK PLACE IN THE FIRST PHASE OF CONSTRUCTING
THE NEW TOWN. THIS IS DIVIDED IN MIDDLE- AND LOW-INCOME
HOUSING. THE FORMER PART EMPHAZISES THE ISSUES OF SUBSIDIES AND
OVERSUPPLY OF HOUSING, WHILE THE LATER DESCRIBES BRIEFLY THE
SMALL EXPERIMENTAL PROJECTS DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME.
1.THE BALSAS RIVER COMMISSION (BRC)
THIS REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY WAS FUNDAMENTAL IN THE
CREATION OF THE REQUIRED INFRASTRUCTURE TO LAUNCH THE GROWTH
POLE PROGRAM IN 1970./1 BRC FOLLOWED THE TENNESSY VALLEY
1/.CREATED IN 1960 AFTER A SIMILAR BUT SMALLER AGENCY, IT WAS
INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPLEMENTING TWO LARGE DAMS: EL INFIERNILLO IN
1960 (ONE THE LARGEST OF THE COUNTRY FOR MANY YEARS), AND "LA
VILLITA" IN 1964. IT ALSO BUILT THE REGIONAL HIGHWAY SYSTEM.
1
AUTHORITY MODEL, HENCE ITS INTEREST WAS IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND REGIONAL PLANNING. HOWEVER IT PROVIDED THE REGION'S
SETTLEMENTS WITH PROVISION OF WATER /2 AND ALSO SET UP THE
INITIAL WORKERS CAMPS THAT AFTER BECAME GUACAMAYAS.
THE BRC IMPACT ON HOUSING WAS FELT THROUGH WATER
PROVISION, BUT IT WAS ALSO INSTRUMENTAL IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF
LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE RURAL COMMUNITIES IN A REGION THAT WAS
CONSIDERED AN ISOLATED REGION, UNTIL 1970.
BRC PREVIOUS STUDIES WERE USED IN PREPARING THE WORLD BANK
PROJECT. UNFORTUNATELY A LACK OF PRECISION RENDERED THE STUDIES
USELESS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE /3
THIS AGENCY WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE CREATION OF GUACAMAYAS
FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS: THE ACQUISITION OF THE LAND, AND THE
CREATION OF THE FIRST TWO WORKERS CAMPS, THE EXPEDITION OF
WRITTEN TEMPORARY PERMISSIONS TO SETTLE, AND THE PROMISES OF
ITS HEAD, EX-PRESIDENT DON LAZARO CARDENAS, TO PROVIDE LAND,
HOUSING, SERVICES, AND JOBS TO THOSE WHO SETTLED IN THE REGION.
BRC WAS DISMANTLED IN 1977 COINCIDING WITH A PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION REFORM, TRANSFERING THE OWNED LAND IN GUACAMAYAS
TO THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES (SEE III-1
THE NEW ROLE OF FIDELAC).
2/ THE HOUSING SITUATION IN THE 1960'S INDICATED SOME 4,000
INHABS. IN THE REGION, ONLY 4% WITH WATER PROVISION. THE
CENSUS OF 1970 SHOWS SOME 15,000 INHABS. 39% WITH WATER.
3/ IN 1977 THE WHOLE STUDIES OF SETTLEMENTS BUT SPECIALLY FOR
GUACAMAYAS, DONE BY A MEXICO CITY LOCATED PRIVATE FIRM, WHICH
WERE BASED UPON BRC PREVIOUS STUDIES, HAD TO BE TOTALLY REDONE
BY FIDELAC.
2
2. THE INITIAL ROLE OF FIDELAC
FIDEICOMISO LAZARO CARDENAS , FIDELAC , WAS THE AGENCY IN
CHARGE OF IMPLEMENTING 5 OF THE 9 COMPONENTS OF THE WORLD BANK
URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. THIS AGENCY, CREATED IN 1973, IS AN
URBAN DEVELOPMENT TRUST OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR. ITS FINANCIAL
RESOURCES HAVE BEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH TWO OF THE
NATIONAL BANKS /4.. BEING A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCY, IT
GENERATED A PART OF ITS OWN RESOURCES.
FOUNDED INITIALLY AS A HOUSING AND URBAN SERVICES
PROVIDER, FIDELAC HAD TO BE SUBJECTED TO THE SICARTSA HIGH RANK
PERSONNEL HOUSING DEMANDS. ACCORDINGLY FIDELAC, IN THE FIRST
PHASE OF THE CREATION OF THE NEW TOWN CONSIDERED ONLY THE
PROVISION OF MIDDLE AND MIDDLE-HIGH INOME HOUSING. WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF PROVIDING THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPONENT FOR A
SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT IN ANIBAL PONCE -- A NEIGHBORHOOD OF
GUACAMAYAS -- NO OTHER ACTION WAS TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE ENORMOUS
PROBLEMS OF HOUSING AND LACK OF BASIC SERVICES IN THE REGION,
ESPECIALLY IN GUACAMAYAS.
HOWEVER, FIDELAC ENACTED SOME URBAN DEVELOPMENT
GUIDELINES, THAT COULD BE SEEN AS POLICIES ADDRESSING THE LOW-
INCOME POPULATION WITHIN THE URBANIZED AREAS OF THE NEW TOWN.
THESE WERE:
4/ NATIONAL FINANCIERA (NAFINSA) AND NATIONAL BANK FOR PUBLIC
WORKS AND SERVICES (BANOBRAS)
3
A) THE "DERECHO AL TANTO" OR THE RIGHT OF FIDELAC TO BUY
BEFORE ANY OTHER BUYER ALL PROPERTY ON SALE WITHIN THE NEW
TOWN. THIS WAS AN ATTEMPT TO CONTROL EXPLICIT LAND SPECULATION
PRACTICES, AND TO REDUCE UNREASONABLE INCREASES IN THE HOUSING
MARKET.
B) THE DESIGN OF LAND USE TO ENABLE CROSS SUBSIDY SCHEMES
IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS.
C) THE LEAVING OF VACANT LAND TO BUILD FUTURE COMMUNAL
FACILITIES TO PROMOTE DIVERSE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATA
INTERACTION.
THESE POLICIES, AS HAS BEEN THE EXPERIENCE IN OTHER
PLANNED NEW TOWNS IN THE THIRD WORLD /5 , HAD VERY LIMITED
RESULTS.
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUACAMAYAS
GUACAMAYAS EXPANSION STARTED F IOM THE TWO WORKERS CAMPS
CREATED BY CRB IN 1964. THIS SETTLEMENT WAS INTENDED TO HOUSE
BOTH THE PAISAN FAMILIES LIVING THEN IN THE SORROUNDING HILLS,
AND THE FAMILIES OF THE WORKERS ENGAGED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE NEAR-BY "LA VILLITA " DAM.
EX-PRESIDENT DON LAZARO CARDENAS PROMISED PBOTH WORKERS AND
NON-WORKERS THAT THE BRC WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH LAND,
SERVICES, HOUSING, AND JOBS IF THEY ONLY REMAINED IN THE
REGION.
5/ SEE THE CASES OF BRASILIA (EPSTEIN, 1973), CHANDIGARH (SARIN
1982), AND CIUDAD GUAYANA (RODWIN & ASSOC. 1969, AND DAYKIN,
1978)
4
SOME PAISANS FAMILIES ALREADY SETTLED IN THE SORROUNDING
HILLS WERE CONVINCED AND HELPED TO MOVE TO THE WORKERS CAMPS.
FOUR YEARS LATER (1968) BY THE TIME THE DAM WAS FINISHED, THIS
SETTLEMENT HAD GROWN CONSIDERABLY PAST ITS ORIGINAL BOUNDARIES.
THE BRC HAD BEEN GIVING OUT WRITTEN PERMISSION FOR TEMPORARY
SETTLEMENTS WITHOUOT ANY DISCRIMINATION. THE INITIAL SERVICE
PROVISION OF THE WORKERS CAMPS SPURRED THE GROWTH OF GUACAMAYAS
AT A VERY RAPID PACE /6.
IN LATE 1968, WHEN THE DAM WORKS WERE OVER, THE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE WENT AS HIGH AS 40% IN GUACAMAYAS. THE
EMIGRATION WAS OF A SIMILAR PROPORTION /7.
IN EARLY 1971 THE LARGE DEMAND FOR WORK TO BUILD THE STEEL
MILL PLANT AND ITS INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS BROUGHT BACK MANY NEW
MIGRANTS AND INITIATED A LARGE FLUX OF MIGRANTS. THE POOR
ARRIVED TO EITHER THE SMALL TOWNS OF THE MICROREGION, OR ELSE
TO GUACAMAYAS. AT THE PEAK YEAR OF THE CONSTRUCTION WORKS
(1976), THE POPULATION OF GUACAMAYAS WENT UP TO SOME 25,000
INHABS.
AT THIS TIME THE WORLD BANK PROJECT WAS BEING PREPARED
AND A SERIES OF POLITICAL EVENTS WERE TAKING PLACE IN THE
REGION (SEE II-1 SOCIO-POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS).
6/ THE REPORTED GROWTH IN THE REGION'S SETTLEMENTS WERE AS
HIGH AS 28% ANNUAL RATES.
7/ IN 1968 AT THE PICK YEAR OF THE DAM CONSTRUCTION WORKS, THE
POPULATION OF GUAUCAMAYAS HAD REACHED 7700 INHABS. AT THE END
OF THAT YEAR IT WENT DOWN TO 4416. (DANIEL HIERNOUX. EL ESTADO
Y LAS POLITICAS URBANAS. IN LAS TRUCHAS. MEXICO:ECODESARROLLO,
1984.p.101
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ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLES PLAYED BY GUACAMAYAS DURING
THIS TIME WAS THE PROVISION OF INEXPENSIVE RENTAL HOUSING FOR
POOR MIGRANTS AND CONSTRUCTION WORKERS /8.
THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF OF THE 1970-1976 FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL UNREST WAS TAKING PLACE IN GUACAMAYAS,
EVIDENCED IN THE HARSH COMPLAINTS TO THE PRESIDENT DURING ONE
OF HIS VISITS TO THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE RESPONSE WAS THE
CREATION OF A CONSULTATION GROUP OF EXPERTS, FORMED TO SOLVE
GUACAMAYAS PROBLEMS. BUT WITH THE CHANGE OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT PLANTS, THEY WERE RENDERED
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF ANY APPLICATION NOR PRACTICAL
SOLUTIONS /9.
4. THE LAIRD TENURE SITUATION
THE EVOLUTION OF LAND TENURE IN LAZARO CARDENAS WAS
CLOSELY TIED TO THE EVER PRESENT MEXICAN PROBLEM OF "EJIDAL
LAND" /10 FOR URBAN PURPOSES, AT THE TIME THE STEEL MILL
8/ IN 1976 THE PERCENTAGE OF RENTAL HOUSING IN GUACAMAYAS WAS
OVER 30%. (DANIEL HIERNOUX, OP.CIT.p.101)
9/ THE RESULTS OF THIS GROUPS WERE: FIRST A 54 VOLUME DOCUMENT
(WHICH WAS TO BE USED IN LATER PLANS, INCLUDING THE WORLD BANK
PROJECT); SECONDLY, THE INITIATION OF A SERVICE PROVISION
PROGRAM IN GUACAMAYAS; AND THIRDLY, A SITES AND SERVICES
PROJECT IN ANIBAL PONCE, A GUACAMAYAS NEIGHBORHOOD.
10/ "EJIDAL LAND" IS STATE-OWNED LANDS TRANSFERED IN THE PAST
BY THE GOVERNMENT TO RURAL COMMUNITIES. THE EJIDATARIOIS OR
BENEFICIARIES WERE GIVEN AN EJIDAL FIELD IN USUFRUCT, FOR
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, PLUS A LOT TO BUILD A DWELLING. DEMAND
CREATED BY IMMIGRANTS LEAD TO ILLEGAL SALES OR SQUATTING ON
EJIDAL FIELDS CONTIGUOUS TO THE COMMUNITIES. DWELLERS OF THESE
LOTS HAVE NO LEGAL TITLES AND HENCE NO SECURITY TO TENURE. (THE
WORLD BANK).
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PROJECT WAS LAUNCHED IN THE EARLY 1970'S. EXCEPT FOR BRC
WORKERS CAMPS AND ITS SURROUNDING LAND, ALMOST ALL LAND TENURE
IN THE REGION WAS EJIDAL.
IN 1973 MANY WORKERS LIVING IN THE PROVISIONAL WORKERS
SHELTERS SET UP BY SICARTSA PUSHED BY OVERCROWDING AND THE
ARRIVAL OF THEIR FAMILIES, BEGAN INVADING LAND NEAR THE
RECENTLY INITIATED NEW DEVELOMENT AREA OF ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA.
EARLY THAT YEAR FIDELAC HAD JUST BEGAN ITS OPERATION AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW TOWN BEING INVADED.
MEANWHILE THE TOWN OF GUAGACAMAYAS INCLUDING THE AREAS
SURROUNDING THE ORIGINAL WORKERS CAMPS, THREE MILES AWAY FROM
THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS, HAD BEEN GROWING AT A VERY FAST PACE
THOSE NEW SETTLERS GOT WRITTEN PERMISSIONS FROM CRB TO
SETTLE TEMPOPARILY. THIS SETTLEMENTS PROCESS WENT ON WITH NO
BASIC SERVICES PROVISION WHATSOEVER UNTIL LATE 1975.
THE NEXT YEAR, THE HIGH RATE OF INVESTMENT TAKING PLACE IN
THE REGION, COUPLED WITH THE LACK OF SERVICES FORCED THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A BASIC SERVICES PROGRAM COMBINED
WITH LAND TENURE REGULARIZATION. THIS PROGRAM WAS CARRIED OUT
IN THE SO CALLED FUNDO LEGAL (LEGAL URBAN ENDOWMENT) THE
ORIGINAL TOWN NEAR TO THE NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT. /11 (SEE 111-4
LAND REGULARIZATION PROGRAM)
ll/ THEN BECOMING THE REGIONAL COMMERCIAL CENTER. THIS ROLE WAS
LATER STRENGHTENED IN THE MEXICAN NATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM.
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HOWEVER THE PROJECT REQUIREMENT TO WORK ON LAND LEGALLY
OWNED, TO ENABLE A COST RECOVERY POLICY THROUGH MORTGAGING THE
LAND, DEMANDED A THOROUGH LAND REGULARIZATION PROCESS IN THE
ENTIRE MICROREGION.
TWELVE OF THE REGION'S SETTLEMENTS (THREE URBAN AND 9
RURAL) HAD TO UNDERGO THE EXPROPRIATION PROCESS; WAS IN FACT
NEVER CARRIED OUT.
5. THE HOUSING PROVISION IN THE NEW TOWN: FIRST PHASE.
A. THE PROVISION OF MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING
THE F' MEWORK IN WHICH THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS ACTUALLY
TOOK PLACE WAS THAT OF A NEW TOWN BEING DEVELOPED IN ITS
SECOND PHASE. THE FIRST ONE HAD BEEN HARACTERIZED BY THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOME 5100 FINISHED HOUSING TO MIDDLE AND
MIDDLE-HIGH INCOME GROUPS, WHICH REPRESENTED 90% OF THE TOTAL
PUBLIC HOUSING BUILT IN THE REGION DURING THE FIRST PHASE.
DURING THIS PHASE, THERE WERE DIFFERENT PUBLIC ORGANISMS
DEALING WITH HOUSING IN AN OVERLAPPING AND NOT ALWAYS CLEAR WAY
/12. FIDELAC ITSELF WAS ENGAGED IN PROVIDING SOME SERVICES AND
FACILITIES THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY OTHER PUBLIC
AGENCIES /13.
12/ FOR INSTANCE, THE STEEL MILL PLANT UNDERTOOK URBANIZATION
AND CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE RESIDENTIAL AREAS, AND THE SETTING UP
OF MASSIVE WORKERS SHELTERS; THREE OTHER PUBLIC ORGANISMS WITH
OTHER-THAN-HOUSING-PROVISION FUNCTIONS DID PROVIDE SOME
DWELLING ACTIONS.
13/ FOR INSTANCE THE WASTE COLLECTION SERVICE, AND CHILDREN
SCHOOLS
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THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTORS IN THE PROVISION OF HOUSING
DURING THIS PERIOD WERE THREE PUBLIC AGENCIES:/14 FIDELAC
ITSELF, SITSA (SICARTSA-LAS TRUCHAS REAL STATE AGENCY), AND
INFONAVIT (THE WORKERS HOUSING NATIONAL FUND). THE FIRST TWO
CONTRIBUTED WITH MORE THAN A THIRD EACH, WHILE THE REMAINING
PROVIDED BY INFONAVIT (13%) AND THREE OTHER PUBLIC BODIES
(16%). /15 ALL PUBLIC HOUSING ADDED REPRESENTED A 40% OF THE
REGIONAL HOUSING DEMAND, AND ALMOST ALL THE FINISHED HOUSING
BUILT AT THAT POINT.
SITSA WAS THE FIRST AGENCY TO BUILD MASSIVE HOUSING
PROGRAMS IN THE REGION. INITIALLY IT BOUGHT THE HIGH RANK
RESIDENTIAL AREA OF "LA ORILLA" TO BRC, IMMEDIATLY BUILDING
MORE UNITS TO ARRIVE TO 300; IT ALSO SET UP PROVISIONAL SHELTER
CAMPS FOR 5300 WORKERS -WHICH EVENTUALLY HOUSED NEAR THE
DOUBLE THEIR CAPACITY- WITHIN THE SICARTSA'S TERRAIN; AND
UNDERTOOK THE CONSTRUCTION OF TWO LARGE MIDDLE INCOME HOUSING
AREAS: ONE IN LA MIRA, NEXT TO THE MINES, SOME 5 MILES FROM LA
ORILLA, AND "THE 600'S) SOME 590 MIDDLE-HIGH INCOME HOUSING IN
THE ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA NEW AREA. BECAUSE THE SICARTSA'S CHANGE
OF PLANS, THIS PROJECT WAS HALTED NEAR TERMINATION.
14/ FIDELAC BUILT A TOTAL OF 2063 HOUSES, BESIDES URBANIZING
250 HECTARES OF THE NEW ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA AREA OF LAZARO
CARDENAS.
15/ THE MEXICAN INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IMPLEMENTED A 160
SITES AND CORE-HOUSING PROGRAM IN GUACAMAYAS; THE BALSAS
COMMISSION HAD IMPLEMENTED THE TWO WORKERS CAMPS IN ORIGINAL
GUACAMAYAS; INDECO CARRIED OUT TWO EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS
TOTALLING 335 ACTIONS; AND FINALLY THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC
WORKS BUILT UP 70 HOUSES FOR ITS OWN PERSONNEL.
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ONE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION OF THESE PROJECTS WAS THAT AT
TIME OF PROJECT NEGOTIATION AND DURING ALMOST THREE YEARS OF
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, MORE THAN 30% OF THE FINISHED OR NEAR-
FINISHED HOUSING REMAINED UNOCCUPIED. /17 THE FINANTIAL AND
REHABILITATION COSTS OF THESE HOUSES WAS ENORMOUS, REPRESENTING
AN IDLE INVESTMENT ENOUGH TO PROVIDE SOME 10.000 FAMILIES
SERVICED SITES WITH CORE HOUSING /18. SUCH PROJECT COULD HAVE
ACTUALLY BEEN LARGER THAN ALL OF THE SHELTER COMPONENTS OF
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT.
B. THE NEED FOR HOUSING SUBSIDIES
LAZARO CARDENAS, AS ANY NEW TOWN IN A FRONTIER REGION,
HAD TO OFFER INEXPENSIVE HOUSING AND RELY ON OTHER SUBSIDIES,
AS AN ATTEMPT TO COMPENSATE THOSE PEOPLE LIVING AND WORKING IN
AN AREA LACKING OF MOST URBAN SERVICES AND AMENITIES./19
17/ INDEED DURING FOUR YEARS IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT MORE THAN
30% OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE-HIGH INCOME HOUSING REMAINED
IDDLE. THIS LEAD TO SOME VANDALISM OF THE NEAR-FINISHED
HOUSING IN "LAS 600'S" WHICH MEANT EXTRA-COST TO REHABILITATE
THEM WHEN LATER THESE AREAS WERE TRANSFERED FROM SITSA TO
FIDELAC. THE SALE OF THESE HOUSES WAS ALSO A FINANCIAL LOOSE TO
FIDELAC FOR IT HAD TO BE OFFERED ON VERY ATTRACTIVE COSTS TO
BE SOLD.
18/ ESTIMATED BY DANIEL HIERNOUX. OP.CIT. p108.
19/ SICARTSA REPORTED AN ALMOST CONTINUE LARGE TURN OVER OF
PERSONNEL AT ALL LEVELS. ONLY AFTER THE WORLD BANK PROJECT
TERMINATION, THE TURNOVER WAS CONSIDERABLY REDUCED.
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THE PUBLIC ORGANISMS IN THE REGION OFFERED A SERIES OF
INCENTIVES TO KEEP BOTH THE UNSKILLED AND PROFESSIONAL
PERSONNEL IN THE REGION /20. THE MOST IMPORTANT ONES WERE THE
OFFERING OF HIGHER WAGES, AND FOR THE PROFESSIONAL AND
TECHNICAL GROUP, THE HIDDEN SUBSIDY IN FINANCED HOUSING./21
THE LARGEST PORTION OF THE MIDDLE INCOME HOUSING PROVIDED
DURING THIS TIME (1973-76) WAS UNDER A FINANCIAL POLICY OF
VIRTUAL PRICE COST /22.
C. THE SMALL LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROJECTS.
TO ANALIZE LOW-INCOME HOUSING
FRAMEWORK OF THE PROVISION OF HOUSING I
STAGES APPEAR CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATED:
PROJECTSWORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS,
PROVISION AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION.
DESCRIBE ONLY THE FIRST STAGE /23
PROJECTS WITHIN
N A NEW TOWN,
INITIAL STAGE,
AND FIDELAC H
THIS CHAPTER
20/ JOB INCENTIVES THAT STILL REMAIN AT PRESENT
MORE THAN 60% OF THE NOMINAL WAGE (THESE
TRANSPORTATION TO WORK).
21/ THE INTEREST RATES VARIED FROM 4% TO 8%,
COST OF CAPITAL WAS AROUND 10%.2
THE
FOUR
PILOT
OUSING
WILL
COULD RESULT IN
INCLUDED FREE
WHILE THE REAL
22/ THE PROFIT AND CHARGES FOR OVERHEAD COSTS WERE TYPICIALLY
1% TO 2%.
23/ FOR THE DISPROPORTION IN MAGNITUDE IF THREE OF THESE STAGES
ARE COMPARED AGAINST THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS, I HAVE
CHOSEN A PRESENTATION OF TOPICS AROUND THE LARGER PROJECT.
HENCEFORTH, EACH STAGE WILL BE LOCATED IN ACCORDANCE TO ITS
RELATION TO THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS.
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THE "INITIAL STAGE" FROM 1973 TO 1976, INVOLVED ONLY THREE
SMALL PROJECTS (INDECO I, PALAPAS I, AND ANIBAL PONCE)
TOTALLING ALTOGETHER LESS THAN 500 ACTIONS. THESE PROJECTS WERE
SET UP BY CONTRIBUTIONS OF 5 PUBLIC AGENCIES. THEIR
EXPERIMENTAL AND INNOVATIVE CHARACTER MADE THE TWO FIRST ONES
VULNERABLE TO REPLICATION.
THE "INDECO I" PROJECT, IMPLEMENTED IN 1973, WAS A 250
SITES AND SERVICES ]ROJECT, FOLLOWING THE EXPERIMENTAL"SIDOSE"
MODEL./24 THIS WAS THE FIRST HOUSING PROJECT TARGETTED TO THE
POOR./25 IT WAS CARRIED OUT BY SELF-HELP PROGRESSIVE HOUSING, AND
ONLY 4 YEARS AFTER ITS LAND TENURE WAS REGULARIZED.
THE PALAPAS PROJECT WAS A VERNACULAR MODEL, 85 ROW-HOUSING,
BUILT BY MUTUAL AID WITH ONLY INDIGENOUS RAW MATERIALS: "AN
ENCLAVE SETTLEMENT AMONG THE URBAN PUBLIC HOUSUING
DEVELOPMENTS"/26. THIS PROJECT WAS SO CRITICIZED THAT THE 1977
24/ A SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT WITH PROGRESSIVE URBANIZATION.
THESE PROJECTS INTENDED TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN MEXICO DURING THE
1970'S ON A LARGER SCALE, SOON FOUND HARSH OPPOSITION FOR THEIR
ALLEGATED ROLE IN CREATION OF OFFICIAL "CARTOLANDIAS" (CARD
BOARD SHANTYTOWNS)
25/ THE POPULAR INDECO PROJECT BENEFITTED SOME 1250 PERSONS WITH
FAMILY INCOME AROUND 1 TMW. IN 1977 70% OF THESE HOUSEHOLDS
WERE SELF-EMPLOYED OR UNDEREMPLOYED.
26/ VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO AND LUIS PADILLA MASSIEU. PROGRAMA
PILOTO PARA EL MEJORAMIENTO DE VIVIENDA POR AUTOCONSTRUCCION EN
LAZARO CARDENAS, MICH. IN INVESTIGACIONES EN AUTOCONSTRUCCION.
MEXICO CITY:CONACYT, 1979. p.126
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PILOT PROJECT "PALAPAS II" HAD TO BUILT IT ALL OVER AGAIN.
PALAPAS I WAS TARGETTED TO FAMILIES WITH INCOME AROUND 1 TMW.
IN OPPOSITION TO THE "INDECO I", THIS HAD REGULARIZED LAND
TENURE, AND ALSO THE POPULATION HAD MUCH MORE JOB STABILITY./27
THE ANIBAL PONCE PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN 1976. THIS PROJECT
WAS A COMPONENT OF A LARGER PROGRAM THAT INCLUDED LAND TENURE
REGULARIZATION, INTRODUCTION OF BASIC SERVICES, AND THE
PAVEMENT OF THE MAIN STREET AT ANIBAL PONCE (SEE II-1 SOCIO-
POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS).
THIS VERY SUCCESSFUL PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED BY THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THREE AGENCIES. CRB WHICH PROVIDED WITH THE
REQUIRED LAND; THE MEXICAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY
(IMSS), CONTRIBUTING WITH THE FIELD TEAM PERSONNEL; AND
FIDELAC, PROVIDING WITH THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COMPONENT.
THE PROJECT CONSISTED OF 160 SERVICED SITES WITH CORE
HOUSING. ALTHOUGH THE ROOF WAS WITH ASBESTO-CEMENT SHEETS /28
HOUSES WERE ACCEPTED FOR ITS FRESHNESS -- AS IT TOOK ADVANTAGE
OF DOMINANT WINDS WITH A CROSS VENTILATION SCHEME--. ALSO THE
COLABORATIVE EFFORT OF THE THREE INVOLVED INSTITUTIONS WERE
INSTRUMENTAL IN ITS SUCCESS.
27/ IN 1977 PALAPAS I WAS REPORTED TO HAVE 45% STABLE JOB
WORKERS, WHILE IN INDECO I, AT THE SAME TIME, THIS PERCENTAGE
WAS ONLY 30%. (CRUZ TOLEDANO. OP.CIT.)
28/ IN THE REGION THIS IS A ROOF MATERIAL THAT NORMALLY PEOPLE
REJECT FOR ITS HIGH COST IN COMPARITION WITH CARD BOARD, AND
ALSO BECAUSE OF ITS DEFICIENT TEMPERATURE ISOLATING NATURE
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C H A P T E R I I
PROJECT PLANNING AND NEGOTIATION
THIS CHAPTER ADDRESSES GENERAL ISSUES OF THE F RME OF
REFERENCE OF THE SHELTER PROGRAM AS ACTUALLY WAS IMPLEMENTED;
NAMELY, THE SOCIO-POLITICAL SITUATION TO WHICH THE PROJECT
EVOLVED AS A RESPONSE, THE ORIENTATION OF THE ORIGINAL APPROVED
PROJECT, AND THE PROCESS BY WHICH IT WAS ADJUSTED THROUGH
THREE ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS; THEN THE ADJUSTED PROJECT VERSION
ITSELF IS DESCRIBED REFERING TO THE MAIN ASPECTS OF ANY
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. A SPECIAL ATTEMPT IS MADE TO RELATE THESE
ASPECTS TO ACTUAL OUTCOMES, AN TO MENTION ONLY IN A BRIEF
MANNER ASPECTS THAT WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED, AS WELL AS THOSE
OTHER PROJECT COMPONENTS WHICH WERE NOT RELATED TO THE SHELTER
PROGRAM.
1.SOCIO POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE SHELTER PROJECTS
THE ORIGINAL LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT /1
CONTEMPLATED AN INVESTMENT OF US$60 MILLION FOR THE REGION. THE
PROJECT WAS PUPRSUED AS A SUPPORT TO THE NATIONAL SPATIAL
POLICY OF INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION, AND TO THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A FWDNTIER REGION WITH POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.
AT THAT TIME, THE LAZARO CARDENAS AS REPRESENTED ONE OF
THE LARGEST INDUSTRIAL AND URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENTS FOR A
1/ THIS PROJECT WAS APPROVED IN OCTOBER 1976, TWO MONTHS BEFORE
THE CHANGE OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
THE FOLLOWING YEAR THE SECOND -OF FOUR PROGRAMMED TO YEAR 1995-
DEVELOPMENT PHASE OF THE HUGE STEEL MILL PLANT WOULD BE
INITIATED.
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REGIONAL PROJECT, EVER UNDERTAKEN BY THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. IN
EARLY 1977, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO THE NATIONAL
FINANTIAL CRISIS BY STOPPING THE STEEL MILL'S SECOND
DEVELOPMENT PHASE, THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT THOUGHT THE
PROJECT SHOULD BE REDUCED IN ITS SCALE AND SCOPE IN ORDER TO BE
IMPLEMENTED./2
AT THE TIME OF PROJECT ADJUSTMENT, THE NEW TOWN OF LAZARO
CARDENAS AND ITS NEIGHBORING GUACAMAYAS WERE 3 MILES APART -
THE TWO GEOGRAPHICAL EXTREMES OF THE LAZARO CARDENAS
METROPOLITAN AREA, PLANNED FOR THE YEAR 2000. /3
IN 1978 WHEN THE PROJECT WAS FINALLY SIGNED, THESE TWO
WERE THE LARGEST SETTLEMENTS OF THE REGION, DUE TO THE PREVIOUS
YEAR'S IMMIGRATION FLUX THAT HAD CREATED SOCIAL UNREST IN THE
AREA. SUBSEQUENTLY, EACH SETTLEMENT'S GROWTH HAD TEMPORARILY
SUBSIDED. THE LARGE SCALE PROGRAM TO SUPPORT PROGRESSIVE
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION WAS EXPECTED TO COPE WITH THE NEAR 5500
REPORTED DEFICIT (SEE TABLE II-1).
2/ PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT. PROYECTO DE DESARROLLO URBANO
INTEGRADO DE LA ZONA DE CONURBACION DE LAZARO CARDENAS, MICH.
MEXICO CITY: DIRECCION DE INVERSIONES, 1977.
3/ THIS WAS THE RECENTLY COMPLETED FIFTH CONSECUTIVE MASTER
PLAN, THE SO CALLED "URBAN DEVELOPMENT INTEGRAL PROJECT".
ACCORDING TO ITS PRESENTATION IN THE WORLD BANK PROJECT --A 33
VOLUME DOCUMENT-- PROJECTS WERE GIVEN LOCATIONS, PROVIDING A
SATISFACTORY BLUEPRINT FOR EFFICIENT FUTURE GROWTH WITHIN A
STRONG PLANNINIG F JAMEWORK. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION WAS THOUGHT
TO BE FACILITATED BY THE THEN STRONG PUBLIC INSTITUTIONAL
INTERVENTION IN THE AREA, ESPECIALLY WITH THE PRESENCE OF
FIDELAC. THIS PUBLIC AGENCY WAS AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION WHICH PROVIDED A BASE FOR IMPROVING CAPACITY FOR
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.
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TABLE II-1. THE ESTIMATED HOUSING DEFICIT
indicators 1970 1978
Total number of Dwellings 4223 16441
Total number of Families 4343 17029
Actual Deficit 120 588
Precauriosness Deficit 1267 4045
Deterioration Deficit 211 822
TOTAL HOUSING DEFICIT 1598 5455
source: Lopez ,Hector. "El desarrollo urbano" in Revista de la
construccion, No.319, May 1981. p.4 3
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT, CO-FINANCED FOR A TOTAL OF US$28
MILLION, APPARENTLY HAD LITTLE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE DURING THE
INITIAL YEARS OF THE LOPEZ 1ORTILLO ADMINISTRATION (1976-82).
14 HOWEVER, IT WAS CONSIDERED A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO SOCIAL
CONCERN FOR MOST OF THE RECENTLY SETTLED POPULATION IN THE
REGION. INDEED, THE SHELTER RELATED COMPONENTS OF THE OVERALL
WORLD BANK PROJECT HAD THEIR JUSTIFICATION IN THE FOLLOWING
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS:/5
A) UPGRADING: NEED TO IMPROVE IN THE SHORT RUN THE
UNSERVICED AND UNORGANIZED REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS.
B) SITES AND SERVICES: TO MOVE OUT IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS
FROM LOAD RISK AREAS , -AND REDUCE FUTURE RELOCATION COSTS-.
4/ IN MY OPINION, BLOCKADES OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, SUCH AS
THE ISSUING OF LAND EXPROPRIATION TITLES WOULD NOT BEEN
OCCURRED IF THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT PHASE OF SICARSTA HAD NOT
BEEN POSPONED.
5/ PRESIDENCY SECRETARIAT. PROYECTO URBANO INTEGRAL DE LA
CONURBACION DE CIUDAD LAZARO CARDENAS , MICHOACAN. MEXICO CITY:
DIRECCION DE INVERSIONES, 1977.
16
C) SELF-HELP LOANS: THE DEMAND FOR IMPROVED ENVIRONMENTAL
CONDITIONS IN THE AREA.
ACCORDINGLY, THE EMPHASIS OF THE ADJUSTED PROJECT CHANGED
FROM AN URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT TO A MORE SHELTER RELATED
PROGRAM (SEE 11-3 RESOURCE ALLOCATION CHANGES).
THE ADJUSTED VERSION OF THE WORLD BANK PROJECT FOLLOWING
THE DETAINMENT OF THE SECOND PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE STEEL
MILL PLANT, WAS MEANT TO SOLVE REGIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT, URBAN
SERVICES DEMANDS, AND RISKS INCURRED BY THE RIVER FLOODING
OVER URBAN AREAS (SEE 11-3 PROJECT NEGOTIATION AND BARGAINING).
BRIEFLY, THE IMPLICIT REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE LOCATION OF
THE DIFFERENT PROJECT COMPONENTS RELATED TO HOUSING PROVISION
WERE THE FOLLOWING:
THE INITIALLY PLANNED UPGRADING OF THE AREA OF GUACAMAYAS
WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE OF ITS ROLE AS THE PRIMARY RECIPIENT OF LOW
INCOME GROUPS, AND BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL UNREST THAT HAD
OCCURRED IN 1975-76 AT THE PEAK TIME OF THE SICARTSA'S
CONSTRUCTION. THE REASON FOR CHOOSING GUACAMAYAS WAS OBVIOUSLY
ALSO A DECISION BASED UPON ITS LARGE SETTLED POPULATION; IT'S
RELATIVE PROXIMITY TO EXISTING SOURCES OF EMPLOYMENT, PUBLIC
FACILITIES, AND PLANNED OR EXISTING UTILITY SERVICES. THE
SOCIOECONOMIC SURVEYS CARRIED OUT IN THE REGION INDICATED THAT
THE POPULATION IN THESE SETTLEMENTS COULD AFFORD TO PAY THEIR
SHARE OF THE DEVELOPMENTS COSTS /6
6/ F10M THE PREVIOUS REGIONAL STUDIES CARRIED OUT BY THE BALSAS
RIVER COMMISSION
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THE APPARENT REASON FOR CHOOSING TO SUPPORT THE SMALL
SETTLEMENTS OF THE REGION WAS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THEIR
POPULATION WAS DEVOTED TO PRIMARY SECTOR ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES.
THESE ACTIONS WERE INTENDED TO SUPPORT BOTH AN URBAN-RURAL
BALANCE, AND ALSO THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN THIS
IRRIGATED REGION. /7
THE LOCATION FOR THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT IN ZONA
FIDEICOMITIDA WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE IT WAS NEXT TO A PREVIOUS
SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT (INDECO) AND HENCE MOST LIKELY TO
INTEGRATE MORE ADEQUATELY WITH ITS SORROUNDINGS. ALSO ITS
LOCATION WAS RELATIVELY NEAR TO "FUNDO LEGAL" COMMERCIAL
AREA, WHERE MOST SERVICES AND FACILITIES ARE CONCENTRATED.
IN THE CASE OF GUACAMAYAS, THE THREE LOCATIONS FOR THE
SITES PLANNED FOR THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS, WERE BASED
ON THE AVAILABILITY OF LAND; HOWEVER NEITHER OF THESE WERE
FINALLY IMPLEMENTED.
2.RESOURCE ALLOCATION CHANGES
THE ORIGINAL WORLD BANK URBAN DEVELOPMENT INTEGRATED
PROJECT WAS A TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT LOAN, TO CONTINUE
THE URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF A GROWTH POLE CENTER.
7/ INDEED ONE OF NINE PROJECT COMPONENTS WAS THE OPENING OF
NEARLY 200 KM. OF RURAL ROADS INTENDED TO PROMOTE THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURAL POTENTIAL OF THE AREA. IT WAS
NOT UNTIL 1981 THAT THIS IDEA WAS ABANDONNED TO FAVOR THE
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA WITHIN THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL PORTS PROGRAM.
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NEVERTHELESS, SIX YEARS LATER, THE PROJECT RESULTED IN A
TYPICAL WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECT./8
IN THE ORIGINAL PROJECT THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THE
SHELTER RELATED COMPONENTS WERE LESS THAN ONE FOURTH OF THE
TOTAL ALLOCATIONS, WHILE AT THE TIME OF PROJECT TERMINATION
THESE COMPONENTS REPRESENTED ALMOST TWO THIRDS OF TOTAL PROJECT
UTILIZED RESOURCES.
CHANGES WITHIN THE ADJUSTED PROJECT WERE REFLECTED IN THE
NEW ALLOCATIONS FOR THE SHELTER PROJECTS -- 90% MORE RESOURCES
WEWRE DESIGNATED FOR THE UPGRADING PROJECT, THE SELF-HELP GOT
MORE THAN TWICE, AND THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS RECEIVED
AN INCREASE OF FIVE AND A HALF TIMES TIMES ITS ORIGINAL
FINANCIAL RESOURCES.
THE ADJUSTED VERSION DISTRIBUTED SHELTER RELATED ACTIONS
TO ALL THE REGION'S SETTLEMENTS./9 THE LION'S SHARE WAS FOR
GUACAMAYAS, WHICH RECEIVED THREE FOURTHS OF THE UPGRADING
ACTIONS. TWO OF THE TOWNS OF THE STATE NEXT DOOR STATE TO
MICHOACAN, WERE ASSIGNED WITH 9%, AND THE REMAINING FIVE TOWNS
IN MICHOACAN STATE, WITH 15% OF THE DWELLING ACTIONS. NO
UPGRADING ACTION WAS ASSIGNED TO FUNDO LEGAL, AND ONLY ONE
SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT WAS ASSIGNED TO ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA.
8/ A TYPICAL SHELTER PROGRAM CONTAINS URBAN UPGRADING AND SITES
AND SERVICES PROJECTS, AND CREDIT COMPONENTS FOR BOTH BUILDING
MATERIALS (LOCALLY CALLED SELF-HELP PROGRAM), AND USUALLY FOR
SMALL BUSINESSES.
9/ IT COMPRISED URBAN UPGRADING ON 8 OF THE 13 REGIONAL RURAL
SETTLEMENTS, PLUS THE ENTIRE AREA OF GUACAMAYAS, WHICH INCLUDED
"ZONA EJIDAL URBANA", THE ONLY NEIGHBORHOOD THAT WAS SETTLED
OUTSIDE THE TERRAINS THAT WERE ORIGINALLY OWNED BY BRC.
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THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM WAS NOT BOUND TO ANY PARTICULAR
SETTLEMENT, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS REQUIREMENTS IT WOULD OPERATE
ONLY WHERE LAND WAS TO BE REGULARIZED. /10
3.PROJECT NEGOTIATION
IN 1975 THE WORLD BANK AND THE STATE OF MICHOACAN
GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A
PROJECT IN THE REGION. ONE YEAR LATER , THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE
CONSIDERED TO BE THE CONCERN OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, HENCE
THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT TOOK CHARGE OF THE PROJECT.
THE PROJECT WAS APPROVED IN OCTOBER 1976, ONE MONTH
BEFORE THE CHANGE OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION. SUBSEQUENTLY THE
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION WAS TEMPORARILY FROZEN.
IN EARLY 1977 TWO IMPORTANT EVENTS OCCURRED THAT
DETERMINED A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTIONS TO BE FOLLOWED FOR THE
WORLD BANK PROJECT. ONE WAS THE POSTPONMENT OF THE SICARTSA'S
SECOND DEVELOPMENT PHASE , PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN THAT SAME YEAR.
THE SECOND WAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM THAT REORGANIZED THE
PUBLIC SECTOR'S ORGANIZATIONS ALONG SECTORIAL LINES. THIS
CHANGE SWITCHED THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROGRAM TO THE
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HUMAN SETTLEMENTS. /11
10/ THIS REQUIREMENT IMPEDED THE GRANTING OF LOANS IN THE
REGION'S SETTLEMENTS, ALTHOUGH TWO TOWNS OUTSIDE THE
MICROREGION BENEFITTED BY CREDIT FOR SELF-HELP HOUSING.
11/ WITHIN THIS MINISTRY, IT WAS THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGETING
AND PROGRAMMING THEH INSTRUMENTAL ONE FOR THEH DELELGATION OF
RESPONSABILILTIES TO OTHER INSTITUTIONS.
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IN MARCH 1977 A NEW HEAD OF FIDELAC (LIC. ORTEGA SAN
VICENTE) TOOK OFFICE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY HE BEGAN PREPARING
SOME INSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS FOR THE FUTURE PROGRAM (SEE 111-3
ACCESS TO COMMUNITY AND INITIAL WORKS). UPON REQUEST BY THE
WORLD BANK'S DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENTs THE PROJECT
WAS REVIEWED, AND SINCE THE PROJECT WAS FROZEN FOR THE
DETAINMENT OF THE STEEL MILL PLANS, THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS
INITIATED. THE TOTAL INVESTMENT WAS REDUCED FROM US$60 TO
US$28 MILLION; THE PROJECT COMPOSITION WAS ALTERED IN ITS
ALLOCATION SHARES (SEE TABLE 11-4), REDUCED IN ITS SCOPE (THE
POPULAR TECHNOLOGY CENTERS BECAME COMMUNITY CENTERS), AND
SHORTENED IN DURATION FROM FIVE TO THREE YEARS./12
THERE WERE FIVE EXPRESSED REASONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO
PROCEED WITH THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESPITE THE
SICARTSA PROJECT POSTPONMENT: A) THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH
TABLE 11-4: PROJECT MODIFICATION
(in us~millions)
COMPONENT WORLD BANK MODIFICATION
urban upgrading 10.4 7.7
sites and services 7.6 4.9
industrial park 3.6 1.8
rural roads 3.1 1.3
small business credits 8.0 5.0
river control works 24.3 5.7
urban plans tech. assist. 2.9 1.5
t o t a 1 60.0 28.0
source: proyecto integral de desarrollo urbano para
la zona de conurbacion en cd. lazaro cardenas, mich.
12/ PRESIDENCY SECRETARIAT. PROJECT URBANO INTEGRADO DE LA ZONA
CONURBADA DE LAZARO CARDENAS, MICHOACAN. MEXICO, 1977. p.1 1
21
AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROVISION OF HOUSING AND
URBAN SERVICES; B) A CHANCE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL
UNEMPLOYMENT; C) THE CONSPICUOUS LACK OF SERVICES; D) RISKS OF
FLOODING ONTO URBAN AREAS; AND E) THE CONCERN FOR URBAN AND
REGIONAL STUDIES. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH ONE FOLLOWS:
A. WORKING WITH THE WORLD BANK TO PROVIDE HOUSING.
MEXICO IS ONE OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES MOST OFTEN GRANTED
WITH DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS./13 HOWEVER THE LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT IS THE FIRST WORLD BANK PROJECT THAT HAS
TARGETTED THE LOW-INCOME POPULATION GROUPS. IT WAS ALSO THE
FOURTH FOREINGLY FINANCED PROJECT EVER TO ADDRESS THE PROVISION
OF HOUSING./14 FOR THE PAST TWO DECADES MEXICO HAD NOT
RECEIVED HAVE ANY OTHER EXTERNALLY ASSISTED HOUSING PROJECTS,
HENCE IT WAS REGARDED AS AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF THE SHELTER PROVISION EXPERIENCE F 10M THE WORLD
BANK.
B. THE UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE REGION
IN 1976 AT THE PEAK OF THE SICARSTA'S CONSTRUCTION WORKS
THERE WERE 12,000 WORKERS ON THE SITE. THE FOLLOWING YEAR, THE
STEEL PLANT BEGAN ITS OPERATIONS, PROVIDING PERMANENT JOBS FOR
ONLY QUALIFIED WORKERS. CONSEQUENTLY, AT THE END OF 1977 THE
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN THE REGION WAS AS HIGH AS 47.5% OF THE
13/ WITHIN THE WORLD BANK LENDING RECORDS, MEXICO RANKS THIRD
IN RECEIVING THE LARGEST AMOUNT OF FUNDS (7.34% OF TOTAL LOANED
CAPITAL); AND RANKS FIFTH IN RECEIVING THE LARGEST NUMBER OF
PROJECT BESTOWED TO ANY MEMBER COUNTRY (MORE THAN ONE HUNDRED).
14/ MARGARITA NOLASCO. LOS POBRES DE LA CIUDAD in "LAS
TRUCHAS" (ED.I.RESTREPO). MEXICO CITY: ECODESARROLLO, 1984.
p. 1 4 4
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ECONOMIC ACTIVE POPULATION./15 ALTHOUGH IN LATE 1977 A LARGE
PART OF THE POPULATION EMIGRATED, THE UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN
THE REGION WAS CONSIDERABLE.
C. THE LACK OF SERVICES IN THE URBAN AREAS.
GUACAMAYAS WAS AN IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT. PEOPLE HAD
RECEIVED WRITTEN PERMISSIONS -- FOR TEMPORARY SETTLING-- FROM
THE BALSAS RIVER COMMISSION. IN LATE 1976 AN INITIAL UPGRADING
AND REGULARIZATION PROGRAM WAS LAUNCHED, NONETHELESS THE
PROVISION OF SERVICES WAS INCOMPLETE AND DEFICIENT; THERE WERE
SOME AREAS WITH NO PROVISION OF BASIC SERVICES WHATSOEVER. /16
(SEE IV-6 THE UPGRADING PROGRAM)
D. RISKS OF RIVER FLOODING TO URBAN AREAS.
F1OM 1974 TO 1977 SOME 200 Has. OF AGRICULTURAL LAND WERE
LOST BECAUSE OF FLOODING AND SOME URBAN AREAS WERE ENDANGERED
BY EROSION. SILTATION PROBLEMS WERE ENDANGERING THE MOVEMENT
OF LARGE SHIPS IN THE PORT AND REDUCING THE HYDROELECTIC OUTPUT
OF LA VILLITA DAM.
E. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR URBAN PLANS
DURING THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE NEW FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION, THERE WAS THE PREPARATION OF ONE OF THE LARGEST
15/ IN 1978 GUACAMAYAS MASTER PLAN REPORTED THERE WAS STILL A
30% TO 40% NEEDED CAPACITY OF MOST PUBLIC FACILITIES, WITH NO
TELEGRAPH NOR MAIL SERVICES, AND ALMOST NO TELELPHONES IN THE
AREA.
16/ MEXICO HAS A RECORD IN NOT ASKING FOR EXTERNAL HELP TO
PROVIDE PUBLIC HOUSING. INDEED ONLY OTHER 3 HOUSING PROJECTS,
ALL IN THE EARLY 1960;S HAVE BEEN THE ONLY ONES FINANCED
EXTERNALLY. (I.D.B. ONE, A.I.D. TWO)
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PLANNING PROGRAMS, WITH A NATIONAL COVERAGE ,EVER LAUNCHED IN A
DEVELOPING NATION. /17
WITHIN THE LAZARO CARDENAS MICROREGION, BESIDES THE PRIOR
MASTER PLANS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW TOWN, A SERIES OF
PLANS WERE DRAWN,/18 INCLUDING THE MASTER PLAN OF GUACAMAYAS.
THIS LAST ONE WAS A REQUIREMENT OF THE WORLD BANK PROJECT.
4. ADJUSTED PROJECT VERSION
A.CHANGES IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION.
THE INITIAL WORLD BANK URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESIGNED
IN 1976 WAS A TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT LOAN TO CONTINUE
THE URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENTS OF WHAT WAS CONCEIVED OF
AS A GROWTH POLE PROJECT. SIX YEARS LATER , THE PROJECT HAD
BEEN MORE A SHELTER THAN IN FACT AN URBAN INTEGRATED PROJECT.
INDEED, THE SHELTER RELATED COMPONENTS IN THE ORIGINAL PROJECT
ALTOGETHER WERE LESS THAN ONE FOURTH OF THE RESOURCE ALLOCATION
SHARE , WHILE THESE COMPONENTS ACTUAL NUMBERS AT THE TIME OF
PROJECT TERMINATION WENT UP TO 64.5%.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE NON-SHELTER SHARE IN THE ORIGINAL
PROJECT WAS MORE THAN TWO THIRDS, WHILE IN THE ADJUSTED VERSION
ITS WAS NOTICEABLY REDUCED; IN THE FINAL ACCOUNT IT WAS ONLY
17/ WITHIN THE PERIOD 1977-1982, THE NATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM
INVOLVED THE DRAWING OF SOME 2500 PLANS AT 8 LEVELS OF
COMPLEXITY.
18/ AMONG THESE WERE THE LAZARO CARDENAS FUTURE METROPOLITAN
AREA, THE FUTURE URBAN UPGRADING PLAN FO R FUNDO LEGAL, THE
TRAFFIC AND TRANSIT STUDY OF THE REGION, THE MASTER PLANS FOR
THE TWO OTHER URBAN AREAS OF THE MICROREGION, AND THE MUNICIPAL
PLANS FOR ALL THE SORROUNDING THE MICROREGION TOWNS.
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A THIRD OF THE RESOURCES.
IN THE FINAL PROJECT COMPOSITION, THE SHELTER RELATED
COMPONENTS HAD THE GREATER CHANGES: SITES AND SERVICES
INCREASED ITS SHARE MORE THAN FIVE AND A HALF TIMES; THE
BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS IN 112% AND THE UPGRADING PROJECT IN
90%.
B.RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONS
THE WORLD BANK LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
WAS CHARACTERIZED BY THE SMALL NUMBER OF PARTICIPANT
INSTITUTIONS THAT INTERVENED IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND
EVALUATIONS.
THE PROPOSED BORROWER ON THE LOAN WAS THE MEXICAN
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BY BANOBRAS./19 THIS AGENCY WAS
CONSIDERED BY THE WORLD BANK AS A WELL-ORGANIZED INSTITUTION
WITH STRONG MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES, WHICH IN
ADDITION HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THOUSANDS OF
FINISHED HOUSING. IT WAS ALSO CONSIDERED TO HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE
EXPERIENCE IN MANAGING URBAN TRUSTS (FIDEICOMISOS) ACTING AS
TRUSTEE FOR FIDELAC.
FIDELAC WAS CHOSEN AS THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY DESPITE ITS
DEFICIENT FINANCIAL RECORD AND PAST MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES (SEE
19/ BANOBRAS AT THAT TIME HAD PROVIDED SOME 30,000 FAMILIES
WITH SERVICED PLOTS. IT HAD ALSO DEVELOPED IMAGINATIVE PROGRAMS
FOR HOME OWNERSHIP, UPGRADING, SLUM REDEVELOPMENT AND FOR
APPLYING TECHNIQUES OF CROSS-SUBSIDATION AS WELL AS CAPTURING
INCREMENTAL VALUE TO BENEFIT LOWER-INCOME FAMILIES
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I-5C SUBSIDIES IN HOUSING), FOR AS AN INSTITUTION ALREADY
OPERATING IN THE PROJECT AREA, WOULD BE MORE BENEFICIAL TO
IMPROVE ITS OPERATIONAL CAPACITY (SEE III-1 FIDELAC'S RENEWED
ROLE)
THE MONITORING AND EVALUATION ROLES WERE ASSIGNED TO
FIDELAC, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO ANALYZE THE FIELD EXPERIENCES
AND ASSESS THE IMPACT OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. FIDELAC HENCE
CREATED A SPECIAL OFFICE TO COORDINATE THE LOGISTICS OF THE
PROGRAM (SEE 111-2 INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION).
THE MINISTRIES OF HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC WORKS WERE
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TECHNICAL STUDIES AND RURAL ROADS
COMPONENTS, AND THE MINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES AND AGRICULTURE
FOR THE RIVER WORKS (SEE II-4F OTHER PROJECT COMPONENTS)
C.COST RECOVERY, AFFORDABILILTY, AND REPLICABILITY
1) COST RECOVERY. IN ORDER TO ENSURE PROJECT REPLICABILITY,
FULL RECOVERY OF COSTS WAS ATTEMPTED, HENCE APPROPRIATE PRICING
POLICIES FOLLOWED. IN DESIGNING SUCH A STRATEGY, SPECIAL
ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROPER BALANCE
BETWEEN PROJECT COSTS AND THE INCOME LEVELS OF
BENEFICIARIES./20
ALSO IMPORTANT WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROPER RECOVERY
MECHANISMS WHERE COST RECOVERY WAS APPLICABLE (SEE V-4 COST
RECOVERY PERFORMANCE).
20/ THE PRICING SYSTEM USED BY FIDELAC CONSIDERED PRICES
ACCORDING TO THREE CRITERIA: NEIGHBORHOOD, LAYOUT LOCATION, AND
STREET WIDTH. THERE WERE 36 POSSIBLE PRICE ALTERNATIVES, WITH
A PRICE DIFFERENTIAL OF 550%.
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WITHIN THE OVERALL WORLD BANK PROJECT, ABOUT HALF OF THE
BENEFICIARIES WERE SHELTER RELATED, HENCE THE ASSOCIATED COSTS
WERE CONSIDERED TO BE DIRECTLY RECOVERED FN0M THEM. FIDELAC WAS
TO RECOVER MOST OF THE COST ASSOCIATED WITH THE URBAN UPGRADING
PROJECT, THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT, AND THE BUILDING
MATERIALS LOANS PROGRAM THROUGH CONTRACTS AND INDIVIDUAL
LOANS/20 (SEE II-4D FINANCEMENT ISSUES).
2)AFFORDABILITY. A SPECIAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY WAS
CARRIED OUT BY FIDELAC AT THE TIME OF PROJECT PREPARATION. IT
WAS ESTIMATED THAT THE PROGRAM COULD INCLUDE THE LOWEST 40th
PERCENTILE OF THE REGION'S INCOME DISTRIBUTION (EXCEPT FOR THE
LOWEST 3% OF THE LOCAL POPULATION). IT WAS ASSUMED A 15% TO 20%
OF A HOUSEHOLD INCOME WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR HOUSING
PAYMENTS . /21
A SPECIAL FEATURE OF THE WORLD BANK LOW-INCOME HOUSING
FINANCING WAS THAT IT CHARGED A DOUBLE INTEREST RATE COMPARED T
O WHAT FIDELAC HAD BEEN OFFERING -THOUGH SUBSIDIZED- TO MIDDLE
INCOME HOUSING BUYERS./22
3) REPLICABILITY. THE INITIAL IDEA WAS TO EXPAND THESE
PROJECTS OVER THE REGION'S SETTLEMENTS. FOR THIS PURPOSE,
COMMUNITY ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PROGRAM BECAME FUNDAMENTAL. (SEE
111-3 ACCESS TO COMMUNITY AND INITIAL WORKS). ALSO IMPORTANT IN
21/ 15% FOR SERVICED PLOT, 20% FOR CORE-HOUSING.
22/ FIDELAC WAS OFFERING A 6% TO 8% IN THE FIRST HOUSING
PROVISION PHASE.
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THIS RESPECT WAS THE NEED TO REGULARIZE LAND TENURE AS TO BE
USED AS COLLATERAL FOR MORTGAGING.
THE SHELTER PROJECTS WERE EXPECTED TO COVER THE TOTAL
DEMAND FROM LOW-INCOME HOUSING FAMILIES UNTIL PROJECT
TERMINATION IN 1981 /23 (SEE V-5 HOUSING DEMAND AND SUPPLY
AFTER PROJECT). THE REPAYMENTS ADDED TO FIDELAC'S INCREASED
TECHNICAL AND MANAGERIAL CAPABILITIES, AND THE PRIVATE BANKING
SYSTEM, WERE THOUGHT TO BE THE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE SHELTER
PROVISION. /24
D. FINANCIAL ISSUES
THE LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS A GRANT
FROM THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO FIDELAC -THROUGH THE WORLD BANK
REQUEST- FOR CREATING TWO SEPARATE REVOLVING FUNDS TO
CONTINUE AFTERWARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF HOUSING AND URBAN
SERVICES IN THE REGION./25 ALL FINANCIAL RISKS INITIALLY TAKEN
WERE TO BE ABSORBED THROUGH HIGHER INTEREST RATES TO THE
BENEFICIARIES. SINCE A PESO DEVALUATION ACTUALLY OCCURRED THEY
WERE PASSED ON TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
23/ THE WORLD BANK-FIDELAC TEAM ESTIMATED THIS TO BE 74% OF THE
TOTAL DEMAND FOR HOUSING.
24/ WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED WAS THAT THE LOW RETURN RATES, THE
NATIONALIZATION OF THE PRIVATE BANKING SYSTEM AND THE
INCREASING DWINDLING ROLE OF FIDELAC HAVE REDUCED TO A VERY
MINIMUM THE PROVISION OF LOW INCOME HOUSING IN THE REGION.
25/ THE WORLD BANK. LAZARO CARDENAS CONURBATION DEVELOPMENT
PROJECT . WASHINGTON D.C.: THE WORLD BANK, 1978.
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THE PROJECT REPORT ESTABLISHED THE PERCENTAGES (SEE TABLE)
TO BE PROVIDED BY EACH OF THE THREE ACTORS: GOVERNMENT (52.1%),
WORLD BANK (43.1%) AND BENEFFICIARIES (4.4%). THE IMPLIED
SUBSIDY WITHIN THE SHELTER COMPONENTS WAS 100% FOR OFF-SITE
INFRASTRUCTURE. FOR ON-SITE INFASTRUCTURE IT WAS 38.5% AND
25% RESPECTIVELY IN UPGRADING, AND SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS.
THE LOAN WAS GRANTED FOR A TERM OF 17 YEARS, PLUS A GRACE
PERIOD OF 4 YEARS, WITH AN ANNUAL INTEREST RATE OF 15%. THE
PARTICULAR FINANCIAL SITUATION OF EACH PROGRAM IS AS FOLLOWS:
THE SELF-HELP BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS HAD A VARIABLE
REPAYMENT TERM FROM 1 TO 7 YEARS, 15% INTEREST RATE, AND THE
INITIATION OF PAYMENT 6 MONTHS AFTER THE CREDIT WAS TOTALLY
DISBURSED.
THE TERMS FOR THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS WAS 5 TO 10
YEARS, WITH THE SAME INTEREST RATE(INCLUDING A 2% MONTHLY
INTEREST FOR DELAYED PAYMENT). THE DOWN PAYMENT FOR A
SERVICED PLOT WAS US$22, WHILE THE MONTHLY PAYMENTS WERE 22 TO
28 ']DLLARS IN GUACAMAYAS, AND 36 TO 40 DOLLARS IN ZONA
FIDEICOMITIDA.
THE ECONOMIC RATES OF RETURN WERE 22% FOR THE UPGRADING,
AND 28% FOR THE SITES AND SERVICES AND SELF-HELP PROJECTS
WHILE THE OVERALL PROJECT AVERAGE WAS 24%.
THE LOAN INCLUDED FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR THE THREE PILOT
PROJECTS, AS WELL AS SOME INITIAL STUDIES. IT ALSO TOOK
EFFICIENT MEASURES TO ASSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF FINANCIAL
RESOURCES.
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E. PROJECT STANDARDS.
THE SHELTER PROJECTS' DESIGN STANDARDS WERE NEGOTIATED IN
THE SECOND ROUND OF CONVERSATIONS. THE DETAILED ENGINEERING WAS
PREPARED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT OF FIDELAC.
THE OVERALL URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT INCLUDED PLANS FOR
INTRODUCING INF RASTRUCTURE AND BASIC SERVICES TO MOST OF THE
REGION'S SETTLEMENTS; HOWEVER, ONLY THE PLANNED ACTIONS THAT
ACTUALLY WERE CARRIED OUT ARE ADRESSED HERE.
ALL THE LOTS COVERED BY BOTH URBAN UPGRADING, AND SITES
AND SERVICES PROJECTS WERE TO HAVE INDIVIDUAL WATER AND SEWAGE
DWELLING CONNECTIONS. NONE OF THE NEW OFF-SITE INSTALLATIONS
NEAR THE PROJECTS' AREAS WERE REQUIRED, ONLY EXPANSIONS OF THE
DISTRIBUTION AND COLLECTION NETWORKS.
ALTHOUGH INITIAL WATER CONSUMPTION WAS ESTIMATED TO BE
LOWER, THE DESIGN CRITERIA WAS BASED ON A DAILY PER CAPITA
WATER CONSUMPTION OF 200 LTS TO 250 LTS, AND 75% OF THAT AS
DISCHARGE. /26
THE ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION CONSISTS OF EXPANDING THE
EXISTING NETWORK TO PROVIDE STREET LIGHTING AND INDIVIDUAL
DWELLING CONNECTIONS, INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL METERS TO THE
FAMILIES TO BE SETTLED IN THE RECOVERED LOTS, AND THE SITES AND
SERVICES PROJECTS. THE ELECTRICAL NETWORK WAS TO COVER STREET
LIGHTING AND ALL OTHER NON-RESIDENTIAL CONSUMPTION./27
26/ EXISTING NETWORKS WERE DESIGNED WITH EXPAPNSION
CAPACITIES FOR POPULATION GROWTH PROJECTIONS UP TO 1990.
27/ THE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE ELECTRICAL NETWORK WAS BASED ON
AN ESTIMATED DEMAND OF 3,150 WATTS PER CAPITA WITH AN 0.6
FACTOR, OR ABOUT 2,000 WATTS PER CAPITA)
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THE INITIAL PLANS OF THE UPGRADING OF THE CIRCULATION
NETWORK CONSISTED OF TWO STEPS, NAMELY, THE REMODELLING OF
URBAN LAYOUTS /28, FOLLOWED BY THE PAVING OF A SELECTED PART OF
THE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE YEAR ROUND ACCESS TO ALL PARTS OF THE
TOWN. THE CIRCULATION NETWORK IN ALL SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT
AREAS WAS ONLY INTENDED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE SETTLEMENTS
AND NOT TOTAL COVERAGE. ALL STREETS WERE TO BE DESIGNED TO BE
EVENTUALLY UPGRADED. IN DESIGNING THE ACCESS NEWORK, PRIORITY
WAS TO BE GIVEN TO PEDESTRIAN PATHS RATHER THAN TO VEHICULAR
STREETS.
F.OTHER PROJECT COMPONENTS.
TO HAVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE WHOLE URBAN PROJECT, A BRIEF
ACCOUNT ON THE 5 NON-SHELTER PROJECT COMPONENTS FOLLOWS:
A.SMALL BUSINESS CREDITS:
PROVISION OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ESTABLISH SMALL BUSINESSES
OR THE ENLARGEMENT OF EXISTING ONES. THE PROGRAMMING WAS AS
FOLLOWS.
N U M B E R 0 F A C T IO N S
C R E D I T F 0 R INITIAL ACTUAL ACHIEVEMENT
Micro-enterprises 130 37 28.5%
Small-enterprises 40 100 250.5%
Middle-size enterprises 6 6 100.0%
Number of jobs. 1200 385 32.1%
28/ IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE COSTS OF THE PROVIDED SERVICES,
THE TECHNICAL TEAM LOOKED FOR INCREASING THE DENSITIES OF
EXISTING URBANIZED AREAS AND THUS, INCREASED THE NUMBER OF
HOUSEHOLDS THAT COULD SHARE IN THE COST OF GENERAL
INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS. (REDUCING THE SIZE OF LARGER PLOTS,
REDUCING AND STRAIGHTENING OUT ROADS AND FOOTPATHS, AND
PLANNING HOUSING CLUSTERS IN THE EMPTY CORES OF LARGE STREET
BLOCKS)
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B. INDUSTRIAL PREMISES:
THE OBJECTIVES WERE TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW
ENTERPRISES, BUILD WORKSHOP HALLS AND INDUSTRIAL BUILDING FOR
LEASE. NONE OF THESES WORKS WERE ACCOMPLISHED.
C.REGIONAL FEEDER ROADS.
THIS PROJECT CONSISTED OF CONSTRUCTING AND UPGRADING 8
ROADS WITH A TOTAL LENGTH OF 198KM. THIS COMPONENT WAS
CONCEIVED AS A REQUIRED SUPPORT TO DEVELOP THE POTENTIAL
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION. A NETWORK WAS
CONCEIVED TO CONNECT LARGE CULTIVATED AREAS AND SPACE FOR
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION, WITH THE NEW CONSUMERS URBAN MARKET OF
THE REGION. FIDELAC REPORTED ACCOMPLISHED 90% OF THESE
WORKS./29
D.RIVER CONTROL WORKS
THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS COMPONENT WAS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF
EROSION, SILTATION, AND RISK OF OVE RFLOODS FROM ONE OF THE TWO
MOUTHS OF THE BALSAS RIVER. THESE WORKS WERE NEVER CARRIED
OUT, DUE TO PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION BETWEEN IMPLEMENTING
AGENCIES AND ALSO BECAUSE OF A CHANGE OF PLAN FOR THE
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE AREA.
D.TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR PLANNING:
MORE THAN ONE MILLION DOLLARS WAS ALLOCATED TO THIS
COMPONENT. IT WAS USED TO DEVELOP A SERIES OF STUDIES TO BE
29/ THE INITIAL EVALUATION REPORTED ONLY 4 ROADS FINISHED.
(FIDELAC FIRST ROUGHT DRAFT PROJECT TERMINATION REPORT,
1983)
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PERFORMED INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE REGION. HOWEVER A LARGE PART
WAS NOT USED BY SAHOP, FOR ITS WAS ABLE TO SUSTITUTE THEM WITH
FEDERAL RESOURCES. /30
6.COMMUNITY CENTERS.
THESE COMPONENTS WERE TO BE SUPPORT ELEMENTS OF THE SHELTER
PROJECTS. THE INITIAL PLANS WERE TO HAVE 2 IN GUACAMAYAS, AND
TWO IN OTHER TOWNS OF THE REGION. ONLY THOSE IN GUACAMAYAS WERE
CONSTRUCTED.
THESE HAVE OPERATED AS TRAINING CENTERS, BUT ALSO HAVE BEEN
INSTRUMENTAL IN PROMOTING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES AMONG
THE GUACAMAYAS POPULATION.
30/ DANIEL HIERNOUX. "EL ESTADO Y LAS POLITICAS URBANAS", IN
LAS TRUCHAS: INVERSION PARA LA DESIGUALDAD? (IVAN RESTREPO
Ed.) MEXICO CITY: CENTRO DE ECODESARROLLO, 1984. p.122
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C H A P T E R I I I
THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY
THIS CHAPTER FOCUSSES IN FIDELAC AS IMPLEMENTING AGENCY.
ASPECTS CONSIDERED HEREIN ARE OPERATIONAL CHANGES BEFORE AND
DURING THE SHELTER PROGRAM, THE SERIES OF ACTIONS THAT WERE
CARRIED OUT AT THE OUTSET, AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WERE FOUND
AND HOW THAY WERE OVERCOME. SPECIAL EMPHASIS IS PUT IN THE
LISTING OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT
ORGANIZATION FIOM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY.
ALSO IMPORTANT IS THE REFERENCE TO THE LAND TENURE
REGULARIZATION PROGRAM FOR ITS CENTRAL ROLE FOR INITIATING THE
UPGRADING PROJECT ACTIONS. THE CHAPTER ENDS WITH A BRIEF
ACCOUNT OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT ISSUES.
1. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGHTENING.
AS A RESULT FROM NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WORLD BANK, FIDELAC
BECAME A CORPORATE-MINDED, EFFICIENT PROVIDER OF URBAN
SERVICES./l THE REGIONAL ROLE OF FIDELAC WITHIN THE
MICROREGION WAS REINFORCED AND ENHANCED. THERE WERE MANY
CHANGES IN SEVERAL FRONTS. THE CHIEF ONES WERE:
1/ OUTSET OUTCOMES WERE 20% REDUCTION OF ITS ORIGINAL STAFF,
THE RENEWAL OF SOME HIGH RANK POSITIONS, AND THE OPENNING OF
NEW POSITIONS TO DEAL WITH THE NEW FUNCTIONS SET FORWARD BY THE
PROJECT.
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1.THE AUTHORIZATION TO EXPAND ITS AREA OF CONCERN./2
2. THE ENDOWMENT OF MOST OF THE SE TTLED LAND IN GUACAMAYAS.
3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A REVOLVENT FUND TO EXPAND THE
SHELTER AND OTHER PROVISION PROGRAMS.
4.HALTING THE CONSTRUCTING OF FINISHED HOUSING FOR MIDDLE
AND MIDDLE HIGH-INCOME GROUPS./3
5.HAVING ACHIEVED FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE OPPORTUNITY TO
SATISFY THE SHELTER DEMANDS OF THE STEEL WORKERS./4
6.THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FINANCIAL POLICY THAT REFLECTED
REAL COSTS OF CAPITAL.
2. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION
FIDELAC PLAYED THE ROLE OF THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY FOR
BOTH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW TOWN AND THE PROVISION OF
HOUSING. ITS INTERNAL ORGANIZATION WAS ENHANCED AND ITS
CAPABILITIES IMPROVED.
2/ BY THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON NOVEMBER 1978, FIDELAC WAS
AUTHORIZED TO WORK ON ALL OF THE MICROREGION (AFTER LAND WOULD
BE EXPROPRIATED). THE SAME DECREE ALSO GRANTED FIDELAC WITH
THE LAND WHERE MOST OF GUACAMAYAS WAS SETTLED (EXCEPT FOR THE
EJIDAL URBANA ZONE), FORMER PROPRIETY OF THE BALSAS RIVER
COMMISSION.
3/ THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE OVERSUPPLY OF HOUSING IN THE NEW
DEVELOPMENT AREAS IN WHERE MORE THAN 1500 MIDDLE AND MIDDLE-
HIGH INCOME UNITS REMAINED IDDLE FOR THE FOLLOWING THREE YEARS.
4/ ONE OF THE REASONS FIDELAC WAS INITIALLY CREATED, WAS TO
RESPOND PRIMARILY TO THE STEEL WORKERS HOUSING PROBLEMS.
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THE PROJECT PROMPTED THE CREATION OF U.P.E. (PROGRAMMING
AND MONITORING UNIT), WHICH WAS DIRECTLY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
GENERAL DIRECTOR, OVER THE THREE OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENTS.
THIS UNIT WAS IN CHARGE OF COORDINATING THE LOGISTICS OF
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.
WHEN ITS GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF CONCERN WAS EXPANDED BY A
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE IN 1978, FIDELAC WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
DRAWING UP THE GUACAMAYAS MASTER PLAN. NOT HAVING A PLANNING
DEPARMENT, U.P.E. SOON WAS CHARGED WITH THIS TASK AND OTHER,
RESULTING IN AN INCREASE OF ASSIGNED PERSONNEL. THE NEW TASKS
AND THE APPARENT NEED TO DEAL WITH THE OPERATIONAL DEPARMENTS
IN A MORE DIRECT WAY PROMPTED AN HIERARCHICAL CHANGE: U.P.E.
BECAME A FOURTH OPERATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF FIDELAC.
U.P.E.'s CHANGE PROVED TO BE A POSITIVE ONE, FOR IT GOT
THE NEEDED COMMITMENT FROM THE OTHER THREE DEPARTMENT HEADS,
THAT UP TO THAT POINT WERE NOT VERY CLEAR FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
PROJECT./5
OTHER THAN THIS CHANGE, FIDELAC CONTINUED WORKING WITH THE
SAME INSTITUTIONAL OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR MUCH OF THE TIME
OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. IT WAS IN EARLY 1981 THAT THE
CHANGE OF STATE GOVERNOR BROUGHT ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF
ANOTHER GENERAL DIRECTOR (LIC.BARRIOS KNOCK) WHO MADE CHANGES
AND DELEGATED A NEW TEAM TO KEY POSITIONS. THE CHANGE THAT
CAUSED THE MOST DIRECT IMPACT TO THE PROJECT WAS THE
5/ INTERVIEW TO DANIEL HIERNOUX, HEAD OF U.P.E. DURING PROJECT
IMPLEMENTATION.
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TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIAL DEPARTMENT IN THE HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS OFFICE. THE FIELD TEAM WHICH THEN HAD FORTY
MEMBERS, WAS DRASTICALLY REDUCED, AND ITS OFFICES WERE MOVED
FROM NEAR THE BUILDING ENTRANCE TO SOME PROVISIONAL BUILDING
SORROUNDING THE PARKING LOT. PARALLELING THIS HIERARCHICAL
SWITCH, THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WORKS WERE LIMITED TO MINIMUN
OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS, MAINLY THOSE RELATED TO BASIC ACTIONS
OF THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS.
THE MOST RELEVANT ISSUES IN PROJECT ORGANIZATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE IMPLEMENTING STAGE WERE:
POSITIVE ASPECTS:
-POSSIBILITY TO RECRUIT SKILLED AND HIGHLY MOTIVATED
PERSONNEL
-USEFULL CAPITALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE F ROM THE PILOT
PROJECT EXPERIENCE
-AGENCY'S TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY AVOIDED MANY OF THE
BUREAUCRATIC CONSTRAINTS, EXCEPT FOR THE ISSUING OF LAND
EXPROPRIATION DECREES.
-WHEN MUTUAL AID PROPOSALS WERE ABANDONNED, THEY WERE
SUSTITUTED WITH INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
-THE FIELD TEAM APPARENTLY WORKED WELL, WITH RESPECT TO
ITS SPECIAL INVOLVEMENT AND COMMITMENT WITH PROJECT OBJECTIVES.
-POLITICAL RESISTANCE TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION WAS
SUCCESSFULLY AND CONSISTANTLY OVERCOME BY THE FIELD TEAM. THE
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FEW CONFLICTS WITH SOME MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY WERE WELL
MANAGED.
-THE SELF HELP PROGRAM ACHIEVED A HIGHLY BENEFICIAL
CONTROL OF QUALITY AND COSTS OF THE SPECIALIZED LABOR FOR
HOUSING.
-SETTING UP PRODUCTION REDUCED COSTS IN BUILDING
MATERIALS.
-TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SERVICES WERE USEFUL AND WERE WELL
FITTED TO PEOPLE'S NEEDS.
-BUILDING MATERIALS ORGANIZATION AND DELIVERY WAS
EFFICIENT WHEN FUNDING WAS REDUCED. A CENTRALIZED SCHEME WAS
ESTABLISHED, AND TEAM-SIZE WAS REDUCED.
-EVALUATORY STUDY ON SELF-HELP PROGRAM BY U.P.E. PROVIDED
REQUIRED FEEDBACK TO CORRECT INITIAL PITFALLS, SPECIALLY IN THE
SELECTION PROCESS.
NEGATIVE ASPECTS:
-THE INITIAL PLANS OF THE COLLECTION OFFICE TO COORDINATE
RECORD KEEPING FOR BENEFICIARIES OF OVERLAPPING PROJECTS WERE
NOT THOROUGHLY FOLLOWED AND EVENTUALLY THE CONTROL WAS LOST.
-IN GENERAL, THERE WAS DIFFICULTY COORDINATING A GREAT
VARIETY OF WORKS BEING INITATED AT DIFFERENT STAGES, WITHOUT
EFFICIENT PROGRAMMING.
-CONSTANT FRICTION BETWEEN THE SOCIAL FIELD TEAM AND THE
TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT CAUSED FREQUENT DEMAND OF CHANGES IN
PHYSICAL PLANS
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-THERE WAS ILL MANAGEMENT OF THE POLITICS INVOLVED IN LAND
EXPROPRIATION PROCESSES. /6
-ALTHOUGH MANAGEMENT AND CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENTS WORKED
WELL, GENERALLY, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONTRACTORS FINISH UP
WORKS.
-INITIALLY THERE WAS AN INEFFICIENT SELECTION OF
PARTICIPANTS.
-THERE WAS SLOW REDUCTION OF HIGH DEFAULT RATES./7
-THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN DEFINITION OF RESPONSABILITIES
EVIDENT AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION./8
3.ACCESS TO THE COMMUNITY AND INITIAL WORKS.
THE INITIAL WORKS CARRIED OUT IN GUACAMAYAS WERE THE
FOLLOWING SIX IDENTIFIABLE ACTIONS:
A) INTEGRATION OF THE FIELD TEAM.
B) THE INITIAL STUDIES ON PLOT LIMITS
C) THE CAPITALIZATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN GUACAMAYAS
D) THE REBLOCKING OF GUACAMAYAS
F) THE ORGANIZATION OF A TRASH COLLECTION SERVICE
F) THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNAL FACILITIES
6/ ALTHOUGH IT IS UNCERTAIN IF THIS WAS UNAVOIDABLE.
7/ THIS IS DUE TO A COMBINATION OF SEVERAL ASPECTS, AMONG THEM
AN UNCLEAR CONTRACT STIPULATION , BASIC ADMINISTRATIVE
PROBLEMS, AND LACK OF ENOUGH POLITICAL WILL TO ENFORCE
COLLECTION.
8/ FOR INSTANCE THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC LIGHTING IS
SOMETIMES PROVIDED BY FIDELAC, ALTHOUGH IT ITS A MATTER OF THE
FEDERAL ELECTRICAL COMMISSION. THE WASTE COLLECTION SERVICE IS
ANOTHER CASE WHICH SHOULD BE THE TOTAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
MUNICIPALITY.
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THESE ACTIONS WERE ALL RELATED IN DIFFERENT WAYS TO THE
STRATEGY TO ACCESS THE COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY THE LEANDRO VALLE
AREA. AN ACCOUNT OF EACH ONE FOLLOWS, STRESSING THOSE MORE
DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE COMMUNITY ACCESS.
A. THE INTEGRATION OF THE SOCIAL TEAM.
THE PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOCIAL DEPARTMENT OF
FIDELAC WITH THE COMMUNITIES OF GUACAMAYAS WAS REDUCED TO SOME
RECORD KEEPING, WITH ALMOST ANY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT. LEANDRO VALLE WAS CONSIDERED "A SETTLEMENT NO ONE
WANTED TO ENTER". /9
WHEN THE NEW GENERAL DIRECTOR TOOK OFFICE IN EARLY 1977 AND
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT WAS BEING NEGOTIATED, A HEAD FOR THE
FIELD TEAM WAS HIRED./10 SHE WAS AN ARCHITECT AND SOCIAL WORKER
BY TRAINING; AT THE TIME OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SHE LEADED
SOME 30 TO 40 FIELD TEAM MEMBERS.
ABOUT HALF THE FIELD TEAM WORKERS WERE NATIVE )OUNG PEOPLE,
MOST OF THEM WITH NO PREVIOUS TRAINING, BUT APPARENTLY CAPABLES
TO ACQUIRE THE NEEDED SKILLS AS THE PROGRAM WENT ON.
B.INITIAL FIELD STUDIES
THE PREVIOUS WORK CARRIED OUT IN THE REGION BY THE BRC WAS
INSTRUMENTAL IN DRAWING UP THE FIRST PHYSICAL DETAILED PLANS OF
THE SETTLEMENTS TO BE UPGRADED. TO DO THESE INITIAL WORKS A
9/ INTERVIEW TO ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO, FEBRUARY 1985.
10/ ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO. ACCORDING TO THE PEOPLE'S
OPINIONS AND ALSO MANY OF THE FIDELAC STAFF, HER PERFORMANCE
WAS FUNDAMENTAL IN ACHIEVING THE SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM IN THE
FIELD.
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PRIVATE CONSULTANT FIRM LOCATED IN MEXICO CITY WAS HIRED BY
FIDELAC. THE LACK OF PRECISION RENDERED THESE WORKS USELESS,
AND FIDELAC HAD TO INTEGRATE A SPECIAL TEAM TO REDO THE PLANS
"THIS TIME PLOT BY PLOT IN THE FIELD"./ll
C. THE CAPITALIZATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT
BECAUSE LEANDRO VALLE WAS A CLOSED SQUATTER SETTLEMENT,/12
FIDELAC COULD ACCESS THERE ONLY BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE
POLITICAL CONFLICTS THAT AROUSED AMONG LEADERS. FIDELAC BY
QUIETLY SUPPORTING A FEMALE LEADER OPPOSING THE LEADERS ASKING
FOR MONEY TO PROVIDE SERVICES, WAS ABLE TO MEDIATE IN THE
CONFLICT, AND BY DOING THIS, GAINED THE NEEDED LEVERAGE WITHIN
THE COMMUNITY./13
D. THE INITIAL REBLOCKING OF LEANDRO VALLE
THIS SETTLEMENT AS A RESULT OF BEING AN OVERNIGHT LAND
INVASION WAS A COMPLETELY UNORGANIZED AND DISORDERED
SETTLEMENT. IT HAD NO OUTLAY, NOR ANY STREET PATTERN SYSTEM.
THE GROUP OF EXPERTS GATHERED IN 1976 TO SOLVE THE GUACAMAYAS
PROBLEMS, LEFT THIS SETTLEMENT WITH NO PROPOSED SOLUTION.
11/ INTERVIEW TO DR. DANIEL HIERNOUX, MARCH 1985.
12/ LEANDRO VALLE WAS A RAPIDLY CARRIED OUT LAND INVASION
ORGANIZED BY A POLITICAL GROUP "LEANDRO-VALLISTAS" WHO WERE
HEADED BY SOME FORMER MILITARY AND OTHER OLD CATHOLIC
GUERRILLAS (SINARQUISTAS). THIS GROUP WAS SUPPORTED AS WELL BY
A POLITICAL PARTY (PDM) WHICH HAD A STRONG HOLD IN THE STATE OF
MICHOACAN. THE DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS WAS APPALLING (INTERVIEW
TO DR. DANIEL HIERNOUX)
13/ AT THE POINT THAT THE CONFLICT WAS SO HIGH THAT VIOLENCE
WAS ABOUT TO START, BOTH PARTIES ASKED FIDELAC TO MEDIATE IN
THE CONFLIC. FIDELAC, ALTHOUGH OPERATIONG OUTSIDE ITS STRICT
JURIDICTION, CALLEL FOR A COMMUNITY ASSEMBLY TO VOTE FOR ONE OF
THE TWO PARTIES. THE MUNICIPALITY PRESENT, THE FEMALE LEADER
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GAIN THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD.
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE LEVERAGE GAINED BY MEDIATING IN THE
LOCAL CONFLICT AMONG COMMUNITY GROUPS, FIDELAC WAS ABLE,
--THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMITTEES--
TO ACHIEVE THE REBLOCKING OF THIS SETTLEMENT.
THIS ACTION WAS BASIC TO THE LATER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
WOWRLD BANK SHELTER PROGRAM.
E.THE ORGANIZATION OF A WASTE COLLECTION SERVICE
FIDELAC PROMOTED THE ORGANIZATION OF A TRASH COLLECTION
SERVICE BY ASKING SOME LOCAL FEMALE LEADERS TO COORDINATE THE
ACTIONS TO ENABLE A TRUCK AN EASY ACCESS TO PARTS OF THE
NEIGHBORHOOD DIFFICULT TO ENTER. BY THE PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION,
FIDELAC WAS ABLE TO CONTACT AND ASK FOR THE COOPERATION OF THE
LEADERS FOR IMPLEMENTING LATER THAT SAME YEAR THE
REGULARIZATION PROGRAM, AND AFTERWARDS, THE URBAN UPGRADING
PROJECT.
F.THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNAL FACILITIES.
A HEALTH CENTER, A KINDER, A READIND ROOM, AND SOME PUBLIC
PLAZAS THAT WERE PROVIDED UNDER THE 1976 SPECIAL PROGRAM IN
GUACAMAYAS. BECAUSE THEY WERE ILL CONSTRUCTED, FIDELAC WAS ABLE
TO IMPROVE THEM. OTHER ACTION THAT WAS INSTRUMENTAL FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS WAS THE CONSTRUCTION, BY
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT, OF A NEW MARKET IN GUACAMAYAS./14
14/ THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MARKET BUILDING WAS IMPORTANT TO
THE UPGRADING PROJECT FOR THE THEN EXISTING MARKET WAS POSTED
IN THE MIDDLE OF THE STREETS IN ONE ONE OF GUACAMAYAS
NEIGHBORHOODS TO BE UPGRADED.
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4.LAND REGULARIZATION PROGRAM
THE INITIAL FIRST REGIONAL LAND REGULARIZATION PROGRAM IN
1976, AFTER SUCCEEDING IN THE OLD PART OF LAZARO CARDENAS, HAD
BEEN STOPPED FEW MONTHS AFTER IN GUACAMAYAS, WITH FEW ACTIONS
COMPLETED. THE REGULARIZATION PROCESS WAS REINITIATED IN 1978
AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AUTHORIZING
FIDELAC TO UNDERTAKE WORKS IN THE WHOLE MICROREGION (SEE LAND
ACQUISITION ISSUES).
THIS DECREE WAS PROMPTED BY THE VISIT OF THE MINISTRY OF
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS AND PUBLIC WORKS TO GUACAMAYAS IN 1977 THE
VISIT COINCIDED WITH THE POLITICAL PARTISAN STRUGGLE IN LEANDRO
VALLE (SEE POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS IN GUACAMAYAS), AND IT WAS
INTERPRETED AS A SPECIAL FAVOR OF THE MINISTRY, NOT ONLY BY THE
COMMUNITY BUT ALSO BY THE FIELD TEAM /15, THEN IN PROCESS OF
INTEGRATION. THIS FAVORING BECAME ANOTHER FACTOR CONTRIBUTING
TO THE SOCIALLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION (SEE STRATEGY
TO ACCESSING THE COMMUNITY).
IN 1978 320 ACTIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN AND AT THE END OF THE
YEAR 250 TITLES HAD BEEN ISSUED /16. THESE ACTIONS WERE LIMITED
TO LEANDRO VALLE, HOWEVER THE NEXT YEAR THE REST OF THE
GUACAMAYAS NEIGHBORHOODS -EXCEPT FOR TWO- WERE INITIATED.
ON THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PROGRAM, THE HIGHLY CONFLICTIVE
LUCRECIA TORIZ NEIGHBORHOOD FINALLY SIGNED THE ACCEPTANCE
CONTRACT. AT THE END OF THE YEAR 65% OF GUACAMAYASA HOUSEHOLDS
15/ INTERVIEW TO ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO. FEB.23, 1985.
16/ FIDELAC REPORT TO BANOBRAS. ROUGH DRAFT. 1983.
HAD GOTTEN ITS LAND TITTLE /17.
THE LAST NEIGHBORHOOD, URBANA-EJIDAL WAS NEVER
REGULARIZED, FOR BEING SETTLED OUT OF THE LAND ENDOWED TO
FIDELAC. BEING UNDER EJIDAL TENURE (DEFINITION IN LAND
ACQUISITION ISSUES) IT HAD TO WAIT FOR THE ISSUING OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL EXPROPRIATION DECREE, WHICH IN REALITY WAS NEVER
ISSUED (SEE LAND ACQUISITION ISSUES).
ALTHOUGH IN 1984 THERE WERE STILL SOME PENDING CASES, THE
PROCESS OF LAND TENURE REGULARIZATION WAS TOTALLY FINISHED IN
GUACAMAYAS. AT PRESENT, BESIDES URBANA EJIDAL, THERE ARE TWO
NEW SETTLEMENTS SORROUNDING GUACAMAYAS BEYOND ITS LEGAL
BOUNDARIES /18. NEITHER HAS BEEN REGULARIZED .
THE DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY FOUND IN THIS PROGRAM WAS HIGH
ONLY IN LUCRECIA TORIZ, WHERE TWO OF THE LEADERS WERE TOTALLY
OPPOSED TO THE PROGRAM FOR FEARING THEY WOULD LOOSE LARGE
PIECES OF LAND ADJOINED TO GUACAMAYAS. IN SPITE OF HARSH
PARTISAN OPPOSITION, FIDELAC KEPT WORKING UNTIL A MAJOR GROUP
OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD CHOSE TO ACT SEPARATEDLY. SOON AFTER THE
LEADERS THEN ACCEPTED THE REGULARIZATION PROGRAM.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE WERE TWO SPECIALLY COOPERATIVE
AND EASY TO WORK NEIGHBORHOODS: ANIBAL PONCE, THE LARGEST
17/ MARGARITA NOLASCO. LA CIUDAD DE LOS POBRES. IN LAS TRUCHAS.
MEXICO:ED.ECODESARROLLO, 1984. P.152
18/ LAS FLORES (300 SQUATTER FAMILIES) AND COLONIA DE TEMPORAL
A TEMPORARY SETTLEMENT SET UP BY FIDELAC AS A RESULT OF A LAND
INVASION IN 1982.
NEIGHBORHOOD, WHERE A MAJORITY OF STEEL WORKERS NOW LIVE /19 AND
EL TRIANGULITO, A SMALL, WELL ORGANIZED NEIGHBORHOOD WHO WERE
ANXIOUS TO HAVE THEIR LAND PROPERTY CLEARED UP /20.
5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN IMPLEMENTATION.
TWO OF THE THREE FORESEEN IMPLEMENTATION DIFFICULTIES IN
THE PROJECT REPORT ACTUALLY OCCURRED: THE TIME REQUIRED FOR
LAND EXPROPRIATION, AND FIDELAC' S MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY /21.
THE NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES, AS CAN BE EXPECTED FROM ANY
LARGE SCALE PROJECT, WERE MANY. THE MOST CONSPICUOUS EMERGED
F10M THE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION OF NUMEROUS ACTORS, WITH A
MULTITUDE OF TIME FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOMES, THE USE OF
RESOURCES, AND THE ACTORS ASWELL. MOREOVER, PROBLEMS INHERENT
IN ANY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION WERE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREMENTED BY
BOTH, THE OPPOSSING LEADERS WITH VESTED INTERESTS IN LAND
SPECULATION, AND THE HIGH RATE OF INFLATION THAT EVENTUALLY
LEAD TO ONLY ACHIEVE ABOUT HALF THE PROJECT'S TARGETS (SEE
ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES).
THE MAIN SITUATIONS RELATED TO PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION THAT
TO DIFFERENT DEGREES WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH, THE REDUCED
RESULTS AND THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DELAYS WERE THE
FOLLOWING:
19/ A 1984 FIDELAC'S SOCIAL DEPARTMENT SURVEY FOUND THAT 53% OF
HOUSEHOLDS ARE SICARTSA WORKERS.
20/ INTERVIEW WITH ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ TOLEDANO.
21/ WORLD BANK PROJECT REPORT. APRIL 4, 1978. p46.
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1.DIFFICULTIES IN HIRING SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL IN A
FRONTIER REGION /22.
2.INITIAL COMPLICATIONS FOR OVERWHEALMING LOADS OF WORK
FOR PERSONNEL IN GENERAL, BUT SPECIALLY FOR THOSE FOLLOWING
MANAGERIAL TASKS RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF BENEFICIARIES.
3.COMMUNITY RESISTANCE TO PROJECT ACCEPTANCE FROM SOME
LOCAL LEADERS WITH VESTED INTERESTS /23.
4.THE CONFUSION IN COORDINATING TOO MANY WORKS IN
DIFFERENT STAGES /24 AND ABANDONMENT OF HALF TERMINATED WORKS,
SPECIALLY SOME FACILITIES THAT LATER HAD TO BE REBUILT.
5.THE AWAITING FOR LAND EXPROPRIATION DECREES TO INITIATE
WORKS THAT, EXCEPT FOR MINOR ACTIONS, WERE NEVER CARRIED OUT.
6.THE UNUSUAL PRICE SOARING OF THE CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS
COUPLED WITH THE SUBUTILIZATION OF A PART OF THE URBANIZATION
EQUIPMENT.
7.THE STIRED UP FEARS OF PEOPLE THAT THEIR PLOTS WERE
GOING TO BE TAKEN AWAY, OR ELSE WERE GOING TO BE CHARGED
22/ DURING PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IN FIDELAC THERE WAS ANY HIGH
RANK EMPLOYEE THAT WAS NATIVE OF THE REGION.
23/ THE ARGUMENT OF LEADERS ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF FIDELAC TO
ADVANTAGEOUSLY CHARGE FOR THE LAND WAS REFLECTED IN THE 1977
CENSUS CARRIED OUT BY FIDELAC, IN WHICH 80% OF THE INQUIRED
FELT THEY WERE THE LEGAL OWNERS OF THEIR PLOTS. (GUACAMAYAS
MASTER PLAN, 1978. p82)
24/ FOR INSTANCE IN THE CASE OF ANIBAL PONCE THE NEIGHBORHOOD
WAS DIVIDED IN 11 PARTS AND EACH ONE WAS INITIATED IN A
DIFFERENT MOMENT.
UNFAIRLY; HENCE THEY TRIED TO SABORAGE THE MEETINGS /25 AND THE
WORKS /26.
8.THE CONFLICTS INVOLVED IN COORDINATING A POLICY OF
MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO SOCIAL FABRIC MANY TIMES OPPOSSED TO
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND/OR LEGAL ASPECTS
OF PROJECTS /27.
9.THE UNNOTICED BLOCKADE OF MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM, AND
SOME OTHER MINOR PROBLEMS AROUSED WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS /22.
10.THE DIFFICULTY EMBEDED IN STRICTLY CONTROLING THE
CONTRACTORS /28.
25/ AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PROGRAM, IT WAS COMMON THAT EITHER
PEOPLE WOULD NOT COME TO THE SECOND MEETINGS, ADVISED BY THE
LEADERS, OR THAT AFTER ARRIVING TO AGGREEMENTS, THE LEADERS
WOULD CALL FOR A SECOND ASSEMBLY TO INVALIDATE THE ALREADY
TAKEN AGGREEMENTS.
26/ FOR INSTANCE THERE WERE REPORTED SOME WORKERS CREWS THAT HAD
TO STOP THEIR WORKS FOR BEING DILAPIDATED. OTHER REPORTS SPEAK
OF OVERNITE REFILLING WITH GARBAGE AND DIRT OF PROJECT'S
EXCAVATIONS.
27/ THE MOST COMMON CHANGES WERE ON PLOT LIMITS AFFECTING BOTH
THE GENERAL BLOCK OUTLAYS, AND THE PASSAGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
LINES. THERE WERE OTHER CHANGES PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THAT
WERE TYPICALLY REJECTED BY THE TECHNICAL DEPARTMENT, SUCH AS
THOSE INVOLVING -RECALCULATION OF FLOWS IN STEEP AREAS.
28/ THE MOST COMMON WAS THE CONFLICT WITH THE MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT WHO TENDED TO DEFEND THOSE THREATENED WITH BEING
LEFT OUT OF THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS FOR THEIR LACK OF
COOPERATION.
29/ WITH CONTRACTORS THERE IS ALLWAYS THE PROBLEM OF CHEATING.
THEY ARE EITHER TOO WIT AND CAN FOOL THE YOUNG INEXPERIENCED
RESIDENT, OR THEY ARE ABLE TO FIND THE WAY TO MAKE THE OLD
EXPERIENCED RESIDENT OR SUPERVISER TO REPORT HIGHER VOLUMES AND
INFLATED COSTS BY BRIBING HIM.
ACTUALLY THERE WERE MANY DETAILS THAT WERE NOT FINISHED
BECAUSE OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE CONTRACTORS WHO DID NOT COME
BACK TO FINISH UP WHAT THEY HAD LET PAST-BY THE FIRST TIME.
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11. THE ATTAINMENT OF ACCEPTANCE FOR THE FAMILY TRANSFERING,
OR FOR THE MOVE OF HOUSING WITHIN THE PLOT /30.
6. MANAGEMENT ISSUES
THE LAZARO CARDENAS PROJECT SHELTER COMPONENETS SOUGHT TO
REDUCE COSTS AND CONTRIBUTE TO EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION
PROCESSES BY PRODUCING BUILDING MATERIALS AND PROVIDING
SUPERVISION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR PROGRESSIVE HOUSING.
HOWEVER, AS MANY AS 70% OF PARTICIPANTS HIRED PAYED LABOR /31.
THE PRODUCTION OF MATERIAL WAS MADE BY A FACTORY THAT HAD
BEING OPERATING BEFORE THE WORLD BANK PROJECT. THE BULK OF
BASIC MATERIALS WAS BOUGHT IN MEXICO CITY, SOME 600 MILES AWAY,
NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO REDUCE THE PRODUCTS SALE PRICE
IN 20% IN COMPARITION OF THE HIGH LOCAL PRICES OF A FRONTIER
REGION. THE RANGE OF SAND-CEMENT PRODUCTS COMPRISED BLOCK,
SEWAGE PIPING AND COBBLE-STONE PIECES.
30/ THERE WAS ONLY ONE CASE OF FORCED HOUSING MOVEMENT. THE
WELL KNOWN CASE OF "MARIO" A YOUNG HOUSEHOLD COMPLETELY
RETICENT TO MOVE HIS SHACK FROM WHAT WAS GOING TO BE A STREET
IN LEANDRO VALLE. HE EVEN ACTED ROUGHLY OVER SOME SOCIAL
WORKERS, AND WHEN HE AND HIS WIFE WENT OUT OF TOWN, THEN THEY
BROUGHT A BULLDOZED TO TEAR DOWN HIS SHACK, WITH THE PRIOR
REMOVAL OF THE FURNITURE AND HIS STUFF. AT HIS RETURN WHEN HE
SAW WHAT HAD HAPPENED HE CRIED. THEN HE ACKNOWLEDGED HIS
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE; HE ACCEPTED TO BUILD UP HIS SHACK IN AN
ALLOCATED PLOT; HOWEVER HE SAID HE WAS NEVER GOING TO PAY FOR
THE UPGRADING COSTS.
ANOTHER SIMILAR CASE WAS RESOLVED BY VIOLETA WHO CAME TO
SPEAK TO THE NEGLIGENT PERSON AND OFFERED HIM A BEATIFULLY
LOCATED PLOT. AFTER KEEPING IN INSISTING, SHE CONVINCED HIM TO
GO AND JUST TAKE A LOOK AT THE OFFERED PLOT. AS SOON AS HE
ACCEPTED THE NEW PLOT, HIS SHACK WAS TEAR DOWN AND HIS THINGS
WERE MOVED BY A CREWGIVING HIM NO CHANCE TO CHANGE HIS MIND.
31/ 1984 INQUIRY TO 220 FAMILIES THAT HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE
WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS.
THE COST OF MATERIALS SOARED ENORMOUSLY. FROM 1978 TO 1983
THE PRICES WERE RISED 650% UP . WHILE THE INFLATION ESTIMATED
IN THE PROJECT REPORT WAS AN AVERAGE OF 11%, THE LOWEST YEARLY
RATE OF BUILDING MATERIALS INFLATION WAS 25%, REACHING IN 1980
AND 1981 SOME 60%.
FOR THIS IF NOT OTHER REASON, FIDELAC HAD TO BUY BUILDING
MATERIAL IN ADVANCE AND STORE IT IN THE CENTRAL WAREHOUSE.
OTHER MEASURES TAKEN WERE THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF
CENTERS OF DISTRIBUTION, FROM 3 TO 1, THE REDUCTION OF
PERSONNEL IN ALL DEPARTMENTS, AND THE OFFERING OF LESS SERVICES
TO THE PEOPLE (SEE IV-5 THE SELF-HELP PROJECT)
C H A P T E R I V
PROJECTS IMPLEMENTATION AND DESCRIPTION
IMPORTANT ASPECTS RELATED TO BACKGROUND ISSUES FACED BY
THE DIFFERENT PROJECTS IN THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE DESCRIBED
AND ANALYZED IN THIS SECTION. CORRESPONDING EACH ONE TO A
CHAPTER, SUCH ISSUES ARE THE LOCATIONAL ASPECTS, THE SOCIAL
PROBLEMS, AND THE MUTUAL AID AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATIOIN
ASPECTS THAT THE WHOLE SHELTER PROJECT INVOLVED. WITHIN THE
LATER ASPECT, THE PILOT PROJECT WERE CLOSELY RELATED; HENCE
CHAPTER FOUR PRESENTS A DESCRIPTION OF THESE PROJECTS INCLUDING
A LISTING OF THE EXPERIENCES AND KNOWLEDGE ATTAINED AS IT WAS
APPLICABLE TO THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS.
THE NEXT THREE CHAPTERS OF THIS SECTION ARE DEVOTED EACH ONE
TO A SHELTER COMPONENT OF THE WORLD BANK URBAN DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM, NAMELY THE "SELF-HELP PROGRAM" (BUILDING MATERIALS
LOANS PROJECT), THE URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT, AND THE SITES AND
SERVICES PROJECT. THESE ARE DESCRIBED AND ANALYZED IN THEIR
MAIN ASPECTS. THE FOLLOWED ORDER WAS BASED UPON FUNCTIONAL
ASPECTS.
THE SECTION ENDS WITH A CHAPTER SUMMARIZING THE CONCLUSIONS
AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHELTER
PROJECTS. IN THIS CHAPTER THE FOCUSS IS IN PHYSICAL DESIGN
INPUTS FOR FUTURE SHELTER PROJECTS IN THIS, OR SIMILAR REGIONS
OF OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
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1. PROJECTS LOCATION
THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS, INITIALLY PLANNED FOR MOST
OF THE MICROREGION'S SETTLEMENTS, ENDED ALMOST TOTALLY
CONCENTRATED IN THREE OF THE LARGEST URBAN AREAS IDENTIFIED AS
PARTS OF THE FUTURE METROPOLITAN AREA./1 A BRIEF DESCRIPTION
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIONS CARRIED OUT IN EACH ONE FOLLOWS:
A. FUNDO LEGAL.
AT THE TIME OF PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, FUNDO LEGAL WAS THE
ORIGINAL OLD TOWN -- NEXT TO WHICH THE NEW URBAN DEVELOPMENT
TOOK PLACE-- THAT HAD BEEN RECENTLY REGULARIZED AND EXPANDED TO
REACH 15,000 INHABS. BECOMING AT THE SAME TIME A DYNAMIC
COMMERCIAL AND REGIONAL SERVICE CENTER. FUNDO LEGAL
BENEFITTED GREATLY DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE
SELF-HELP LOANS PROJECT. THE FIRST YEAR THE LOANS WERE
CONCENTRATED IN THE PILOT PROJECT OF PALAPAS. THE FOLLOWING
YEAR MANY OF THE FAMILIES LIVING ON FUNDO LEGAL WERE
RECIPIENTS. THIS YEAR THE LOANS WERE OFFERED WITHOUT MUCH
SCREANING.2/
1/ THE LAZARO CARDENAS METROPOLITAN AREA IS THE 600,000 INHABS.
CITY ENVISIONED FOR YEAR 2000. THIS AREA COVERS ABOUT ONE THIRD
OF THE SO-CALLED LAZARO CARDENAS-LAS TRUCHAS MICROREGION.
INCLUDE 4 OF THE 13 SETTLEMENTS OF THE MICROREGION; AS A MATTER
OF FACT, THREE OF THOSE INCLUDED ARE AT PRESENT THE LARGEST
URBAN AREAS.
2/ THE 1980 SELF-HELP EVALUATION REPORTED MANY RECIPIENTS WITH
INCOMES AVOBE 4TMW, AND SOME LOANS THAT WERE NOT USED FOR SELF-
HELP HOUSING. APPARENTLY THESE FINDINGS CAME AT A TIME IN
WHICH THE AGENCY'S PERSONNEL FELT A NEED TO SPEND PROJECT
FUNDS, WHICH AT THE TIME SEEMED ENORMOUS (FIDELAC. EVALUACION
DEL PROGRAMA DE AUTOCONSTRUCCION. LAZARO CARDENAS:UNIDAD DE
PLANEACION Y EVALUATION U.P.E., 1980)
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B. ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA
THIS IS THE NEW DEVELOPED AREA, URBANIZED BY FIDELAC
ACCORDING TO MODERN PLANS. THERE ARE 8 SECTORS, EACH IS
PLANNED TO OPERATE AS A CONTAINED NEIGHBORHOOD. AT THE TIME OF
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, ONLY 4 SECTORS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED.
SECTOR II CONTAINED THE PREVIOUS LOW-INCOME "EXPERIMENTAL"
PROJECT (INDECO I). BETWEEN FUNDO LEGAL WAS LOCATED THE SAITES
AND SERVICES PROJECT FROM THE WORLD BANK.
THE SELF-HELP PROJECT (THE FIRST PHASE OF THE WORLD BANK
CO-FINANCED BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS PROJECT) WAS INITIATED
DURING THE PILOT PROJECT "INDECO II" IN THE PROGRESSIVE
URBANIZATION PROJECT IMPLEMENTED BY INDECO IN 1973 (SEE I-5C
THE SMALL LOW INCOME HOUSING PROJECTS). TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE AND FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUILDING MATERIALS FOR
THIS LATER AND THE WORLD BANK SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT,
FIDELAC SET UP BETWEEN THESE TWO PROJECTS A BUILDING MATERIALS
DISTRIBUTION CENTER.
C. GUACAMAYAS.
THIS SETTLEMENT GOT THE LION'S SHARE OF THE WORLD BANK
SHELTER PROJECTS. IN ADDITION TO THE REGULARIZATION OF THE
ENTIRE AREA,/3 IT WAS BENEFITTED BY A THOROUGHLY CARRIED OUT
UPGRADING PROJECT, ONE MEDIUM SIZED SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT,
AND A MAJORITY OF THE TOTAL SELF-HELP PROGRAM LOANS.
3/ EXCEPT FOR ZONA URBANA EJIDAL (567 FAMILIES IN 1978), BECAUSE
OF PROBLEM OF EJIDAL LAND TENURE.
52
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE NEIGHBORHOOD -- WHERE NONE OF
THE PROGRAMMED ACTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT-- THE ACTIONS TAKEN FOR
THE REMAINING 10 GUAUCAMAYAS NEIGHBORHOODS INVOLVED IN THE
UPGRADING PROJECT COMPRISED FOUR LEVEL OF ACTIONS: TWO NEW
AREAS, ONE PARTIAL SUBDIVISION WITH ALL SERVICES PROVIDED, TWO
STREET WIDENING WITHOUT LAND SUBDIVISION, PLUS COMPLEMENTARY
SERVICE INTRODUCTION, AND FIVE MINOR LAND SUBDIVISION WITH
STREETS AND SERVICE NETWORKS WORKS COMPLETION.
IN RESPECT TO THE SELF-HELP CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING, AT THE
END OF THE PROGRAM, 45% OF THE GUACAMAYAS HOUSEHOLDS HAD
PARTICIPATED IN THE BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS PROGRAM.
THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT IN GUACAMAYAS, GOT LITTLE
MORE THAN HALF THE ACTIONS OF THIS PROJECT COMPONENT /4.
D. OTHER SETTLEMENTS IN THE REGION
ONLY MINOR WORKS IN SOME OF THE SMALL SETTLEMENTS OF THE
REGION WERE CARRIED OUT, EXCEPT FOR A 40 HOUSING UNIT PROJECT
BUILT ON UNSERVICED LAND IN LAS PEGNAS, SOME 10 MILES AWAY FROM
LAZARO CARDENAS. APPARENTLY THIS WAS LARGELY AN UNSUCCESSFUL
PROJECT FOR THE HOUSES NEVER GOT THE NECESSARY INFRASTRUCTURE
NOT BASIC SERVICE PROVISION.
2.SOCIO-POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE SHELTER PROJECTS
BY 1975 GUACAMAYAS HAD DEVELOPED ALONG ONLY THE WEST SIDE
OF THE REGIONAL HIGHWAY. THAT YEAR THE LEANDRO-VALLE INVASION
4/ THERE WERE SOME 600 ACTIONS TAKEN, OF WHICH THE PROJECT
IN GUACAMAYAS PROVIDED WITH 55% OF THE TOTAL.
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OCCURRED. FOLLOWING THE INVASION THE PRESIDENT (LIC. LUIS
ECHEVERRIA 1970-76) WENT TO THE NEW INDUSTRIAL TOWN OF LAZARO
CARDENAS-LAS TRUCHAS AND IN ITS WAY HE WAS STOPPED AT
GUACAMAYAS WHERE HE RECEIVE HARSH COMPLAINTS FROM THE COMMUNITY
FOR THE CONSPICUOUS LACK OF BASIC SERVICES. AS A RESULT SPECIAL
FUNDS WERE PROVIDED FOR SUPPLYING THESE SERVICES, AND A
CONSULTANT GROUP OF EXPERTS WAS CREATED (SEE 11-1 SOCIO-
POLITICAL ANTECEDENTS).
THE PRESIDENT'S SECRETARIAT ALLOCATED EXTRAORDINARY FUNDS
TO THE STATE PLANNING OFFICE/5 TO CARRY OUT AN INTEGRAL URBAN
PROGRAM. THIS PROGRAM COMPRISED OF THREE BASIC COMPONENTS:
1.LAND TENURE REGULARIZATION IN FUNDO LEGAL AND GUACAMAYAS, 2.
INTRODUCTION OF BASIC URBAN SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
GUACAMAYAS AND TWO OTHER SETTLEMENTS, AND 3. ONE SITES AND
SERVICES PROGRAM IN ANIBAL PONCE, A NEIGHBORHOOD AT GUACAMAYAS.
THE SPECIAL PROGRAM ENDED IN LATE 1976. BECAUSE OF ITS
LACK OF MONITORING AND CONTROL IT WAS LARGELY A FAILURE./6
HOWEVER FOR THE REGULARIZATION OF FUNDO LEGAL AND IN
GUACAMAYAS, BOTH THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT, AND THE
PAVEMENT OF THE MAIN STREET WERE SUCCESSFULLY CARRIED OUT.
5/ COPDEMICH IS THE STATE OF MICHOACAN PLANNING OFFICE IN
MORELIA (LOCATED SOME 6 HRS. FROM LAZARO CARDENAS)
6/ ALL THE INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK WAS DEFECTIVE, AND A MAJOR
PART OF IT HAD TO BE SUSTITUTED WITHIN THE WORLD BANK
UPGRADING PROJECT.
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THE PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT ALSO MADE PROVISION FOR A
CONSULTANT GROUP -- COMPRISED OF EXPERTS, SOME OF WHICH WERE
PEOPLE FRIOM UNITED NATIONS--. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, THERE WERE NO
REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE LOCAL PUBLIC AGENCIES./7
THE CONSULTANT GROUP PRODUCED AN EXTENSIVE REPORT (52
VOLUMES) PROPOSING SOLUTION AND RECOMMENDING ACTIONS. DESPITE
ALL OF THIS EFFORT, NONE OF THE PROPOSALS WERE IMPLEMENTED.
THE REASON THE WORK WAS POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY NOT
SUPPORTED WAS DUE TO THE DETAINMENT OF THE STEEL MILL
DEVELOPMENT PLANS, DECIDED IN EARLY 1977 BY THE NEW FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATION (JOSE LOPEZ PORTILLO 1976-1982), THAT FOLLOWED
AN EMIGRATION FLUX THAT TOOK OUT MUCH OF THE SOCIAL PRESSURE
GENERATED BY THE PROBLEMS OF GUACAMAYAS AND THE REGION.
SINCE 1975, THE BALSAS RIVER COMMISSION HAD LOST CONTROL
OF LAND OCCUPATION PERMITS. THIS PROPICIATED A CONSIDERABLE
NUMBER OF IRREGULARITIES TO TAKE PLACE./8
AT THE TIME THE WORLD BANK PROJECT WAS BEING NEGOTIATED,
IN LEANDRO VALLE THERE WAS AN APPALLING MIXTURE OF DIFERENT
POLITICAL INTERESTS. THESE INCLUDED: THE NEIGHBORHOOD LEADERS,
THOUGHT TO BE SOMEWHAT CORRUPTED, THE PDM,/9 THE LEANDRO-
7/ APPARENTLY THIS DECISION WAS INTENDED TO DEPOLITIZED THE
SITUATION.
8/ IRREGULARITIES INCLUDED SELLING OF PERMITS AMONG THE
PEOPLE, INVASION OF LAND RESERVED FOR PUBLIC USE, AND
SQUATTERING IN RISKY AREAS.
9/ DEMOCRATIC MEXICAN PARTY, IS A CENTER/RIGHT WING PARTY,
WHICH HAD A STRONG HOLDING IN MICHOACAN STATE
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VALLISTAS POLITICAL GROUP,/10 SOME MEMBERS OF OLD AND NEW
POLITICAL PARTIES,/ll AND EVEN SOME MEMBERS REPRESENTING
INTERESTS OF THE SICARSTA WORKERS UNION.
SOON AFTER FIDELAC BEGAN COLELCTING FIRST ROUND OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC DATA IN GUACAMAYAS, SOME PARTISAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS BEGAN TO TAKE PLACE IN SOME OF THE GUACAMAYAS
NEIGHBORHOODS, ESPECIALLY STRONG IN ONE OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS
(LUCRECIA TORIZ).
APPARENTLY THERE WAS AS WELL AN ATTEMPT OF THE NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS /12, TO DEVELOP
PARTISANSHIP ACTIONS, BUT THESE INITIAL ACTIONS WERE WEAK AND
SOON CEASED.
EXCEPT FOR THE INITIAL ATTEMPT OF CNOP, NONE OF THE
POLITICAL PARTIES TRIED TO USE THE SHELTER PROJECTS AS A WAY TO
GET PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THEIR PARTY.
IN THIS POLITICALLY CONFLICTIVE CONTEXT, FIDELAC'S INITIAL
INTERVENTION WAS PERCEIVED AS ONE MORE POLITICAL MOVE, ONE
THAT REPRESENTED THE GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS.
A WOMEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, HEADED BY A CATHOLIC
ACTIVIST, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN INVOLVING THE COMMUNITY THROUGH
ORGANIZING POPULAR ASSEMBLIES (SEE 111-3 ACCESS TO COMMUNITY
AND INITIAL WORKS)
10/ A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF OLD PARTIES.
11/ MEXICAN WORKER PARTY AND SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY.
12/ CNOP IS ONE OF THE THREE POLITICAL SECTORS THAT INTEGRATE
THE PRI, THE OFFICIAL PARTY.
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3. MUTUAL AID AND PARTICIPATION.
DURING PROJECT NEGOTIATIONS, THE WORLD BANK PROPOSED SOME
OF THE F.S.C.V.M. /13 SOLUTIONS FOR COMMUNAL FACILITIES. THESE
SUGGESTIONS WERE REJECTED BY FIDELAC ON GROUNDS THAT MUTUAL AID
WAS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE LOCAL PEOPLE. FROM A PREVIOUS
EXPERIENCE FIDLEAC STAFF CONCLUDED THESE SCHEMES WERE
INOPERATIVE./14
ALLOWANCE FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING,
HOWEVER, WAS A RESPONSE OF THE PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED --IN THE
PILOT PROJECT IN LEANDRO VALLE, WHERE THE UNACCEPTABLE BY THE
COMMUNITY HOUSING MODEL DISCOURAGED A MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PILOT PROJECT /15 (SEE IV-2 PILOT
PROJECTS). ON THE OTHER HAND THE PALAPAS PROJECT WAS SUCCESSFUL
WHERE THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATED IN DECISIONS ON HOUSING DESIGN
AND ON SOME PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES.
13/(SALVADOREAN FOUNDATION FOR LOW-COST HOUSING).
14/ INDEED, THE SELF-HELP PROJECT CARRIED OUT BY INDECO IN
1977 HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE IT HAD RELIED TOO MUCH ON
NON-PAYED LABOR CONTRIBUTIONS, AND INVESTED LARGE SHARES OF THE
PROGRAM RESOURCES TO PROMOTING THE SELF-HELP SCHEME BY TRAINING
PEOPLE TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE. AT THE END THE INSTITUTIONS
MODEL WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSED ON THE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS. THIS
RESULT, ACCORDING TO ONE OF FIDELAC STAFF INVOLVED, "WAS DUE TO
THE GREAT DEAL OF INDIVIDUALISM SHOWN BY THE LOCAL
PARTICIPANTS" (DANIEL HIERNOUX)
15/ THE REJECTION OF THE HOUSING MODEL, ACCORDING TO THE
TECHNITIANS IN CHARGE OF THE PROJECT, WAS DUE TO LACK OF
ACCEPTANCE OF BOTH, THE PREFABRICATED ELEMENTS AND THE SLOP
ROOF TYPOLOGY . ACCORDING TO THE SOCIAL WORKERS AND OTHER
FIDELAC STAFF WAS DUE TO THE STIFF DECISION OF THE TECHNITIANS
IN IMPOSING WHAT PEOPLE FELT WAS NOT SECURE ENOUGH, AND WOULD
NOT ENABLE THEM THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND FLOOR.
A DIFFERENT SOURCE REPORTED THE "LACK OF MODERNITY" AS ONE
OF THE CAUSES.(CRUZ TOLEDANO AND PADILLA, OP.CIT.)
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ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE WORLD BANK OFFICERS INVOLVED, THE
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT COMPONENT OF THIS PROJECT WAS ITS MOST
DISTINGUISHING FEATURE. SOME OF THE FIELD TEAM WORKERS I SPEAK
WITH DURING MY RESEARCH, RELATED SIMILAR IMPRESSIONS REPORTING
THAT COMMUNITY OPPOSITION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS WAS
SOMETIMES HARSH BUT EVENTUALLY WAS OVERCOME./16
IT WAS EVIDENT TO ME THAT THE FIELD TEAM WAS WELL
INTEGRATED AND EFFECTIVELY COORDINATED. MOST OF ITS MEMBERS
SEEMED PERSONALLY COMMITED TO THE PROJECT'S OBJECTIVES./17
THE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION WAS
ACHIEVED BY INTERACTING ACTIVELY WITH COMMUNITY COMMITTEES /18.
16/ "AS SOON AS WE BEGAN WORKING IN LEANDRO VALLEL CARRYING OUT
SURVEYS, THE 'PESETEROS' (PST) BECAME VERY ACTIVE. FOR INTANCE,
THEY WOULD GO DOOR BY DOOR TALKING TO PEOPLE AND CONVENCING
THEM THAT FIDELAC WAS CHARGING THEM UUNFAIRLY FOR A LAND THAT
WAS ALREADY THEIRS, FOR ACCORDING TO FEDERAL LAW, AFTER 5 YEARS
ANY UNCLAIMED LAND BECOMES OF THE OCCUPANTS.
17/ AS ONE OF THE MOST ENTHUSIASTIC FIELD TEAM WORKERS PUT IT
"WE WOULD WORK MANY TIMES EVEN ON SUNDAYS AND VERY OFTEN UNTIL
LATE IN THE NIGHT, EVEN IF WE DID NOT GET ANY EXTRA PAYMENT.
MOST OF THE PEOPLE SUPPORTED THE PROJECT'S GOALS, AND WERE
VERY HELPFULL AND COOPERATIVE WITH EACH OTHER. ANOTHER EXAMPLE
OF OUR SPECIAL COMMITMENT MAY BE EXPRESSED BY SIMPLE THINGS
SUCH AS OUR EXPENSES FOR SHOES. BECAUSE THE VERY STICKY MUD IN
GUACAMAYAS, SHOES WOULD NOT LAST VERY LONG. WE NEVER RECEIVED
ANY HELP FROM FIDELAC IN THIS REGARDS. FURTHERMORE, EVEN THOUGH
THERE WAS A VEHICLE OF FIDELAC TO TAKE US IN THE MORNING AND
PICK US UP IN THE AFTERNOON, MANY TIMES WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY
FOR OUR TRANSPORTATION COSTS WHILE WORKING . ALTHOUGH
OCASSIONALLY WE WOULD COMPLAIN, THE FUNNY THING IS THAT WE WERE
SO INVOLVED THAT MOST OF US CONSIDERED THESE EXPENSES ANOTHER
PART OF OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROGRAM"(CLEMENTINA)
18/ ONE ASPECT THAT WAS DEBATED WITH THE COMMUNITY WAS THE
ISSUE OF PLOT SIZES IN GUACAMAYAS. WHERE PEOPLE REJECTED THE
105m2 (7X15) PLOT SIZE, THE TECHNICIANS RECOMMENDED 162 m2
(9X18). THE FINAL DECISION WAS TO MAKE 200 m2 (10X20) BE THE
STANDARD AREA UNDER A NON-COMERCIAL CHARGE. ANY AREA EXTRA
WAS PAID AT ITS REAL MARKET VALUE.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEES, ONE FOR EACH OF THE 11 AREAS
OF GUACAMAYAS, WAS A MIXED BLESSING BECAUSE IT TOOK SO MUCH
TIME TO CONVINCE SOME COMMITTEES OF ACCEPTING THE LAND
REGULARIZATION PROGRAM. /19
4. THE SELF-HELP PROJECT DESCRIPTION
THE BUILDING MATERIALS LOAN PROJECT (LOCALLY CALLED THE
SELF-HELP PROGRAM) JUST RECENTLY STOPPED, WAS NATIONALLY AN
INNOVATION /20, AND LATER HAS BEEN BY FAR, THE MOST LASTING
AND OUTSTANDING OF THE WORLD BANK COMPONENTS.
DURING THE 8 YEARS OF OPERATION THIS PROJECT UNDERWENT A
SERIES OF CHANGES ON ITS BENEFICIARY SELECTION PROCEDURES, ITS
LOAN CEILINGS, ITS RANGE OF FEATURES, AND ITS LOGISTICS. THE
THREE MAIN CHANGES OCURRED: ONE IN 1980 WHEN A DETAILED
EVALUATION STUDY WAS CARRIED OUT; THE SECOND IN 1982 WHEN NO
19/ THE BREAKING OFF INTO MANY COMMITTEES PROVED TO BE A
STRATEGICALLY DUBIOUS DECISION. BECAUSE OF THE DELAYS AND
PROBLEMS THAT AROUSE WITH COORDINATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF
WORKS AT MANY DIFFERENT STAGES OF ADVANCEMENT. ON THE OTHER
HAND, THIS ORGANIZATION OF SMALL NEIGHBORHOOD COMMITTEES GAVE
THE COMMUNITY A REAL CHANCE FOR PARTICIPATING AND DEVELOPING A
PARTICIPATORY AND CIVIC CONSCIENCE AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL,
CERTAINLY A NEEDED FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE LIVING CONDITIONS. IN
FACT, IT WAS ONE OF T HE THREE MAIN SOCIAL OBJECTIVES OF THE
WORLD BANK PROJECT REPORT.(W.B. PROJECT REPORT p. 6) OF THE
MAIN THREE SOCIAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT (WORLD BANK PROJECT
REPORT p6).
20/ IT WAS THE FIRST MEXICAN PROJECT OF ITS KIND. THE SELF
HELP PROGRAM STARTED IN LATE 1977 WITH FUNDING FROM FIDELAC.
SOON AFTER, THE EXPENDED FUNDS WERE ABSORVED BY THE LOAN FROM
THE WORLD BANK
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MORE LOANS WERE EXTENDED TO THE RURAL COMMUNITIES (CHUCUTITLAN
AND LAS PENAS, BOTH OUTSIDE THE MICROREGION); AND THE THIRD IN
1983 WHEN THE 3 LOCAL CENTERS WERE REDUCED TO ONE
DISTRIBUTIONAL CENTER.
IN THE FIRST OCASSION, THE CRITERIA FOR BENEFICIARIES
SELECTION WAS SYSTEMATIZED TO CORRECT IRREGULARITIES /21. THE
SECOND STOPPED THE BLACKSMITHING AND CARPENTRY PRODUCTION
WORKSHOPS, AND ALSO CONCENTRATED THE DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS,
BUT CONTINUED OFFERING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE LOCAL
CENTERS. THE THIRD CHANGE STOPPED THE LOCAL TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE, REDUCED DRASTICALLY THE PERSONNEL, HALTED THE
PAYMENTS FOR SPECIALIZED LABOR, AND INCREASED THE CEILING FROM
18% TO 25% OF FAMILY INCOME.
DURING ITS FIRST STAGE, THE PROGRAM OFFERED 3 DIFFERENT
KIND OF INTEREST RATES (9%,12%,AND 15%); AT THE END ONLY ONE
(15%),WHILE THE REPAYMENT TERM REMAINED BASICALLY THE SAME (7
YRS)/22.
21/ THE SISTEMATIZED CRITERIA FOR THE PROGRAM INVOLVED 10
ASPECTS WITHIN 3 CATHEGORIES, EACH ONE WITH 1,2,OR 3 POINTS. AT
THE SAME TIME THERE WAS A COMPLIANCE GRADING THAT ACCEPTED 4
VALUES (25% TO 100%). HENCE THESE ENABLED A QUANTITATIVE
MEASUREMENT. THIS NEW CRITERIA WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN REVIEWING
THE PROGRAMS PROCEDURES, AND TIGHTING UP THE SELF-HELP LOANS
CONTROLS.
22/ THE 3 DIFFERENT INTEREST RATES WERE ACCORDED IN RELATION TO
THE INCOME LEVEL AND SIZE OF THE LOAN. THIS PROCEDURE WAS
REPORTED AS DIFFICULT TO HANDLE; INSTEAD, THE LOAN TERMS SHOULD
BE THE ONES TO BE ADJUSTED. PEOPLE WITH HIGHER INCOMES (4TMW)
SHOULD BE LENDED BUT WITH 1 TO 2 YEARS REPAYMENT TERM.
... "OTHERWISE THE PROGRAM IS PROVIDING GOOD MONEY FOR PEOPLE
WHO DO NOT NEEDED." (ARQ. CASTRO, SINCE 1982 HEAD OF THE SELF-
HELP PROGRAM)
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THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED FREE OF CHARGE, AND
IT CONSIST OF A PHYSICAL PLAN (VERY SIMPLY DROWN, WITH BASIC
MEASURES), ESSENTIAL BUILDING AND COMMON SENSE RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LOCAL BUILDING CODE AND REGULATIONS /23.
ONCE GRANTED THE LOAN, PEOPLE HAD A TWO MONTHS TO GO FOR THE
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TO INITIATE THE WORKS. DURING THE
CONSTRUCTION PERIOD, THERE WAS FOR PARTICIPANTS ACCESS TO
TOOLS LENDING /24.
SPECIALIZED LABOR COSTS WERE INITIALLY CONTROLED BY THE
PROGRAM. ONCE LIBERATED IN 1983, PRICES WENT UP, AND THERE WERE
REPORTED MORE PROBLEMS WITH QUALITY AND SOME CHEATING /25.
SOME OTHER FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM WERE:
-THE COST OF MATERIALS IS AT MARKET PRICES
-THE MAJORITY OF RECIPIENTS WERE FROM THE POPULATION GROUP
THAT HAS THE HIGHEST DEMAND FOR HOUSING (1.5-2.5TMW).
-LOANS MAY BE EXTENDED 10%. AFTER TERMINATION, PAYMENTS
BEGIN 30 DAYS AFTER.
23/ DURING THE FIRST STAGE, THIS COMPONENT WAS A SERVICE
OFFERED TO ANY KIND OF RESIDENTIAL PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED EVEN
THOSE PLANS OUT OF THE PROGRAM, FOR MIDDLE AND MIDDLE-HIGH
INCOME GROUPS.
24/ THIS SERVICE WAS SUSPENDED ON THE FOURTH YEAR OF
OPERATION. INCLUDED CONCRETE MIXERS, SHOVELS, WOOD FORMS,
TROWELS, CARD BOARD, AND BASIC MASONRY TOOLS).APPARENTLY THERE
WAS AN EFFICIENT CONTROL... "IT WAS NOT ALLWAYS POSSIBLE THAT
PEOPLE RETURNED THE LENDED TOOLS; HOWEVER, THEY WILL ALLWAYS
PAY FOR THEIR LOOSING OF THEM" (RESIDENT OF THE ZONA
FIDEICOMITIDA LOCAL CENTER).
25/ THIS USEFULL TO PEOPLE FEATURE WAS ELIMITED BY THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT ON GROUNDS THAT "THESE TRADES DO NOT
PAY TAXES". IT INCLUDED PAYMENTS FOR PLUMBING, BLACKSMITHING,
AND ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION WORKS.
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5.URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT
THIS CHAPTER DISPLAYS TWO RELATED PARTS: THE FIRST DEALS
WITH PROJECT DESIGN AND PROGRAMMING, AND THE SECOND LOOKS AT
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. SINCE THE UPGRADING PROJECT ACTIONS
CARRIED OUT IN TWO SETTLEMENTS OUTSIDE THE MICROREGION WERE
NEGLIGIBLE, THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM IS LIMITED TO
GUACAMAYAS.
THE DESIGN AND PROGRAMMING STAGE OF THE UPGRADING
PROJECT IS ANALIZED FROM THREE PERSPECTIVES: INVENTORY
CONDITIONS, EVALUATION OF EXISTING CONDITIONS, AND
IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS THAT REQUIRE ATTENTION.
A. INVENTORY CONDITIONS
SINCE THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF GUACAMAYAS , CAMPAMENTO
OBRERO WAS THE ONLY SERVICED RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE
AREA AS OF LATE 1975. /26 THE FOLLOWING YEAR THERE WAS A
PARTIAL UPGRADING PROGRAM THAT SUPPLIED SOME OF GUACAMAYAS'
NEIGHBORHOODS WITH WATER, SEWAGE, ELECTRICAL, AND CIRCULATION
NETWORKS AT NEAR STANDARD LEVELS.
B.EVALUATION OF EXISTING CONDITIONS.
THE ORIGINAL PROJECT INFORMATION ON THE CONDITIONS OF
GUACAMAYAS WERE BASED ON A STUDY THAT WAS INNACURATE. ONCE
AKNOWLEDGED, FIDELAC INTEGRATED A SPECIAL TEAM TO DRAW NEW
PLANS, PLOT BY PLOT, AND ADJUST THE SET OF INVENTORY CONDITIONS.
ALTHOUGH IN MOST NEIGHBORHOODS THERE WAS A CLEAR STREET
26/ THE CASE OF LACK OF SERVICES IN GUACAMAYAS WAS DRAMATIC. IN
LATE 1975 AT THE PEAK TIME OF THE CONSTRUCTION WORKS OF
SICARTSA THE REPORTED POPULATION AT GUACAMAYAS WAS 25,000
PEOPLE.
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NETWORK, THIS WAS NOT ALWAYS
NEIGHBORHOODS SETTLED ON STEEP TERRAIN AROUND GUACAMAYAS NORTH
LIMIT, WHICH HAD NO CIRCULATION PATTERNS AT ALL. THE OTHER
CASE WAS LEANDRO VALLE, WHERE A RECENT SQUATTERING IN 1975 HAD
OCCURRED IN FLAT BUT SOMEWHAT WET LAND, AND WHICH HAD PRODUCED
A COMPLETELY AWKWARD LAYOUT PATTERN ( WHICH BY THE WAY, CREATED
CONFLICTS WITH THE COMMUNITY).
GUACAMAYAS BEING THE LOW-INCOME CITY DEVELOPMENT PARALLEL
TO THE NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT, WAS FAR FROM THE PUBLIC SERVICES
AND FACILITIES OF THE REGION. THESE SERVICES WERE LOCATED 3
MILES AWAY IN LAZARO CARDENAS. THESE SITUATIONS, IN
CONJUNCTION WITH THE LACK OF SERVICES, TRANSPORTATION COSTS,
PLUS OTHER EXPENSES CAUSED A CONSIDERABLE BURDEN TO MOST OF
THE SETTLED FAMILIES /29
28/ TO A LARGE EXTENT, THESE SITUATIONS WERE THE CAUSES THAT
INSTIGATED THE SOCIAL UNREST TAKING PLACE IN LATE 1975. THE
ROLE OF GUACAMAYAS IN THE REGION WAS A VITAL ONE: THE PROVISION
OF INEXPENSIVE SHELTER TO A MULTITUDE OF WORKERS AND PROVIDERS
OF INFORMAL SERVICES. GUACAMAYAS WAS AT THAT TIME, ENABLING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL AND VERY IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT TO TAKE PLACE. HEN E IT WAS INADMISSIBLE TO HAVE
SUCH AN ARRAY OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND HEALTH RELATED PROBLEMS.
THIS WAS EVIDENT F 10M THE FIFTY EXPERT GROUP -INCLUDING TWO
EXPERTS FROM U.N.-THAT GATHERED TO FIND SOLUTIONS FOR THE
PROBLEMS OF GUACAMAYAS
29/ ALTHOUGH FAMILIES SETTLED IN GUACAMAYAS HAD NO HOUSING
PAYMENTS, THE COST FOR SUPPLY OF WATER BY TRUCK, AND THE
TRANSPORTATION COSTS CAME FWIM THEIR LIVING EXPENSES, REDUCING
THE LENDED LAND ADVANTAGES.
"AN EXTRA COST WAS THE BUYING OF SHOES FOR THE FAMILY. THE
VERY STICKY MUD OF UNPAVED STREETS, IN THIS AREA OF HEAVY RAINS
THAT LASTED HALF A YEAR, RAPIDLY DESTROYED SHOES. ALSO THE TIME
IT TOOK TO EITHER BRING WATER HOME, OR GO TO THE IRRIGATION
CHANNEL TO WASH THE FAMILY'S CLOTHING WAS A HINDRANCE FOR US -
WOMEN AND OUR FAMILIES SO FULL OF SMALL CHILDREN" (DONA MARIA
SAAVEDRA, LEADER OF WOMEN PARTY).
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THE CASE. SOME OF THE
o.IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS THAT REQUIRED ATTENTION.
A GENERAL LIST OF FELT NEEDS WITH ROUGH ESTIMATIONS FOR
PROJECT SUBCOMPONENTS ADDRESSING GUACAMAYAS PROBLEMS, IS
PRESENTED HERE. /30
1. REGULARIZATION OF LAND TENURE STATUS FOR ALL GUACAMAYAS
PLOTS.
2. PROVISION OF LAND FOR SOME 1000 FAMILIES LIVING TWO OR
MORE FAMILIES ON SAME PLOT.
3. SEWAGE INTRODUCTION AND THE PROVISION OF WATER SUPPLY
TO SOME 2500 PLOTS -PLUS TO OTHER 1000 FAMILIES- ON AN
INDIVIDUAL HOUSE BASIS.
4. ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS FOR SOME 1500 EXISTING PLOTS ,
PLUS CONNECTIONS FOR EXTRA 1000 PLOTS.
5. PATTER LAYOUT FOR 3 SETTLEMENTS.
6. PAVEMENT OF SOME 12 TO 17 KM OF STREETS.
7. SKILL TRAINING PROGRAMS
8. CHILDREN'S SCHOOL
9. CREATION OF FORMAL COM MUNAL REUNION SPACES.
THE WORLD BANK UPGRADING PROJECT CONTEMPLATED 11
NEIGHBORHOODS; HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE PROBLEMS OF EJIDAL LAND
TENURE, ZONA URBANA EJIDAL, A LARGE PART OF GUACAMAYAS (537
FAMILIES), WAS LEFT WITH NO ACTION AT ALL.
30/ THESE ROUGH ESTIMATIONS ARE BASED ON REGIONAL DATA.
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B.THE IMPLEMENTING STAGE
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE URBAN UPGRADING PROGRAM WAS
DEPENDING ON THE LAND TENURE REGULARIZATION PROGRAM. SOME OF
THE SHARED WORKS FROM BOTH PROGRAMS WERE CARRIED OUT AT THE
SAME TIME, SUCH AS THE REBLOCKING OF UNORGANIZED SETTLEMENTS.
THIS CLOSE LINK WAS BECAUSE OF THE WORLD BANK REQUIREMENT TO
WORK ONLY ON LAND THAT IS REGULARIZED, WHICH THEN ENABLE MORE
EFFICIENT COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS.
THE IMPLEMENTATION STAGE OF THE UPGRADING PROJECT WAS A
SPECIALLY DIFFICULT ONE TO COORDINATE BECAUSE IT WAS ALMOST
IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE INITATION OF WORKS IN EACH
NEIGHBORHOOD. IN OTHER CASES THE NEIGHBORHOODS WERE DIVIDED
AND THEN DEVELOPED ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT WORK SCHEDULES. THIS
WAS THE CASE OF ANIBAL PONCE WHERE THE PROJECT AREA WAS DIVIDED
INTO 11 SECTIONS.
DIFFICULTIES WITH CONTRACTORS WAS ANOTHER FACTOR
CONTRIBUTING TO PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION. DUE TO THESE
PROBLEMS, PARTS OF TWO NEIGHBORHOODS WERE NEVER FINISHED AND
MANY MINOR WORKS WERE LEFT UNDONE UNTIL 1984.
THIS PROJECT COMPONENT RECEIVED BY FAR, THE LARGEST SHARE OF
THE WORLD BANK RESOURCES (SEE II-4A CHANGES IN RESOURCE
ALLOCATION). IT INCLUDED THE INTRODUCTION OF INFRASTRUCTURE
AND BASIC SERVICES TO 10 OF THE 11 GUACAMAYAS NEIGHBORHOODS.
THESE WORKS WERE COMPRISED OF PIPED WATER, WATER BORNE
SEWAGE, AND ELECTRICITY CONNECTIONS TO EACH HOUSE, PLUS PUBLIC
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LIGHTING AND STREET PAVEMENTS. INCLUDED AS WELL WER MINOR
OFF-SITE INFRASTRUCTURE WORKS.
THE PROJECT WAS IMPLEMENTED IN THREE YEARS, ALTHOUGH SINCE
1981 MINOR WORKS HAVE CONTINUED. AS OF LATE 1984, WORKS
REMAINED UNFINISHED IN MINOR PARTS OF THE REGION.
AN EVALUATION CARRIED OUT BY FIDELAC IN EARLY 1984 SHOWED
THAT THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE CONSIDERED THAT THE PROVISION OF
BASIC SERVICES WAS COMPLETE. 21% OF THE PEOPLE CONSIDERED THE
PROGRAM'S WORKS UNFINISHED./31 THE SAME INQUIRY UNCOVERED A
CONTINUING HIGH PERCENTAGE OF PROVISIONAL SHELTER./32
7. THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THIS PROJECT COMPONENT MAY
BE BROKE DOWN INTO 8 STAGES: ADVERTISEMENT, INITIAL INQUIRY,
DATA CHECK UP, CONTRACTING, INITIAL PAYMENTS, PLOT ALLOCATION,
SERVICE PROVISION CHECK UP, AND CONTROL OF TRANSFERS.
THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS. INITIAL
ADVERTISEMENT WAS DONE BY RADIO --THE PROGRAM OFFERED HOUSING
"FOR 15 PESOS A DAY" (US 60 CENTS) UNDER AFFORDABLE CONDITIONS
31/ THIS POLL WAS CONDUCTED BY THE HUMAN SETTLEMENT DEPARTMENT
OF FIDELAC, SURVEYING 165 PARTICIPANT FAMILIES. THERE WERE
SOME PROBLEMS WITH RELIABILITY, FOR THIS PERCENTAGE DOES NOT
CORRESPOND TO THOSE NOT SERVED WITH STREET PAVEMENT WHICH IN
FACT IS HIGHER THAN 79%. THE SAME INQUIRY FOUND ONLY 17% OF
THE HOUSEHOLDS HAD PAYED THE TOTAL BILL, OR WERE ON TIME WITH
PAYMENTS. THESE FIGURES, ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE AVOBE
MENTIONED FINDING.
32/ THE PERCENTAGE OF SHACKS WAS 22% WHICH SUGGESTS THAT
BECAUSE THE HARSH INFLATIONARY CURVE AFFECTED THE COST OF
BUILDING MATERIALS, THIS PHENOMENA WILL REMAIN FOR A LONG TIME.
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TO MOST INCOME GROUPS (SEE VI-2 ACCESS TO TARGET GROUPS)./33
IN LATE 1979 THE CLERICAL OFFICE WAS SET UP IN THE
COMMUNITY CENTERS, WHERE APPLICANT HOUSEHOLDS WERE INTERVIEWED,
THEN 5 SOCIAL WORKERS HELPED THEM TO FILL OUT SOCIO-ECONOMIC
INQUIRIES. THE FAMILY DATA WAS CHECKED ACCORDING TO THE
SELECTION CRITERIA:/34 IF THEY QUALIFIED, THE PEOPLE MET AGAIN
WITH THE SOCIAL WORKER, WHO HELPED THEM FILL OUT THE CONTRACT,
INFORMED THEN ABOUT COSTS, FINANCIAL TERMS, AND PAYMENT
MECHANISMS. THE PEOPLE WOULD GO TO FIDELAC HEADQUARTERS OFFICES
AND MAKE THEIR DOWN PAYMENTS
WITHIN THE PROCESS, APPLICANT HOUSEHOLDS WERE ABLE TO
CHOOSE THE GENERAL LOCATIONAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF THEIR
PLOT BUT NOT ITS PRECISE LOCATION./35 AFTER THE HOUSUEHOLD HAS
ASSIGNED A PLOT, THE SOCIAL WORKER
33/ THE DOWNPAYMENT CORRESPONDED TO 20% OF THE MINIMUM
OFFICIAL WAGE IN THE REGION. THE MONTHLY PAYMENT TO 22% TO 35%
IN GUACAMAYAS, AND 28% TO 40% IN ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA; ANNUAL
INTEREST 15%; REPAYMENT TERM 5 TO 10 YEARS. THE RADIO
ADVERTISING WAS CARRIED OUT AT A TIME OF HIGH DEMAND FOR
HOUSING FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REINITIATION OF THE
SICARSTA'S SECOND DEVELOPMENT STAGE.(END 1979-1980)
34/ THE CRITERIA FOR BEING SELECTED WITH A PLOT IN A SITES AND
SERVICES PROJECT WERE BASAICALLY THE FOLLOWING FOUR: 1.TO BE A
FUNCTIONAL FAMILY; 2.TO HAVE NO OTHER PROPERTY WITHIN THE
REGION; 3.TO HAVE A JOB; 4.TO HAVE A STABLE INCOME BETWEEN 1.5
AND 3.0 TMW)
35/ THE ALTERNATIVES WERE: CORNER, STREET WIDTH, AND TOWN
LOCATION. THE REPORTED FINDINGS WERE THAT WIDER STREET CORNERS
WERE CHOSEN BY THE HIGHER INCOMES, AND CORNERS BY THOSE
THINKING OF OPENING A STORE OR SMALL BUSINESS IN THE FUTURE.
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WOULD GO WITH A TECHNICIAN AND THE HOUSEHOLD TO THE PLOT SITE.
HENCE FROM THAT DATE, THE PLOT WAS THERE MARKED ON THE TERRAIN,
AND HENCE FROM THAT DATE, A TWO MONTH PERIOD WAS DESIGNATED AS
THE MANDATORY OCCUPATION TIME./36
ONCE THE FAMILY HAD SETTLED, FIDELAC STAFF WOULD CHECK
ENSURE THE SERVICES WERE FUNCTIONING. IN CASE OF
IRREGULARITIES, IT WAS IMMEDIATELY REPORTED AND FIXED BY THE
CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT.
THE INITIALLY PLANNED CORE-HOUSING PROJECTS WERE NOT
CARRIED OUT AS CONCEIVED. INSTEAD THE PARTICIPANTS COULD
PARTICIPATE IN THE BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS OF THE SELF-HELP
PROGRAM. PEOPLE WHO DID NOT OCCUPY THEIR PLOTS, AND IN A FEW
CASES, THOSE THAT HAD NOT MADE THEIR INITIAL 3 MONTH PAYMENTS,
LOST THEIR RIGHT TO THE PLOT. THESE PLOTS WERE REALLOCATED.
DUE TO EMPHASIS PUT ON PLOT OCCUPATION IN ORDER TO SUPPORT
THE PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION, AND EVENTUALLY HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOOD CONSOLIDATION, SOME 90% OF THE PLOTS WERE
INITIALLY SET UP WITH SHACKS MADE OUT OF CARD BOARD AND OTHER
PROVISIONAL MATERIALS. FOUR YEARS LATER THE PERCENTAGES OF
SHACKS WERE 10% FOR GUACAMAYAS AND 22% FOR ZONA
36/ THE TWO MONTHS PERIOD ESTABLISHED IN THE BEGINNING SOON WAS CHANGED
TO ONLY 30 DAYS. THIS WAS AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE FOR PROMOTING
THE SETTLEMENT OF PROJECT BENEFICIARIES.
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FIDEICOMITIDA. /37
THE TWO SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS, DIFFERED GREATLY BUT
NEVERTHELESS, IN 1984, THEY REPRESENTED THE MOST CONSOLIDATED
NEIGHBORHOODS IN THEIR SORROUNDING AREAS./38 HOWEVER THESE
AREAS HAD THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF WALKWAYS PAVED./39
8.LESSONS FROM SHELTER PROJECTS
THE URBAN LAYOUT DESIGN FOR LAZARO CARDENAS FUTURE SITES
AND SERVICES PROGRAMS NEEDED SOME IMPROVEMENTS. THE FOLLOWING
CONSIDERATIONS OFFER WAYS FOR OPTIMIZING DESIGN AND REDUCING
URBANIZATION COSTS.
FIRST: CONVENTIONAL URBAN LAYOUT --A GRIRIDON PATTERN WITH
BLOCKS AND STREETS WITH ACCESS TO ALL HOUSING-- DEMANDS A
37/ THOSE REMAINING IN PROVISIONAL DWELLINGS FALL INTO TWO
GROUPS. ONE GROUP COULD NOT AFFORD THE SELF-HELP LOANS BECAUSE
THEY WERE VERY POOR. MOST OF THESE PEOPLE WERE THE SQUATTERS
FAMILIES SETTLED ON FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN GUACAMAYAS, AND WHO,
IN 1982 WERE TRANSFERED TO SITES AND SERVICES GUACAMAYAS. THE
SECOND GROUP WERE HOUSEHOLDS THAT DID NOT ACCEPT THE SELF-HELP
PROGRAM "BECAUSE OF ITS HIGH INTEREST RATES, AND BECAUSE IT DID
NOT INCLUDE LABOR PAYMENTS IN THE LOAN". ACCORDING TO THE
SOCIAL WORKER IN CHARGE OF THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT ON
ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA " BECAUSE THEY WOULD RATHER RELY ON THEIR
OWN EFFORTS".
38/ THE MAIN REASON FOR THE RAPID CONSOLIDATION WAS THE
SPECIAL SUPPORT OF THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM IN THESE TWO AREAS.
ACCORDIDNG TO THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM 1984 RECORDS, 80% OF THE
HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN BUILT HOUSING WITHIN THESE SETTLEMENTS HAD
BEEN LOAN RECIPIENTS. THE ACTUAL PERCENTAGE OF TOTALLY
CONSOLIDATED HOUSING WAS 67% IN EARLY 1984 -ALTHOUGH IN THIS
NEIGHBORHOODS HOUSING ALWAYS REMAINS PROGRESSIVE HOUSING.
39/ WHILE THE UPGRADED AREAS HAD 55%, THESE AREAS HAD ONLY
36%. THIS MAY BE DUE TO THE LACK OF MONEY THAT AT THE TIME WAS
PUT INTO A RAPID HOUSING CONSOLIDATION PROCESS.
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RELATIVELY LARGE PAVEMENT AREA, AND LARGER INFRASTRUCTURE
NETWORKS. DUE TO HIGH INFLATION, THE SOARING COSTS ARE LEAVING
THE LOWEST INCOME GROUPS (55% WITH INCOME UNDER 2.5 TMW)
WITHOUT PUBLIC PROVISION OF SHELTER. HENCE INCREASED USE OF
PEDESTRIAN WAYS INSTEAD OF STREET ACCESS, MAY PROVIDE LOWER
URBANIZATION COSTS IN CONSOLIDATED AND FULLY SERVICED AREAS
(THE CASE OF ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA). THIS IDEA HAS BEEN USED IN
LAZARO CARDENAS AND PRESENTS THREE MAIN PROBLEMS: FIRST,
PARKING AREAS ARE UNSAFE TO LEAVE CARS SOPEDESTRIAN WAYS GET
BLOCKED BECAUSE THEY ARE USED TO PARK CARS; SECOND, SUPPLY
TRUCKS OFTEN DELIVER IN PEDESTRIAN WAYS, DAMAGING PAVEMENT
AND SOMETIMES UNDERLYING SERVICES INFRASTRUCTURE. THIRD,
BUMPERS AND ENTRANCE OBSTACLES ARE EASILY REMOVED BY PEOPLE.
HERE ARE SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS:
FIRST: THE NEED EXISTS FOR COMMUNAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CARING
AND WATCHING CARS, OR ELSE, TO MAKE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL PARKING
BY INTRODUCING PEDESTRIAN WAYS THAT ENABLE 2 CARS (4 MTS). THE
SOLUTION OF HAVING QUITE NARROW STREETS WITH CURVES THAT ENABLE
THE PASSING OF SOME CARS BY USING WALKWAYS -SIMILAR TO WHAT
WAS USED IN GUAUCAMAYAS SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT. THESE
STREETS SEEMS A GOOD SOLUTION, ALTHOUGH IT MEANS HIGHER
PAVEMENT STANDARDS.
THERE IS ALSO A NEED TO REINFORCE THE PRIMARY FUNTION OF
WALKWAYS TO REDUCE ITS OCASSIONAL USE BY SMALL TRUCKS, IN
CONJUCTION WITH AN EFFICIENT AND FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OF
CIRCULATION PATTERN THAT MAY PROVIDE ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL
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AREAS IN CORE-AREAS OF BLOCKS. A WAY TO DISCOURAGE TRUCK
ENTRANCE TO WALKWAYS IS BY THE USE OF GRADES IN WALKWAYS
ENTRANCE.
SECOND: THE BUILDING CODES REQUIRE A 7 MTS. MINIMUM PLOT
WIDTH; THIS MEASURE DETERMINES URBANIZATION COSTS. IF THE 105
M2 MINIMUM PLOT SURFACE IS MAINTAINED (7 X 15) AND THE
PROPORTIONS ARE CHANGED TO EITHER 6X17.5 OR 5X21, THERE WOULD
BE CORRESPONDINGLY A 15% TO 25% REDUCTION OF URBANIZATION
COSTS. HOWEVER, THIS HAS TO BE RELATED TO THE COSTS OF BASIC
BUILIDNG MATERIALS THAT GO IN WALLS, FOR 7MT. WIDTH HAS THE
ADVANTAGE OF THE HOUSING SCHEME THAT ALLOWS, PERPENDICULAR TO
THE STREET, TWO STANDARD ROOMS WITH A CORRIDOR IN BETWEEN. THIS
BASIC SCHEME REDUCES COSTS BY INCREASING THE DOUBLE USE OF
WALLS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MINIMUM PLOT WIDTH IS ESTABLISHED
BY MOST STATE GOVERNMENTS, AND EVEN IF ADVISABLE, IT SEEMS
DIFFICULT TO CHANGE.
IF THE CODES ARE NOT REVISED, SOLUTIONS ARE TO BE FOUND
IN THE EXPLORATION OF THE CONDOMINIUM TENURE REGIME. THE
EXPLORATION OF VERTICAL (AND PERHAPS HORIZONTAL) CONDOMINIUM IS
A WAY TO EXPLORE FOR SOLUTIONS TO REDUCE URBANIZATION COSTS IN
LOW INCOME AREAS, BY REDUCING THE LENGHT OF LINES, AND THE
CORRESPONDING URBANIZATION AREA TO BE PAYED PER SERVICED PLOT.
IN THE CASE OF HORIZONTAL CONDOMINIUM, THE PROVISION OF A
SERVICE COMMON WALL FOR TWO FAMILIES IN EACH PLOT SETS UP AN
ALTERNATIVE TO SITES AND SERVICES SCHEMES.
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THIRD: ALTHOUGH AN UN-EXPLORED SOLUTION IN THE REGION,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS MAY PROVIDE THE SITUATION NECESSARY TO
TRY A CLUSTER SCHEME FOR THE LOWEST INCOME GROUPS. BECAUSE OF
THE 3 MTS. STANDARD WALKWAYS IN SOME AREAS OF LAZARO CARDENAS,
THIS APPROACH MAY HAVE POSSIBILITIES OF ACCEPTANCE IN THE TWO
LARGER URBAN AREAS. HOWEVER, ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE FOUND FOR
THE LOCAL BUILDING CODES REQUIREMENT OF 6MTS. SUCH AS LEAVING
FREE 1.50 MTS. IN FRONT OF EACH HOUSE.
FOUTH: THE POTENTIAL USE OF INCENTIVES AND THE
IDENTIFICATION OF DISINCENTIVES OFFER WAYS OF SOLUTIONS THAT
MAY IMPROVE LAYOUT EFFICIENCY. ESPECIALLY IF COMBINED WITH THE
CONDOMINIUM HORIZONTAL SCHEME. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS MAY BE THE
INCREASED LOAN LIMIT OF THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM, A CLOSER
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE SUPPORTING THESE SCHEMES, OR SOME EXTENDED
TERMS OF REPAYMENT
FIFTH: THE ELIMINATION OF UNNECESSARY CONSTRUCTION COSTS
COULD BE ACHIEVED IF DIFFERENT PLOT AND SHELTER OPTIONS ARE
OFFERED WITHIN EACH PROJECT THIS PROPOSAL IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EXPERIENCE OF OTHER PROJECTS IN WHERE THERE ARE FAMILIES THAT
BENEFITTED MORE FROM NON-CORE HOUSING ALTERNATIVES, TRADING-
OFF PLOT SPACE FOR AN "ALIEN CORE HOUSE"
SIXTH: THE RECONSIDERATION OF UNDESIRED SERVICE LEVELS,
INVOLVES THE REVISION OF ISSUES SUCH AS THE PROVISION OF SEWAGE
IN THE VERY FIRST STAGE OF THE PROGRESSIVE URBANIZATION
SCHEMES. THIS PROPOSAL IS SUPPORTED FROM THE LOCAL EXPERIENCE
OF AMPLIACION LA VILLITA (PROGRESSIVE URBANIZATION SCHEME)
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WHERE ONLY 2 OF MORE THAN 40 FAMILIES USE THEIR SEWAGE SYSTEM
CONNECTION.
INCLUDED IN THIS PROPOSAL IS TO AVOID THE PROVISION OF
PAVED AREAS AND WALKWAYS. AN AREA IN WHERE PAVEMENT IS
ESPECIALLY UNNECESSARY IN PARKING AREAS (SUCH AS IN THE CASE OF
LEANDRO VALLE AND FEW PARTS OF GUACAMAYAS SITES AND SERVICES
PROJECT AREA). FURTHER EVIDENCE STEMS 10M THE FACTS THAT IN
CAMPAMENTO OBRERO THE SETTLERS DECIDED NOT TO HAVE PAVEMENTS;
IN OTHER NEIGHBORHOODS, THE PEOPLE -BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE
TO PAY- DECIDED NOT TO BE PROVIDED WITH SIDEWALKS.
ALSO TO AVOID THE INDIVIDUAL PROVISION OF WATER MAY BE AN
ALTERNATIVE FOR PROGRESSIVE URBANIZATION SCHEMES. THE ACTUAL
PROVISION OF WATER IN GUACAMAYAS, EVERY OTHER DAY, AND VERY
OFTEN INTERRUPTED, FORCES PEOPLE TO COLLECT WATER AND TO BUILD
WATER TANKS AT STREET LEVEL. STANDPIPES CLOSE ENOUGH TO HOUSING
MIGHT BE AN ACCEPTABLE SERVICE LEVEL IN AN INITIAL STAGE.
SEVENTH: INCREASING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR RENTAL
ARRANGEMENTS, HOWEVER CONTROVERSIAL , SEEM A DESIRABLE PROJECT
FEATURE TO BE SUPPORTED. MANY POLICYMAKERS ARGUE THAT RENTING
IS NOT A SOLUTION FOR THE POOR, AND OTHERS SAY THAT
EXPLOITATION OF THE RENTING POOR BY A WEALTHIER CLASS IS A
REALITY. THE FORMER ARGUMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS
IN ALL URBAN AREAS, WHERE A SIGNIFICANT PROPORTION OF
HOUSEHOLDS ACTUALLY RENT. THE LATTER ONE IS AN UNAVOIDABLE
PHENOMENON PERHAPS POSSIBLE TO MINIMIZE BY EXPANDING RENTAL
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HOUSING SUPPLY, BY ENSURING THAT FULL COST RECOVERY IS ENFORCE
SO THAT PROJECTS DO NOT SUBSIDIZE A WEALTHIER CLASS. ALSO
MONITORING SPECIFIC ABUSES. THE WORLD BANK AFFIRMS THAT THIS
SUPPLY SIDE STRATEGY IS MORE SUCCESSFURL THAN THE RENTAL
RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS./40
EIGHT: MORE ENPHASIS SHOULD BE PUT IN DESIGN AND
MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE PROVISION RESPONSIBILITIES. COLLECTIONS
AND COST RECOVERY WILL ALSO IMPROVE PROJECT EFFICIENCY IN OTHER
FUTURE PROGRAMS.
NINTH: MORE RESEARCH SHOULD EXPLORE THE COMMUNITY'S
PARTICIPATION IN THEIR OWN GOVERNANCE. THIS IS AN UNTAPPED
RESOURCE TO BE USED WITHIN THE SHELTER PROJECTS. COMMUNITY
PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTION WAS REPORTED AS HIGH IN MY
INTERVIEWS WITH SOCIAL WORKERS WHO COMPLAINED ABOUR THE LACK OF
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT. AREAS IN WHICH THESE WERE MANIFEST WERE
STREET CLEANING, GARBAGE COLLLECTION ORGANIZATION,
REFORESTATION, AND PLAYGROUND MAINTENANCE. THE CAREFUL DESING
OF INCENTIVES MAY ALSO ACHIEVE CONTRIBUTIONS IN COST RECOVERY.
THE IMPROVED COMMUNICATION WITH THE COMMUNITY IS A KEY ISSUE IN
IMPLEMENTING THESE ELEMENTS IN HOUSING PROGRAMS.
40/ (DOUGLAS KEARE AND SCOTT PARRIS. EVALUATION OF SHELTER
PROGRAMS FOR THE URBAN POOR. THE WORLD BANK: WASH. DC, 1982.
p.106)
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C H A P T E R
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
THIS CHAPTER DEALS ESSENTIALLY WITH THOSE INSTITUTIONAL
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE STAGE AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION.
THESE INCLUDE THE STATUS OF TERMINATION OF WORKS, THE
CONTINUATION OF SOME WORKS SIMILAR, OR RELATED TO THE SHELTER
PROJECT COMPONENTS, AS WELL AS DAY TO DAY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO
HOUSING DEMAND, TRANSFERS, CONSOLIDATION, AND COST RECOVERY. AT
THE LAST CHAPTER OF THE SECTION I ATTEMPT TO PRESENT A CRITICAL
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE ROLES OF FIDELAC IN THE
REGION'S PROVISION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING.
1.COMPLETION AND CONTINUATION OF PROJECTS.
THE SELF-HELP CONSTRUCTION LOANS PROGRAM HAS BEEN THE MAIN
THRUST OF FIDELAC SHELTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES AFTER PROJECT
TERMINATION. THIS PROGRAM WITH A REDUCED STAFF, A MORE
CENTRALIZED OPERATIONAL SCHEME SINCE 1983, AND AFTER 1982 WITH
A MORE LIMITED SCOPE, CONTINUED ITS OPERATION UNTIL LATE 1984.
IT WAS THEN SUSPENDED DUE TO THE LACK OF REQUIRED FINANCIAL
RESOURCES. AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM
PROVIDED THE MOST EVIDENT SUPPORT FOR HOUSING CONSOLIDATION IN
THE AREA (SEE IV-5 SELF-HELP PROJECT DESCRIPTION).
THE UPGRADING PROGRAM LEFT SOME ASPECTS OF THE WORK
UNFINISHED. THIS WAS DUE PARTLY TO THE EXHAUSTION OF WORLD BANK
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RESOURCES. HOWEVER, SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WERE DIRECTLY THE
FAULT OF THE CONTRACTORS, WHO AS THEY WENT ALONG PASSED OVER
SOME PARTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION WITHOUT FINISHING IT AND DID NOT
RETURNED TO COMPLETE THE JOB. TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE
AFFECTED NEIGHBORHOODS HAS INITATED A SEARCH FOR A PARTIAL
SOLUTION TO THESE PROBLEMS.
WITH RESPECT TO COST RECOVERY, IT IS ARGUED BY OPPOSING
NEIGHBORHOOD LEADERS, THAT THE CONTRACTS SIGNED BY THE
NEIGHBORHOODS STIPULATED THAT REPAYMENT FOR UPGRADING PROJECT
COSTS WOULD BE INITIATED ONLY AFTER ALL WORK WAS FINISHED./1.
WHILE THIS ARGUMENT HOLDS FOR THOSE AFFECTED BY THE UNCOMPLETED
WORK, THIS IS NOT THE CASE FOR THE MAJORITY OF BENEFICIARIES
FIDM THE PROJECT. THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE PROVISION OF WATER
AND GARBAGE COLLECTION SERVICES ARE COMMON COMPLAINTS ASWELL.
ONE ISSUES THAT REMAINS TO BE CLEARED UP BY FIDELAC IS TO
ACCOMPLISH THE COMPLETION OF WALKWAYS. THESE WERE LEFT TO BE
FINISHED BY EACH HOUSEHOLD ACCORDING TO THE TERMS AGREED TO BY
THE COMMUNITIES.
THE LAND REGULARIZATION PROGRAM IS WELL ON ITS WAY. VERY
FEW CASES REMAIN WITHOUT LAND PROPERTY TITTLE. (SEE 111-4 LAND
REGULARIZATION PROCESS).
THE COMMUNITY CENTERS CONTINUE PROVIDING SOME FEW TRAINING
COURSES. LATELY THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PLANS TO WORK WITH THE
RECENTLY ARRIVED TO THE REGION THE BUILDING INDUSTRY TRAINING
1/ THE ALTERNATIVE ARGUEMENT WAS THAT EARLY PAYMENT INCREASED
RESOURCES FOR DOING THIS NECESSARY WORK.
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INSTITUTE (ICIC). THIS MAY PROVE A HELPFUL ALTERNATIVE TO WHAT
IS REGARDED AS AN ALMOST DEAD INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITY. OTHER
ALTERNATIVES INVOLVE THE DELEGATION OF THESE CENTERS TO
CULTURAL OR EDUCATIONAL MINISTRIES.
2.COST RECOVERY
ALTHOUGH INEFFICIENT COST RECOVERY RESULTS FIVM A
COMBINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL REASONS, THE MOST
APPARENT CAUSES IN THE LAZARO CARDENAS SHELTER PROJECTS ARE
TWO: FIRST, THE DIFFICULTIES IN COORDINATING THE ONSET OF
UTILITY SERVICES WITH REPAYMENTS DUE TO LACK OF AGGREEMENT WITH
COMMUNITY COMMITTEES,/2 AND SECOND THE POLITICAL RISKS
IMPLIED IN ENFORCING EFFICIENT COST RECOVERY MEASURES
THIS PROJECT SHARES WITH OTHER SIMILAR ONES OTHER LESS
OBVIOUS CAUSES: THE LACK OF ADEQUATE TECHNOLOGY TO KEEP
ACCURATE RECORDS, AND THE TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRACTICE OF
DEFAULTING IN PUBLIC SERVICE PAYMENTS.
THE RELATIVELY HIGH PERCENTAGES OF DEFAULTS AND PAYMENT
DELAYS MAKE THE LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT ONE
CASE AMONG MANY OF DEFICIENT COST-RECOVERY AMONG THE WORLD
2/ THE AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNITY WAS THAT PAYMENT WOULD
START WHEN THE WORK WAS COMPLETED. SINCE THIS WAS NOT CLEARLY
STATED, IT IS NOW ARGUED BY THE COMMITTEES THAT WHILE THERE ARE
STILL UPGRADING PROGRAM AREAS IN GUACAMAYAS THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN FINISHED, PAYMENTS ARE NOT YET DUE.
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BANK SHELTER PROJECTS./3
THE CAUSES ARE THE SAME THROUGH OUT. IT IS EVIDENT FROM
THESE SOMEWHAT EXPERIMENTS THAT THE INITIAL ASSUMPTION OF
COST-RECOVERY IS APPARENTLY NOT A REALISTIC ONE, AT LEAST
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. IF IT IS TRUE THAT
A MAJORITY OF THE BENEFICIARIES WILL ACT ECONOMICALLY SPEAKING
IN A RATIONAL WAY, THEN IF LEFT ALONE THEY WILL MOST LIKELY
NOT PAY BACK THE PROJECT COSTS, THE LIMITED NUMBER OF FEASIBLE
THINGS THAT CAN BE DONE TO ENFORCE COST RECOVERY IS OFF
SOMETHING CHRONICALLY WRONG WITH BUILDING SO LARGE HOUSING
PROJECTS WITH PUBLIC FUNDS. PERHAPS THE CONCEPTS OF JOHN TURNER
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO EXPLAIN WHY CENTRALIZED INSTITUTIONS HAVE
SO MANY PROBLEM IN THE DELIVERY OF SERVICES./4
FIDELAC HAS TRIED A WIDE VARIETY OF MEASURES, LIMITED IN
SCOPE AND TIME, TO ATTAIN A BETTER RECOVERY RECORD /5; IN EACH
OCCASION, SOME RESULTS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, EACH TIME
THESE TACTICS HAVE BEEN STOPPED BY POLITICAL PRESSURES
CLOCKED IN A RATIONALE.
3/ FOR ALL THE PROGRAMS, THE AVERAGE DEFAULT RATE IS 35%, AND
FOR THOSE IN ARREARS 43%.
4/ JOHN F. TURNER, F EEDOM TO BUILT. NEW YORK: PANTHEON BOOKS,
1976.
5/ THESE MEASURES HAVE RANGED F10M DOOR TO DOOR INQUIRES
ASKING EACH FAMILY TO SHOW THEIR LATEST MONTHLY PAYMENT
RECEIPT TO SOME EMBARGOS OF PROPERTY. OTHER MEASURES HAVE
INCLUDED PERSONAL TALKS WITH LEADERS ASKING FOR THEIR
COOPERATION, AS WELL AS THREATENING WITH JUDICIAL ACTIONS
THOSE WITH MORE THAN 3 MONTH DELAYS.
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COST RECOVERY IN THE FACE OF HARSH INFLATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKENING SEEMS INCREASINGLY AN UNREWARDING
ENDEAVOR; FURTHERMORE, JUDGED THE GROUNDS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
GROUNDS, ENFORCING COST RECOVERY SEEMS UNFAIR TO THE POOREST
FAMILIES./6
THE DIFFICULTIES IN COST RECOVERY, HERE AS IN MOST
SHELTER PROJECTS, VARIES WITH THE KIND OF PROJECT. WHILE SITES
AND SERVICES HAD 53% IN ARREARS, AND THE SELF HELP A SOMEWHAT
LOWER PERCENTAGE, THE UPGRADING PROJECT IN EARLY 1984 HAD, BY
FAR, THE HIGHEST RECORD OF THOSE IN DEFAULT./7
3. HOUSING CONSOLIDATION AND TRANSFERS
CONSOLIDATION AND PROPERTY TRANSFERENE ARE TWO ISSUES
IMPORTANT IN THE CONTEXT OF IMPROVEMENTS TO HOUSING, AND ARE
PART OF THE EXTENDED ROLE THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY SHOULD
CONTINUE TO HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON.
THE MOST OBVIOUS CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE DEGREE OF
CONSOLIDATION IS THE COMPARISON OF DURABLE CONSTRUCTIONS AND
SECOND FLOORS
6/ AN INQUIRY IN EARLY 1984, PLUS TALKS WITH SOME OF THE SOCIAL
WORKERS CONFIRMED FOR ME THAT THOSE IN ARREARS OR DEFAULTING
TEND TO BE THE ONES BETTER OFF. THE REASON IS THAT THEY KNOW
HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS, AND HENCE KNOW HOW EXPENSIVE IT IS FOR
FIDELAC TO EXERCISE JUDICIAL CONTROL. FURTHERMORE, IF ALERTED
ON TIME, AND IF THEY MAKE THEIR PAYMENTS, LEGAL ACTIONS IS
ALWAYS STOPPED. HENCE THEY RUN LITTLE RISKS OF HAVING THEIR
BELONGINGS SEIZED.
7/ FOR INSTANCE, IN EL CERRITO, ONE OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS THAT
STILL IS UNFINISHED, IN MID 1984 THE PERCENTAGE OF DEFAULTS WAS
93%,WHILE IN GUACAMAYAS ON THE AVERAGE, UP TO LATE 1983 60% OF
THE TOTAL UPGRADING BENEFICIARIES WERE IN ARREARS AND ONLY 35%
WERE IN DEFAULT.
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AGAINST OTHER SIMILAR AREAS. FOR INSTANCE, THE SITES AND
SERVICES PROJECTS DEVELOPED UNDER THE WORLD BANK PROJECT ARE ON
A PAR OR ARE EVEN BETTER OFF THAN THEIR NEIGHBORING AREAS
HAVING A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME /8.
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THESE PROJECTS HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED
BY EXPLICIT PROMOTIONAL CAMPAIGNS BY THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM.
SPECIAL EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PUT UPON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE
PROJECT IN ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA./9
IF THE TWO SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS ARE COMPARED WITH
ONE ANOTHER, THERE ARE NOTICEABLE DIFFERENCES. THE ONE IN ZONA
FIDEICOMITIDA HAS A MUCH HIGHER PROPORTION OF SECOND FLOOR
HOUSING AND A FEWER NUMBER OF SHACKS THAN THE ONE IN
GUACAMAYAS./10 THIS WAS EXPECTED SINCE THE LATTER ONE HAD LOWER
INCOME GROUPS, AND HIGHER TRANSPORTATION COSTS DUE TO ITS
COMPARATIVE LOCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE.
ALL PROJECT SHELTER BENEFICIARIES HAVE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT
CONCERNING TRANSFERS. DURING THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, FIDELAC HAS
TO APPROVE ANY OPERATION THAT INVOLVES MORTGAGING, SELLING, OR
TRANSFERING PROPERTY. THE CONTROL OF TRANSFERS IS A TASK THAT
8/ WHILST THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECTS HAVE SOME 3 TO 4
YEARS OF CONSOLIDATION, THE SIMILAR INDECO AND LEANDRO VALLE
HAVE RESPECTIVELY 12 AND 6 YEARS.
9/ THIS SEEMS TO BE A SPECIAL POLICY TO HAVE MORE CONSOLIDATED
AND HIGHER INCOME FAMILIES IN THE NEW DEVELOPMENT AREAS.
10/ WHILE IN ZONA FIDEICOMITIDA THERE IS ONE SECOND FLOOR HOUSE
FOR EACH 12 HOUSES, IN THE GUACAMAYAS SITES AND SERVICE PROJECT
THERE ARE ONLY SOME 10 HOUSES IN ALL (LESS THAN ONE FOR EACH 30
HOUSES). IN THE EXTENT OF NON DURABLE CONSTRUCTION, THERE ARE
10% SHACKS IN THE FORMER AND 22% IN THE LATER.
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REQUIRES CONSTANT VIGILANCE F'E0M FIDELAC./11 DURING EARLIER
STAGES, THERE WAS A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WOULD
SELL THEIR PLOTS AND LEAVE THE REGION WITHOUT HAVING PAYED FOR
THE PLOT OR THE SELF-HELP LOANS, LEAVING THE NEW OWNER WITH
AN EXTRA DEBT.
4. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
THE LAZARO CARDENAS MUNICIPALITY IS AN OVER-BURDENED AND
UNDERFUNDED LOCAL GOVERNMENT. IT HAS THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR
MAINTENANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE -WHICH IS NEW AND OF A RELATIVELY
GOOD QUALITY-, AND GARBAGE COLLECTION IN FINISHED PROJECT
AREAS.
FIDEICOMISO OFFERS HELP TO THE MUNICIPALITY FOR WASTE
DISPOSAL SERVICE IN THE COMPLETED PROJECT AREAS. NEVERTHELESS,
THIS SERVICE HAS HAD DIFFICULTIES IN ITS EFFICIENCY AND
ADEQUACY DUE TO DETERIORATION OF THE PICK UP TRUCKS, WHICH
ARE INADEQUATELY MAINTAINED. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 6.5 TONS OF
GARBAGE ARE PICKED UP DAILY, HOWEVER, ONE TON IS LEFT BEHIND TO
BE DUMPED IN EMPTY PLOTS./12
THE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM FUNCTIONS IRREGULARLY DUE TO, FOR
EXAMPLE, ITS DEPENDENCY ON ELECTRICAL WATER PUMPS, A SMALLER
THAN NEEDED CENTRAL WATER DEPOSIT TANK, AND A GENERAL LACK OF
11/ FIDELAC KEEPS TWO WATCHMEN IN GUACAMAYAYS AND USUALLY ONE
SOCIAL WORKER IN EACH PROJECT AREA WHO GENERALLY ARE ABLE TO
DETECT TRANSFERS.
12/ CONURBAL. PLAN ECOLOGICO DE LA ZONA CONURBADA. LAZARO
CARDENAS, COMISION DE CONURBACION, 1981.
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PRESSURE. CUSTOMARILY THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED EVERY OTHER DAY.
HENCE MANY FAMILIES HAD TO BUILD STREET LEVEL WATER
CONTAINERS. WHEN OCCASIONALLY THERE IS NO WATER FOR SOME DAYS,
FIDELAC PROVIDES FREE WATER WITH TRUCKS. BUSINESSES THAT
REQUIRE MORE WATER -SUCH AS "TORTILLERIAS"- HAVE HAD TO DIG
THEIR OWN WELLS.
THE STREET LIGHTING IS OF LOW-INCOME RESIDENTIAL AREA
STANDARDS, BUT IT IS BADLY MAINTAINED BY THE POPULATION.
BREAKING BULBS IS COMMON. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SERVICE HAS
NOT BEEN WELL DEFINED. SOMETIMES FIDELAC PROVIDES THE
MAINTENANCE, OTHER TIMES THE FEDERAL ELECTRICAL COMMISSION
(CFE) DOES IT.
THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH DRAINAGE NOR PAVEMENT
MAINTENANCE. BOTH THE BUILDING MATERIALS OF THESE
INFRASTRUCTURE WAS PROVIDED BY THE CENTRAL BUILDING FACTORY OF
FIDELAC.
FIDELAC PAYS TWO WATCHMEN TO GIVE DAILY REPORTS ON ISSUES
RELATED TO GUACAMAYAS. SOME OF THEIR FUNCTIONS ARE: PLOT
ASSIGNMENT, TRANSFERS CONTROL, AND IN GENERAL THEY ACT AS
MEDIATORS IN DISPUTES BETWEEN THE INSTITUTIONS AND THE PEOPLE.
5. HOUSING SUPPLY AND DEMAND AFTER THE PROJECT
THE DEMAND FOR HOUSING IS CONTINUOUSLY BEING MONITORED BY
THE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT OF FIDELAC BY MEANS OF ROUTINE
REQUEST THAT PEOPLE FILL OUT A BRIEF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SURVEY.
THIS DEMAND IS CONSTANTLY RENEWED, WHICH ENABLES A PROCESS IN
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WHICH THE REAL DEMAND IS THE ONE THAT HAS THE LATEST POSITION
IN TIME.
THE PROCESS OF SELECTION OF BENEFICIARIES IS ACCORDING TO
A CRITERIA BY WHICH WAITING TIME, INCOME, AND NUMBER OF
DEPENDENTS ARE THE MAJOR DETERMINANTS.
IN EARLY 1984 THE RENEWED DEMAND WAS AROUND 2100 FAMILIES,
WHILE THE SQUATTERING FAMILIES IN THE REGION WERE REACHING
SOME 2600 FAMILIES /13. THE COMPOSITION OF THE DEMAND WAS ITS
MAJORITY FOR THE LOWER INCOME BRACKETS, WITH RESIDENCE IN
LAZARO CARDENAS (RENTING) OR WITHIN THE SMALL SETTLEMENTS OF
THE MICROREGION (ARRIMADOS OR SQUATTERS)/14. ROUGHLY SOME 90%
OF THE APPLICANTS DEMAND ONLY SERVICED PLOTS./15
THE PROVISION OF HOUSING AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION IS
COMPRISED OF HOUSING ACTIONS THAT INCLUDE A WHOLE RANGE OF
ALTERNATIVES THAT GO F IM THE TEMPORARY PERMISSION TO SETTLE
IN A SHACK (250 FAMILIES IN AREA DE TEMPORAL) TO FINISHED
HOUSING (ONLY 18 HOUSES IN THE REGION), INCLUDING PROGRESSIVE
URBANIZATION (300 PLOTS WITH ONLY WATER AND SEWAGE IN
13/ THIS FIGURE WAS ESTIMATED BY ADDING THE 1000 PLOTS THAT WILL
BE ADDED IN EARLY 1985 BY GIVING OUT LAND BY THE STATE
GOVERNMENT NEXT TO SOLIDADRIDAD SOCIAL, THE PREVIOUS LAND
GRANTING GIVEN OUT BY THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.
14/ 1.0-1.6 TMW.........37% LOCATION
1.7-2.0 TMW.........14% GUACAMAYAS............23%
2.1-2.5 TMW......... 17% LAZARO CARDENAS
2.5-3.9 TMW.........22% & SMALL SETTLEM.......77%
4.0-&UP TMW..........5%
15/ ESTIMATED BY THE HEAD OF THE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT.
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AMPLIACION LA VILLITA), SITES AND SERVICES (SOME 30 PLOTS IN
AMPLIACION JARENI), AND CORE HOUSING (FONHAPO PROGRAM FOR UP 3
TMW HOUSEHOLDS).THE TOTAL SUPPLY HAS RESPONDED TO A SMALL PART
OF THE RECORDED DEMAND (IN 1981 40%, 1982 20%, 1983 30%)./16
MEANWHILE THE OLD SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS REMAIN UNTOUCHED
BY ANY OF THE REGIONAL PUBLIC AGENCIES. LA ORILLITA NEXT TO THE
SICARTSAS HIGH RANK RESIDENTIAL AREA, HAS A LONG TIME DISPUTE
WITH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR LAND REGULARIZATION FOR LAND
REGULARIZATION,/17 SOLIDARIDAD SOCIAL (SOME 2 MILES FROM LA
ORILLA, AND LAS FLORES NEXT TO THE SOUTHERN GUACAYAS BOUNDARY
HAD NEARLY 400 FAMILIES EACH WITH NO SERVICE PROVISION; THE
REST OF THE 13 SMALLER SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS SURROUNDING THE
AREA -NOT COUNTING ANY OF THE 11 SMALL RURAL TOWNS OF THE
MICROREGION- HAVE BEEN GROWING NEXT THE IRRIGATION DITCH.
AREA DE TRANSICION, THE TEMPORARY 250 FAMILY SETTLEMENT
CREATED BY FIDELAC AS RESPONSE OF AN EARLY 1982 LAND INVASION,
ARE SUPPOSEDLY WAITING FOR THE OPENING OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING
PROJECTS BY FIDELAC. IN FACT, ROUGHLY TWO THIRDS ARE DEMANDING
TO STAY IN THAT LENT LAND. THE OTHER THIRD WANT TO BE MOVED OUT
SINCE THEY ARE SETTLED IN A HIGH SLOPE AREA (30%) WITH RISKS OF
EROSION AND MUD AVALANCHES IN RAINING SEASON.
16/ NOLASCO, MARGARITA. LA CIUDAD DE LOS POBRES, IN LAS
TRUCHAS. MEXICO: ED. ECODESARROLLO, 1984.
17/ ACCORDING TO THE HEAD OF CONURBAL IN THE REGION, CORETT HAS
OFFERED THE REGULARIZATION TO THE ORIGINAL SETTLED FAMILIES.
HOWEVER THE DISPUTE AROUSED FOR THOSE FAMILIES THAT HAVE
ARRIVED LATER AND WHO DEMAND LAND FOR THEMSELVES. THIS MEANS
THE PURCHASE OF EXPENSIVE LAND NEXT TO "LA ORILLITA"
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6 .PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE ROLE OF FIDELAC
SINCE 1978 THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL PORTS PROGRAM (NIPP)
WAS APPROVED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MOTIVATED BY THE OIL
BOOM OF THE COUNTRY AND THE NEED TO UTILIZE EXTRAORDINARY
INCREASES IN NATIONAL INCOME. HOWEVER IT WAS NOT UNTIL 1980
INITATED IN LAZARO CARDENAS.
THE FIRST CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENACTMENT OF NIPP FOR THE
REGION WAS THE CREATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS COMMITTEE
(CPD), A PUBLIC ORGANIZATION WHICH BEGAN A SLOW AND STEADY
PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGHTENING. AT THE SAME TIME IT
REDUCED FIDELAC'S PROVISION OF FISCAL RESOURCES. THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS NEW INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION WERE:
1. IN 1980, CPD ALLOCATED A PART OF ITS FUNDS TO FIDELAC
WHICH THEN HAD REACHED ITS APOGEE AS THE ONLY PUBLIC BODY
MAKING DECISIONS ON URBAN PLANNING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN
THE LAZARO CARDENAS METROPOLITAN AREA BOUNDARIES.
2. ALTHOUGH FIDELAC DID KEPT PROVIDING LOANS FOR SELF-
HELP HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, THE POST-PROJECT PROVISION OF LOW-
INCOME HOUSING HAS A BEEN REDUCED TO A MINIMUM.
18/ THE MAIN SOURCE FOR WRITING THIS CHAPTER WAS DANIEL
HIERNOUX. "EL ESTADO Y LAS POLITICAS URBANAS" IN LAS TRUCHAS: INVER
CITY: CENTRO DE ECODESARROLLO, 1984.
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3.MANY PLOTS ON THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT IN
GUACAMAYAS WERE GIVEN TO SOME OF THE 330 "EJIDATARIOS" WHOSE
LAND WAS EXPROPRIATED BY CPD FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE
INDUSTRIAL PARK.
THE CREATION OF CPD SUGGESTS NEW TRENDS IN THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMMENT OF THE CITY AND MORE SPECIFICALLY IN THE PROVISON
OF HOUSING.
TWO OTHER SIGNS OF CHANGE OF ROLE: FIRST, THE MUCH SHORTER
PERIOD OF TIME TO ISSUE EXPROPRIATION DECREES FOR INDUSTRIAL
PURPOSES. AND SECONDLY, THE SUSPENSION OF APPROVED FEDERAL
RESOURCES FOR A SPECIAL LARGE PROGRAM OF RENTAL APARTMENTS.
PROVISION FOR THE LOW-INCOME GROUPS, SUCH AS THE ONES THE
SHELTER PROJECTS BROUGHT ABOUT, BECAUSE INSTITUTIONAL
ENFRANCHISEMENT WILL BE ABANDONNED OR UNDER UTILIZED FOR THE
LOW INCOME FAMILIES. WHAT IS NEEDED -AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
PASSES- IS A SERIES OF PROGRAMS THAT OFFER ACCESS TO HOUSING TO
ALL INCOME GROUPS.
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C H A P T E R V I
PROJECT IMPACTS
THIS SECTION PRESENTS A SPECIFIC VIEW OF THE MAIN IMPACTS
OCCURRED BY THE SHELTER COMPONENTS OF THE LAZARO CARDENAS URBAN
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. THESE IMPACTS ARE IDENTIFIED ACCORDING TO
A STANDARD CRITERIA FROM A WORLD BANK PUBLICATION./1
1. ACHIEVEMENT OF PHYSICAL OBJECTIVES
A. THE QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES OF THE SHELTER PROJECTS WERE:
A.TO BENEFIT 37,000 PEOPLE LIVING IN THE WHOLE MICROREGION.
B.TO PROVIDE LEGAL TENURE TO 6760 HOUSEHOLDS.
C.TO PROVIDE INF1kSTRUCTURE AND BASIC SERVICES TO 5580 FAMILIES
D.TO CREATE 1200 NEW SERVICED PLOTS
E.TO EXTEND 5300 BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS FOR SELF-HELP.
B.THE EXTENT OF ACHIEVEMENT WAS AS FOLLOWS:/2
A.THE BENEFITTED POPULATION WAS 16,000 (70.3%)
B.THE NUMBER OF LAND TENURE ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN AND ACCOMPLISHED
WAS 2823 (41.9%)
C.THE NUMBER OF UPGRADED PLOTS WAS 2823 (50.6%)
D.THE NUMBER OF NEW PLOTS WERE 1319 (73.3)
E.THE NUMBER OF BUILDING MATERIAL LOANS MADE WITH WORLD BANK
FINANCIAL RESOURCES WAS 1803 (34%); ADDING THOSE MADE WITH
FISCAL RESOURCES IT WAS 3727 (73.3%).
A ROUGH MEASURE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ACHIEVEMENT IS
THE AVERAGE, WHICH IS 62% OF THE QUANTITATIVE OBJECTIVES.
1/ DOUGLAS H. KEARE AND SCOTT PARRIS. EVALUATION OF SHELTER 1D
PROGRAMS FOR THE URBAN POOR: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS. WORLD BANK
STAFF WORKING PAPER No.547, 1982.
2/ ACCORDING TO THE 1983 REPORT OF FIDELAC TO BANOBRAS.
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2. ACCESIBILITY TO TARGET POPULATION
THE PROJECTS WERE TARGETTED TO THE POPULATION UNDER THE 40th
PEPRCENTILE OF THE MICROREGION. IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT ONLY A
3% WOULD BE OUT OF THE PROJECTS REACH. HOWEVER THE PROJECTS
HAVE SERVED ALL INCOME GROUPS, INCLUDING THOSE ABOVE 4 TMW /2.
THIS NEVERTHELESS HAS BEEN A COMMON FEATURE FOUND IN MOST WORLD
BANK PROJECTS /3.
HOWEVER THE INCOME GROUPS MORE FREQUENTLY SERVED BY THE
PROJECTS WERE THOSE GROUPS WITH LOWEST FAMILY INCOME IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD OF THE 40th PERCENTILE (1.25 TMW) /4. INDEED, ALL
PROGRAMS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE SERVED IN ITS LARGER SHARE TO
THE 0.5 TO 1.5 TMW INCOME GROUPS. THE PROJECTS REPORTS AND
EVALUATIONS OF THE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS DEPARTMENT CONFIRMED
2/ THIS IS THE CASE OF THE SELF-HELP PROJECT IN ITS FIRST
PHASE FROM 1977 TO 1980. IT PROVIDED CREDIT FOR HOUSEHOLDS
ABOVE 4.5 TMW; IT ALSO SERVED WITH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
RESIDENTIAL PROJECTS OF THE WELL-OFF FAMILIES. EVEN IN 1984,
IN THE LAST YEAR OF OPERATION, IT WAS PROVIDING SOME 10% OF
ITS RESOURCES TO FAMILY INCOME ABOVE 4TMW.
3/ INDEED THE FINDINGS ARE THAT PROJECTS INCLUDE UP TO THE
70th PERCENTILE, ALTHOUGH MOST ARE TARGETTING BETWEEN THE
20th AND THE 50th PERCENTILE GROUPS (KEARE p.vi). ON THE
OTHER HAND THE DIFFICULTY TO TARGET UPGRADING PROJECTS SOLELY
TO THE LOWEST INCOME GROUPS IS NOT NECESSARILY A NEGATIVE
FACTOR, FOR ITS REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE GREATER POPULATION
AND ITS INCREASED ABILITY TO OFFER LOW INCOME GROUPS
EMPLOYMENT.
4/ THE RECORDED-BY-FIDELAC DEMAND FOR HOUSING CONCENTRATED
56% OF THE DEMAND BETWEEN 0.5 AND 1.5 TMW.
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ADEQUATE AFFORDABILITY . THE DISPOSABLE INCOME FOR HOUSING
EXPENDITURE WAS CONSIDERED 18%. AFTER 1982 THIS CEILING WAS
RISED UP TO 25%.
THERE WERE SOME UNAVOIDABLE LOOPHOLES IN THE BENEFICIARIES
SELECTION PROCESS /6. SINCE IT IS UNECONOMICALLY TO HAVE A LONG
SCREENING PROCESS TO VERIFY THE APPLICANTS INCOME BY VISITING
THEIR HOMES, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE OF MANY OTHER WORLD BANK
EXPERIENCES, INHERENT ERROR HAD TO BE ACCEPTED. NEVERTHTELESS,
CARE WAS TAKEN TO AVOID INCLUDING TOO MANY HIGH INCOME FAMILIES
WHO DID FALSIFY INCOME STATISTICS IN ORDER TO PARTICIPATE /7.
5/ THE PERCENTAGE OF TARGETTED GROUPS THAT FALL IN THE 0.5
TO 1.5 TMW INCOME LEVELS RANGE BETWEEN 33% AND 71%. THESE
FIGURES COME F' X)M EVALUATIONS CARRIED OUT IN A RAPID -
PERHAPS SUPERFICIAL-- MANNER BY THE HUMAN SETTLEMENTS
DEPARTMENT, BUT ALSO F 10M PROJECT REPORTS AND THE WORLD BANK
INITIAL ESTIMATES.
6/ THESE WERE DUE IN PART TO THE
THE INCOMES OF FAMILIES AT ENTRY,
OF MIDDLE CLASS HOUSING. IN THE
PROPERTY, THESE WERE NOT DETECTED
PUT IN EVIDENCE, THEY HAD ALREADY
THERE WAS NOTHTING ELSE TO DO. THE
PAY ALL AT ONCE, ALSO SHOWS SOME OF
AVOID IN THE SELECTION PROCESS.
DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING
COUPLED WITH THE SHORTAGE
CASES OF OWNERS WITH ANOTHER
IN THE BEGINNING, AND WHEN
PAYED FOR THEIR PLOTS SO
FACT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO
THE DEFICIENCIES HARD TO
7/ IN 1980 THE SELF HELP PROGRAM WAS ABLE TO SISTEMATIZE THE
PROCEDURE BY GIVING DIFFERENT WEIGHTS TO EACH REQUIREMENT.
APPARENTLY THIS EFFORT DID NOT LEAD TO A COMPUTERIZED PROCESS,
BUT ONLY WAS USED AS A MORE PRECISE CRITERIA.
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ON THE DEFINITION OF INCOME FIDELAC CUSTOMARILY HAS
MAINTAIN THE SAME: FAMILY INCOME INCLUDES ONLY THE PARENTS
INCOME. USUALLY THE INSTITUTIONS DOES NOT CONSIDER FINANCIAL
TRANSFERS /8. ACCORDING TO THESE CRITERIA AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE
OF INCOME GROUPS WERE INCORPORATED TO THE SITES AND SERVICES
PROJECTS.
THE LAZARO CARDENAS PROJECT SUPPORTED FINDINGS OF THE WORLD
BANK IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. ONE IS THE FACT THAT BENEFICIARIES
HAVE BEEN STIMULATE TO PRODUCE A QUALITY OF HOUSING HIGHER THAN
EXPECTED. THIS IS FOR FAMILIES CONTINUE TO INVEST MONEY AND
TIME IN THE PROJECT AREAS PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVING NOT ONLY
THEIR HOUSES BUT ALSO COMMUNITY FACILITIES SUCH AS SIDEWALKS,
PARKS, AND COMMUNITY CENTERS (KEARE p.vi).
SOME DATA ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF PROJECTS
BENEFICIARIES FOLLOWS.
8/ ALTHOUGH I DID NOT HAVE ANY DATA FOR THE COMPROBATION OF
TRANSFERS, A WORLD BANK PILOT EVALUATION PUBLISHED IN 1980
FOUND AN IMPORTANT BEHAVIORAL ASPECT OF THE LOW-INCOME GROUPS:
THAT FINANCIAL TRANSFERS OCCUR UP TO ONE THIRD OF THE
HOUSEHOLDS, AMOUNTING A 10% OF TOTAL INCOME, AND ARE AS STABLE
AS ANY SOURCE OF INCOME TEMPORARITY AUGMENTED WHEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PURCHASE A HOUSE OCCURS. "THESE FINDINGS
SUGGEST THAT MORE AND POORER FAMILIES CAN AFFORD THE HOUSING
PROVIDED UNDER THESE PROJECTS. ALSO THEY SUGGEST THAT MORE AND
POORER FAMILIES CAN AFFORD THE HOUSING PROVIDED UNDER THESE
PROJECTS. ALSO THEY SUGGEST THAT CREDIT REQUIREMENTS ARE
PROBABLY MUCH LESS UNIFORM THAN ANTICIPATED" (KEARE p.xv).
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41% F 10M THE PRIVATE SECTOR, ,58% 1110M THE TERTIARY SECTOR;
AVERAGE AGE 37 YEARS; 84% FUNCTIONAL FAMILIES (73% MARRIED
COUPLES); 17% OF FIDELAC PERSONNEL WAS RECIPIENT OF LOANS; 71%
WITH RESIDENCY TIME BETWEEN 3 AND 10 YRS.; 70% WITH INCOME
BETWEEN 0.5 AND 2.5 TMW (THE RANGE BETWEEN 1.5 AND 2.5 TMW WERE
37%). THESE ARE THE MOST RELIABLE FIGURES OF THE PROJECT, FOR
THEY WERE DONE ON 1056 CASES OF THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM BY
U.P.E./9
3. IMPROVEMENTS TO HOUSING
AN URGENT NEED TO CONSOLIDATE HOUSING IN THE URBAN AREAS
OF THE REGION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED./10 HOWEVER, NOT ALL
BENEFICIARIES FROM THE DIFFERENT SHELTER PROJECTS HAVE BEEN
RECIPIENTS (SEE SELF-HELP PROGRAM), IN THIS RESPECT, THE
BUILDING MATERIALS LOANS PROGRAM HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN
HOUSING CONSOLIDATION IN ALL UPGRADED AREAS, BUT MORE
SPECIFICALLY IN THE SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT AREAS /11.
9/ U.P.E. EVALUACION DEL PROGRAMA DE AUTOCONSTRUCCION. LAZARO
CARDENAS: FIDELAC, 1980.
10/ RESULTS FROM AN INQUIRY CARRIED OUT BY THE HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS OFFICE OF FIDELAC IN EARLY 1984 INDICATE THAT THE
REASONS FOR CONSOLIDATING URBAN HOUSING ARE THREE: THE FREQUENT
TROPICAL STORMS, THE RAPID DETERIORATION OF CARD BOARD, AND THE
DEMAND FROM SOCIAL STATUS.
11/ THE PERCENTAGE OF CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION IS QUITE
NOTICEABLE IN THESE AREAS, RANGING FROM AN AVERAGE OF 78% IN
SITES AND SERVICES TO 68% IN UPGRADED PROJECT AREAS. (IN THESE
SURVEY SAMPLE FIGURES, CONSOLIDATED HOUSING IS CONSIDERED THAT
WHICH HAS CONCRETE SLAB). ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAM RECORDS,
IN SITES AND SERVICES PROJECT AREAS, 80% OF THOSE LIVING IN
CONSOLIDATED HOUSING HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE SELF-HELP
PROGRAM.
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IT SEEM EVIDENT THAT PEOPLE HAVE BEEN BENEFITTED MORE THAN
EXPECTED. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO SPECIAL STUDIES ON THE MARKET
VALUES OF HOUSING, ACCORDING TO MARKET VALUES /12, IT IS
EVIDENT FROM LOOKING AT THE PRESENT SALE PRICES THAT THE
EXISTING HOUSING HAS INCREASED ITS VALUE BY A SUBSTANTIAL
PROPORTION/ 13.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON EXPENDITURES FOR
FOOD AND OTHER BASIC NECESSITIES HAVE BEEN VERY REDUCED /14,
SPECIALLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE HIGH RATE OF INFLATION, WHICH
HAS BEEN MORE THAN TWICE THAN THE DELAYED-PAYMENT INTEREST
RATES /15. IT MAY BE ASSUMED ALSO THAT SIGNIFICANT INCREASES
12/ THE DIFFICULTY IN ESTIMATING CHANGES IN HOUSING VALUE BY
MEASURING DIRECTLY AT MARKET VALUES, ARISES FROM THE PROJECT
STIPULATION THAT HOUSES CANNOT BE SOLD WITHIN A 5 YEAR PERIOD
FOLLOWING ITS COMPLETION. FIDELAC SEEMS NOT TO HAVE DONE A
DETERMINATION OF THE EXTENT OF IMPROVEMENTS IN HOUSING QUALITY
OVER TIME, THE SO CALLED HEDONIC PRICING TECHNIQUES, IN WHICH
IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE PRICE OF HOUSING DEPENDS DIRECTLY ON THE
SUM OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS AS THEY ARE PERCEIVED JOINTLY BY
BUYER AND SELLER.
13/ AT THE GUACAMAYAS DWELLING MARKET, EVIDENCE FROM THE
FREQUENT TRANSFERS (30% IN SOME AREAS), SHOWS THAT DEPENDING
UPON THE BUYER'S NEEDS AND POSSIBILITIES, AS WELL AS THE
SELLERS SITUATION, ANY THING GOES INTO PRICING. THE SAME IS
SELLED, BUYED, OR RENTED: A SOLID MATERIALS HOUSING AS IT IS
ANY UNFINISHED HOUSE, OR EVEN A TEMPORARY SHACK.
14/ THE FIDELAC CENSUS IN 1977 FOUND THAT FAMILIES WERE
SPENDING UP TO 15.4% OF THE FAMILY BUDGET IN HOUSING. THE
PAYMENTS FOR THE PROJECT URBAN AND SHELTER BENEFITS WERE SET TO
RANGE FROM 15% TO 25% OF FAMILY INCOME.
15/ ALTHOUGH NO DATA WAS AVAILABLE, THE ROLE GUACAMAYAS WAS
PLAYING DURING THE PRIOR STAGE OFFERING RENTAL HOUSING (MORE
THAN 30%) MOST LIKELY HAS CONTINUE.
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IN RENTAL INCOMES WERE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE PROGRAM, TAPPING
IN THIS WAY NEW SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSING.
4. ACCESS TO SERVICES
IMPROVED ACCESS TO SOCIAL AND OTHER URBAN SERVICES THROUGH
THE PROGRAMS HAVE YIELDED RELATIVELY GOOD RESULTS. ALTHOUGH
NOT ALL BENEFICIARIES ARE CONVINCED OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE PROGRAM,/16 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND INTEGRATION WITH
URBAN SERVICES HAVE CLEARLY BEEN IMPROVED IN ALMOST ALL THE
GUACAMAYAS NEIGHBORHOODS /17.
UPGRADING PROJECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE BENEFITTED FIEM PIPED
WATER ALTHOUGH IT IS SUPPLIED ONLY EVERY OTHER DAY, WITH
OCCASIONAL SHORTAGES THAT MAY LAST SEVERAL DAYS. ON THOSE
OCCASSIONS, FIDELAC AND THE MUNICIPALITY WILL PROVIDE WATER BY
TRUCK.
PARTICIPANTS ALSO HAVE BENEFITTED FROM HAVING A PRIVATE
TOILET. PAVED ROADS HAVE FREE THE GUACAMAYAS POPULATION FROM
THE DIFFICULTIES OF UNKEEP. DURING THE RAINY SEASONS, PROBLEMS
WITH CLOTHING CLEAN, AND THE EXPENSE IN SHOES HAS BEEN REDUCED.
TRUCK DELIVERY AND COLLECTIVE TRANSPORTATION HAVE AS WELL BEEN
BENEFITED FROM PAVED ROADS. ONLY THE TRASH COLLECTION SERVICE
HAS CONTINUED TO BE REPORTED DEFICIENT. (SEE V-2 OPERATION AND
MAINTENANCE)
16/ IN A SURVEY IN CERRITOS, ONE OF THE NEIGHBORHOODS WITH
UNFINISHED FACILITIES, 56% OF THE INTERVIEWED SHOWED DISATIS-
FACTION WITH THE SERVICES. IN CONTRAST THE FIGURE FOR EL TRIA-
NGULITO, A WELL-SERVED NEIGHBORHOOD, WAS 11%.
17/ BESIDES CERRITO, SOME 3 BLOCKS OF LEANDRO VALLE, TWO AREAS
REMAIN WITH UNFIFINISHED WORKS. ZONA EJIDAL URBANA, FOR BEING
SETTLED ON EJIDAL LAND TENURE, AND CAMPAMENTO OBRERO, FOR
HAVING ACCORDED NOT HAVING THEIR ROADS TO BE PAVED.
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5. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME GENERATION
BESIDES THE JOBS GENERATED DIRECTLY BY THE PUBLIC WORKS OF
THE UPGRADED AREAS /18, INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT FROM LABOR HIRED TO
HELP BUILD THE DWELLING WAS 70%, A COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING HIGH
FIGURE AMONG THE WORLD BANK PROJECTS.
6. INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING
FIDELAC AT THE TIME OF PROJECT PLANNING WAS CONSIDERED AS
AN INTITUTION FINANCIALLY QUITE DEFICIENT, OVERSTAFFED, AND
FUNCTIONING WITH INADEQUATE PLANNING, REVIEWING AND MANAGERIAL
CAPACITIES/19. FIDELAC, AS MANY OF THE OTHER URBAN DEVELOPMENT
TRUSTS OF THE COUNTRY, WAS CONCEIVED OF AS A TEMPORARILY SET
AGENCY TO IMPLEMENT A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, WITHOUT CONCERN FOR
COST RECOVERY.
THE CHANGES FIDELAC HAD TO UNDERGO WERE THE FOLLOWING
SEVEN:
1.IT WAS REORGANIZED AS A SELF-FINANCED, CORPORATION-
MINDED PROMOTER OF URBAN PROGRAMS.
2.ADDED TO ITS FUND-DISBURSEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION ROLES,
IT BECAME RESPONSIBLE FOR PROJECT COST-RECOVERY.
3.FIDELAC WAS GRANTED WITH THE AUTHORIZATION TO CREATE
TWO REVOLVENT FUNDS FROM RECOVERED PAYMENTS TO EXPAND URBAN
PROGRAMS.
18/ A TYPICAL WORLD BANK PROJECT WOULD PRODUCE PER UNIT 0.53
PERSON/YEAR EMPLOYMENT, AND GENERATE SOME 600 DOLLARS OF WAGE.
KEARE. EVALUATION OF SHELTER PROJECTS. WORLD BANK, 1982).
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4.ITS STAFF WAS RENEWED, ITS STAFF' EDUCED IN 20%, AND A
PROJECT MANAGER POSITION ADDED
5.DEBTS FROM OTHER PUBLIC ORGANISMS WERE ASSURED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO BE RESOLVED
6.OVERALL RESPONSABILITY FOR THE WORLD BANK SHELTER
PROJECTS (INCLUDED COMMUNITY CENTERS AND SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT
PROGRAM) WAS TO BE DELEGATED FROM SAHOP TO FIDELAC /20.
7.FIDELALC WAS ASSIGNED THE UNIQUE ROLE OF OVERALL URBAN
DEVELOPMENT AND PROVISION OF URBAN SERVICES FOR THE AREA TO BE
THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF LAZARO CARDENAS IN YEAR 2000 /21.
UNDOUBTELY THE WORLD BANK PROJECT WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN THE
STRENGHTENING AND EXPANSION OF ROLE THAT FIDELAC PLAYED IN THE
LARGE URBAN AREAS DURING THE FOLLOWING 4 YEARS. AT PRESENT,
HOWEVER, DUE TO INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS /22,THIS ROLE
SEEMS TO BE DIMINISHING AND WEAKENING RAPIDLY.
19/ THE DEFICIENCIES WERE IN RESPECT TO MANAGERIAL PROCEDURES
AND FINANCIAL RECORD, DUE TO ITS PAST PROVISION OF SUBSIDIZED
CREDIT FOR HOUSING AND TO THE LARGE DEBT FROM SICARTSA; ITS
STAFF WAS AT LEAST 20% EXTRA THAN NEEDED (WORLD BANK PROJECT
REPORT p.3 3 )
20/ THIS COINCIDED WITH THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM OF
THE NEW FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION 1976-82, UNDER WHICH ALL PUBLIC
AGENCIES WERE REORGANIZED UNDER SECTORIAL LINES. IT WAS ALSO
INCLUDED, AFTER THE PLANNED LAND EXPROPRIATION, EXPANSION OF
ITS PROGRAMS TO THE WHOLE MICROREGION.
21/ BOTH BECAUSE THE WORLD BANK PROJECT AND FOR THE 1977
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM.
22/ INTERNALLY IS ITS DEFICIENT COST RECOVERY, AND CONCURRENTLY
ITS LACK OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO EXPAND ITS PROGRAMS.
EXTERNALLY, THE PRESENCE OF NEW INSTITUTIONS, DOMINATING ON
CONCERNS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT WITH LITTLE REGARDS TO
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE.
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AT THE LEVEL OF THE PROVISION OF HOUSING AND BASIC
SERVICES, THE AGENCY HAS IMPLEMENTED TWO INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS: A
CATCHMENT AREA, AND A PROGRESSIVE URBANIZATION PROJECT /23;
THESE TWO ARETHE ALMOST SOLELY ACTIONS TO COUNTERACT THE NEW
BANK STATE SCHEMES THAT PROVIDE CORE HOUSING EXCLUSIVELY FOR
THE DEMAND AVOBE 3 TMW.
AS A MODEL INSTITUTION IT HAS BEEN PROVIDED ADVISE TO
OTHER THREE FIDEICOMISOS (URBAN DEVELOPMENT TRUSTS) IN THE
COUNTRY /24.
NOTWITHSTANDING, INTERNALLY THE QUALITY OF ITS STAFF AND ITS
OPERATION (SPECIALLY THE STATISTICAL AND SURVEY FUNCTIONS) HAS
BEEN DIMINISHING /25. MORE RECENTLY ITS SCOPE AND STAFF SIZE
SEEMS TO BE SHRINKING /26.
IN SUMMARY, THE WORLD BANK LOAN WAS A TEMPORARY
INJECTION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES THAHT GAVE FIDELAC LEVERAGE
THAT IS VANISHING RAPIDLY ONE AND A HALF YEARS AFTER PROJECT
TERMINATION.
24/ THESE ARE THE THREE OTHER PORTS BEING DEVELOPED DURING THE
PAST ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL PORTS
PROGRAM.
25/ BECAUSE LOW WAGES -ACTUALLY THE LOWEST OF ANY PUBLIC
AGENCY IN THE REGION- AND FOR UNSATISFIED DEMANDS TO CREATE AN
EMPLOYEES UNION, AROUND 1982 MANY OF THE STAFF THAT HAD BEEN
WORKING IN THE WORLD BANK SHELTER PROJECTS LEFT THE
INSTITUTION. PARALLELING THIS MOVEMENT, THE SOCIAL DEPARTMENT
WAS CHANGED FROM ITS FRONT SITUATION PLACE TO A MUCH LESS
IMPORTANT LOCATION WITHIN THE HEADQUARTER BUILDING.
CONCOMITANTLY, SPECIALLY AFTER THE DISMANTELING OF U.P.E.,
THE QUALITY OF RESEARCH AND SURVEYING DETERIORATED.
POLICY OF INSTITUTIONALITY IN GUACAMAYAS.
26/ IN LATE 1984 THE REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL HAS BEEN QUITE
NOTICEABLE. ALSO THE TERMINATION OF THE BUILDING MATERIALS
LOANS PROGRAM ARE BOTH SYMPTOMS OF ITS CRISIS.
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ITS CHIEF ACHIEVEMENTS, HOWEVER WERE THE PROVISION OF BASIC
URBAN SERVICES TO LOW-INCOME GROUPS, THE INTRODUCTION OF SOME
3000 PLOTS TO THE LAND MARKET , THE SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH
THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE PROGRAM, AND THE ENACMENT OF A
LOW INCOME HOUSING POLICY./27
7. BROADER IMPACTS ON NATIONAL URBAN HOUSING POLICIES AND
ON URBAN AREAS
A.ON COMMUNITY SELF-AWARENESS
THE CREATION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMITTEES, WAS CONCEIVED
AS A DEVISE TO CONTROL THE PROJECT PARTICIPANTS, /28 IT BECAME
INSTEAD AN INSTRUMENT FOR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIC AWARENESS. SOME OF THESE COMMITTEES ARE
THE ONES THAT ARE NOW OPPOSSED TO FIDELAC MEASURES TO ENFORCE
COST RECOVERY, ALTHOUGH RECENTLY IT SEEMS THIS IS BEGINNING TO
CHANGE /29
27/ DR. DANIEL HIERNOUX'S ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
BEHAVIOR OF THE OVERALL GROWTH POLE PROGRAM CONCLUDES THAT THE
LACK OF EFFICIENCY AND THE EXCESSIVE WASTE OF RESOURCES ARE
INTENTIONAL. IN HIS ANALYSIS HE SEES THE STRATEGY OF FIDELAC TO
CREATE THE NEIGHBORHOOD COMMITTEES AS A MEANS TO CONTROL THE
COMMUNITIES THROUGH COOPTED LEADERS. HE CONCLUDES THAT IN SPITE
OF THE OFICIAL INTENTIONS TO CONTROL COMMITTEES, THEY ARE
BOUND EVENTUALLY TO GET RID OF THE CORRUPTED LEADERS.
28/ IN EARLY 1984, TALKS WITH THE LEADERS OF CERRITO ASKING FOR
THEIR COOPERATION TO ENCOURAGE PAYMENTS -AS A MEANS TO PROVIDE
FIDELAC WITH THE REQUIRED RESOURCES TO FINISH UP THE WORKS-
SEEMED TO BE HAVING SOME SUCCESS.
29/ ALTHOUGH NEITHER OF THESE ACTIONS IS COMPLETELY NEW IN THE
REGION (THE FIRST INDECO PROJECT, AND PLANS FOR CATCHMENTS
AREAS IN 1981 WERE BEING CONSIDERED), BOTH ARE TO BE CONSIDERED
AS RESPONSES TO AN EMERGENCY SITUATION.
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B.ON LABOR TURNOVER AND RESIDENTIAL STABILITY
GUACAMAYAS AS PART OF THE NEW TOWN REGION, WAS ALSO
SUBJECTED TO THE MIGRATIONAL FLUXES DETERMINED BY THE
GENERATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES. ITS ROLE AS PROVIDER OF CHEAP
ACCOMODATION WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN KEEPING WORKERS IN THE
REGION/30.
E. ON PROMOTION OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES
DURING THE PROJECT, FIDELAC BEING THE STRORNGEST PUBLIC
ORGANIZATION IN THE REGION, WAS ABLE TO PROMOTE AND COOPERATE
WITH MANY SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE LOW-
INCOME COMMUNITIES.
D.ON SUPPORT TO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
FIDELAC WAS CREATED FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF
PROVIDING HOUSING AND URBAN SERVICES TO THE PERSONNEL OF
SICARTSA. BECAUSE OF ITS INITIAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS
ON WORK IN GUACAMAYAS, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE AGENCY TO
RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF THE LOWER ECHELON OF STEEL WORKERS LIVING
IN GUACAMAYAS. UNTIL THE WORLD BANK PROGRAM WAS INTRODUCED.
HENCE THE IMPACT ON UPGRADED AREAS BENEFITTED DIRECTLY A VERY
LARGE PROPORTION OF THE SICARTSA WORKERS DEMANDING HOUSING. /31
30/ AFTER PROJECT TERMINATION THERE WAS A NOTABLE REDUCTION IN
THE WORKERS TURNOVER INDEX (INTERVIEW WITH ARQ. VIOLETA CRUZ
TOLEDANO, MARCH 1985)
31/ THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN
GUACAMAYAS BENEFITTED A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE STEEL WORKERS.
ALL NEIGHBORHOOD REPORTED AT LEAST A 30% OF HOUSEHOLDS HOLDING
JOBS IN SICARTSA. ANIBAL PONCE, ONE OF THE TWO NEIGHBORHOODS
MOST BENEFITTED BY THE SELF-HELP PROGRAM, ALONE HAS MORE THAN
HALF SICARSA WORKERS.
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E.ON THE SUPPORT TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT
THROUGH THE DRAWING OF THE GUACAMAYAS MASTER PLAN, AND BY
SUPPORTING THE URBAN PLANNING EFFORTS MADE WITHIN THE REGION,
THE WORLD BANK PROJECT HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON CREATING A MORE
RATIONAL AND ORDERLY URBAN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL PATTERN IN
THE MAIN URBAN AREAS. ALSO THE HOUSING STOCK OF THE REGION WAS
INCREASED BY MORE THAN 1500 NEW HOUSING.
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